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Abstract
Critical infrastructures are based on complex systems that provide vital services to the nation.
The complexities of the interconnected networks, each managed by individual organisations,
if not properly secured, could offer vulnerabilities that threaten other organisations’ systems
that depend on their services. This thesis argues that the awareness of interdependencies
among critical sectors needs to be increased. Managing and securing critical infrastructure is
not isolated responsibility of a government or an individual organisation. There is a need for
a strong collaboration among critical service providers of public and private organisations
in protecting critical information infrastructure. Cyber exercises have been incorporated
in national cyber security strategies as part of critical information infrastructure protection.
However, organising a cyber exercise involved multi sectors is challenging due to the di-
versity of participants’ background, working environments and incidents response policies.
How well the lessons learned from the cyber exercise and how it can be transferred to the
participating organisations is still a looming question. In order to understand the implications
of cyber exercises on what participants have learnt and how it benefits participants’ organi-
sation, a Cyber Exercise Post Assessment (CEPA) framework was proposed in this research.
The CEPA framework consists of two parts. The first part aims to investigate the lessons
learnt by participants from a cyber exercise using the four levels of the Kirkpatrick Training
Model to identify their perceptions on reaction, learning, behaviour and results of the exer-
cise. The second part investigates the Organisation Cyber Resilience (OCR) of participating
sectors. The framework was used to study the impact of the cyber exercise called X Maya
in Malaysia. Data collected through interviews with X Maya 5 participants were coded and
categorised based on four levels according to the Kirkpatrick Training Model, while online
surveys distributed to ten Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) sectors partici-
pated in the exercise. The survey used the C-Suite Executive Checklist developed by World
Economic Forum in 2012. To ensure the suitability of the tool used to investigate the OCR,
a reliability test conducted on the survey items showed high internal consistency results. Fi-
nally, individual OCR scores were used to develop the OCR Maturity Model to provide the
organisation cyber resilience perspectives of the ten CNII sectors.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures provide vital services that support the stability, functionality and
economy of every country. Critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical
power systems, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems and emergency
services. These sectors are categorised differently based on a country’s definition of critical
infrastructures [Cho10]. They are considered critical because their incapacitation or de-
struction would have a debilitating impact on national security and the economic and social
welfare of a nation [Cav07].
As critical infrastructures are built on interconnected networks, systems and applications that
support each other’s interest and interact at different levels; failure in one infrastructure may
impact the functionality of other infrastructures [SDPS09].The current trends, promoting to
connect anything to the Internet, has encouraged a growing number of vulnerabilities and
cyber threats across industries and societies [Wig14].
Cyber threats are become more sophisticated in nature and difficult to trace. As a result,
many cyber threats are difficult to identify by a single organisation [ZW12]. A collaborative
information sharing on cyber threats and cooperation on cyber crisis emergency among multi
organisations and sectors are necessary. As major critical services are owned by private
organisation, protecting critical services and goods need a strong commitment by private
and public collaboration [Nic06].
One initiative as highlighted in [LBSDG13], was through joint public and private of multi
sectors in a collaborative cyber exercise as included in the national cyber security strategies
in many countries. Cyber exercises as suggested by [GR10] and [PT12], are to test the pre-
paredness of public and privates organisations against cyber threats that potentially affect
organisations services. It also promotes awareness of interdependencies and vulnerabilities
1.2. Background of the Research 2
among critical infrastructure organisations [WDG04]. As reported in [PT12], cyber exer-
cises have increased in popularity. They have been conducted in Europe, UK, US, and Asia
to test community preparedness on cyber crises that could potentially affect the critical in-
formation infrastructure and to boost resilience among critical infrastructure organisations
[GR10],[PT12].
This chapter provides the background that motivates the research and is divided into nine
sections. Section 1.2 introduces the background of the research and Section 1.3 discusses
the research problems. Section 1.4 defines the thesis statement that drives this research.
Section 1.5 addresses five research questions, and Section 1.6 highlights seven objectives in
this research. Section 1.7 emphasises the contributions of the thesis and Section 1.8 shares
publication related to this research. Section 1.9 summaries the organisation of this thesis by
providing an outline of each chapter.
1.2 Background of the Research
Critical infrastructures, defined by the USA Patriot Act as in [Bal04] consist of two terms
; ’critical’ implies the dependence of a nation or the public on physical and information
assets to the extent that loss, lack or inefficiency of any would have a serious impact. The
word ’infrastructure’ denotes the basic structures and facilities necessary for a country or
an organisation to function efficiently. Various threats, from natural and man-made disaster,
system failures and cyber attacks could affect critical infrastructure services.
As nations and critical infrastructures became more reliant on computer networks for their
operation, as suggested in [Lui12], vulnerabilities in the information infrastructure systems
could be exploited to penetrate unsecured computer networks, disrupt, or even shut down
critical functions. Moreover, cyberterrorism as highlighted in [Lew03], is the use of com-
puter network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, trans-
portation, government operations), or to force or intimidate a government or civilian popu-
lation. An example of cyberterrorism were Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on
Estonia’s information technology infrastructure over a prolonged period from April to May in
2007 [COT13]. The attacks targeted banking, media, police websites and paralyzing internet
communication with attacks coming from 128 sources outside Estonia [COT13]. Severe eco-
nomic losses were experienced due to the inability to perform online transactions [Her11].
The attacks occurred through the use of globally dispersed and virtually unattributable bot-
nets of ’zombie’ computers [Her11]. The hackers hijacked computers including many home
PCs in places like Egypt, Russia, and the United States and used them in a ’swarming’ DDoS
strategy [Her11]. These uncovered the vulnerability of critical information infrastructures
(CII) of all nations [Cav07].
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The US National Research Council reported in [Wil03], the potential for attacks on control
systems that has garnered serious attention around the globe. Also described in [NWD+12],
that the most commonly discussed were cyber threats on industrial control systems includ-
ing supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and distributed control (DC)
systems. The SCADA systems are normally used to remotely monitor data of a large ge-
ographical area and to transmit commands to remote assets such as valves and switches
[Wei10]. These control systems can be found in water utilities, oil pipelines, nuclear plants,
chemical plants and etcetera [MR12]. In previous practices, SCADA Systems are often iso-
lated systems that were not connected or accessed by other networks. But, due to the need
for information sharing between isolated SCADA systems are now often connected as net-
works. This opens up SCADA infrastructure of security and vulnerabilities as described in
[FF05],[Wei10] and [MR12] .
In June 2010, a cyber worm dubbed ’Stuxnet’ had struck the Iranian nuclear facility at
Natanz indicated a cyber attack targeting critical infrastructure [sym10]. Stuxnet altered
the frequency of the electrical current to the drives causing them to switch between high
and low speeds for which they were not designed [FR11]. This switching caused the cen-
trifuges to fail at a higher than normal rate [FR11]. According to [sym10], Stuxnet entered
the computers in two ways, either through email attachments or downloaded from malicious
websites . It allowed attackers to compromise systems by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities
in client-side software [FR11]. Once executed, the Trojan installed a backdoor that allowed
an attacker to control the computer and perform a variety of compromising actions [NF11].
These included modifying, executing and deleting files; executing malicious files; and, most
importantly, gaining access to the compromised corporation’s network, which then opened
up the target to additional attacks [sym10]. Stuxnet has infected over 60,000 computers
in Iran; other countries affected include India, Indonesia, China, Azerbaijan, South Korea,
Malaysia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland and Germany [FR11].
Obviously, the impact of sophisticated cyber attacks have changed the landscape of cyber-
crime, enormously increasing the need for a cross-boundary collaboration [Hys07]. As sug-
gested in [PT12], cyber exercise is an important tool to assess the preparedness of a com-
munity against cyber crises, technology failures, and critical information infrastructure inci-
dents. This research addresses the importance of collborative cyber exercises involved multi
sectors and its contributions to national critical information infrastructure protection.
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1.3 Research Problem Statements
There has been a long history of conducting exercises to prepare for natural disasters and
other physical hazards [GR10]. However, cyber exercises did not gain significant attention
until 2003, due to the focus of literature in cyber exercises are more on academic exercise,
with limited resources on cyber exercise involved a collaboration of multi sectors organi-
sations. This research investigates cyber exercise categories of academic, competitive and
cyber crisis exercises involved multi sectors. Chapter 2 provides literature review of types,
purposes and research of these exercises.
Critical infrastructures were often unprepared for medium and longer term disruption to their
communications systems [PT12]. One reason highlighted in [The13], is the difficulties of
senior management finding the time required by emergency planning groups, because organ-
isations could not easily commit resources to the activities that have a high social value, but
no significant value in financial contributions in return. Chapter 7 investigates the importance
of senior management commitment to support the cyber risk that contribute to organisation
cyber resilience using C-Suite Executive Checklist developed by World Economic Forum
in 2012.Through the participants’ perceptions, this research also investigates the involve-
ment of senior management in nurturing cyber resilience in their organisations. Chapter 7
addresses the evaluation of organisations’ cyber resilience across ten critical national infor-
mation infrastructure (CNII) sectors.
In addressing this issue, government create incentives that motivate the coordination and
collaboration of multiple industries in a national response program. It is important to have
a national response program involving emergency coordination between the government,
businesses, citizens, and other nations during a cyber-attack incident [WDG04]. The na-
tional program can provide centralized coordination especially when dealing with critical
information infrastructure [Amo12].The program should be rehearsed regularly to prepare
the national response. Chapter 3 address the importance of cyber exercise as national cyber
security strategy implementations in some countries like the UK, US,Europe and Malaysia.
More importantly, organising cyber exercises that involved multi sectors are challenging due
to the diversity of participants’ background, working environments and incidents response
policies [Mar09]. How well lessons are learned from cyber exercises and how they can be
transferred to the participating organisations remains a looming question [MFS+11]. Some
lesson learned from cyber exercises in other countries are also discussed in Chapter 3. Fur-
thermore, a cyber exercise post assessment framework was used to study the participants’
lesson learned was addressed in Chapter 4. Subsequently, research has been conducted to
investigate the importance of cyber exercises involved multi sectors and how they benefit
their organisations.The details of these studies are discussed in Chapters 5,6 and 7.
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1.4 Thesis Statement
This thesis investigates the importance of cyber crisis exercises that involved multi sectors
under Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) in two directions as depicted in
Figure 1.1. Both studies used data collected from a cyber crisis exercise called X Maya in
Malaysia:
First, it investigates how a cyber crisis exercise can benefit participants’ individual learning
and how their experience in the exercises is transferred to their organisation. The investi-
gation of participants’ learning uses a post assessment framework to gather and categorise
interview data from X Maya participants.
Second, it investigates how the C-Suite Executives checklist can be used to assess Organi-
sation Cyber Resilience (OCR) of CNII participated sectors. The C-Suite Executives survey
was developed by the World Economic Forum in 2012. It focuses on three main compo-
nents: governance, programme and network. The average score across these components
contributes to the Organisation Cyber Resilience (OCR) of different sectors. Finally, based
on the individual score, the Organisation Cyber Resilience Maturity Model (OCRMM) was
developed for the ten CNII sectors involved with X Maya.
Figure 1.1: Research Direction
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1.5 Research Questions
This research was conducted to provide answers for research questions (RQs) as addressed
below:
1. RQ1: What are cyber exercises categories?
2. RQ2: How do cyber exercises contribute to critical information infrastructure protec-
tion?
3. RQ3: How can cyber exercises be beneficial to participants and their organisations?
4. RQ4: What are the impacts of cyber exercises to participants and their organisations?
5. RQ5: How to assess organisation cyber resilience of CNII sectors involved in cyber
exercises?
1.6 Research Objectives
This study is focusing on cyber crisis exercises involved a collaboration of ten critical na-
tional information infrastructure (CNII) sectors that test a national cyber security policies and
procedures. The exercise called X Maya conducted as annual cyber exercise in Malaysia. It
is an important tool to boost cyber resilience in CNII sectors. The study aims to support
these cyber exercises through:
1. To gather and classify information related to cyber exercises.
2. To identify cyber exercises categories from existing cyber exercises literature.
3. To identify cyber exercises implementations and contributions to critical information
infrastructure protection.
4. To provide a framework for a cyber exercise post assessment.
5. To investigate the implications of X Maya to participants and their organisation.
6. To investigate the usability of organisation cyber resilience survey used to assess or-
ganisation cyber resilience of participated sectors in X Maya.
7. To assess organisation cyber resilience of CNII sectors involved in cyber exercises in
Malaysia.
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1.7 Thesis Contributions
1. A cyber exercises post assessment framework
This research used a post assessment framework that adopts the four-level Kirkpatrick
training model to collect, code and categorise the participants interview data in order
to investigate the learning outcome from four levels: reaction about the exercise, the
learning skills experienced during the exercise, the behaviour developed during the
exercise, and the result, i.e., how the benefits are transferred to their organisation. At
the organisational level, the framework provides an assessment of organisation cyber
resilience of CNII sectors involved in the exercise.
2. Reliability test on C-Suite Executive survey
The study has validated the internal consistency of the C-Suite Executive survey. The
reliability test results on C-Suite Executive items survey showed a very high internal
consistency of Cronbach alpha values of 0.976, which supports the use of survey for
organisation cyber resilience assessment.
3. Organisation cyber resilience assessment to critical sectors
This work provides an assessment of organisation cyber resilience for ten critical infor-
mation infrastructures sectors and developed an organisation cyber resilience maturity
model for the sectors.
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis
This research is structured into eight chapters, as shown in Figure 1.2; it provides the con-
nection between chapters with the research questions and research objectives. An overview
of each chapter is as follows:
Chapter 2 - Literature Review on Cyber Exercises: This chapter provides background lit-
erature on cyber exercise categories. It focuses on three types cyber exercises of academic,
competitive and collaborative cyber exercises. The scope, purposes and research directions
of these exercises are covered in this chapter.
Chapter 3 - Cyber Exercise Contributions to Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
(CIIP): This chapter introduces the definitions of critical infrastructure and critical informa-
tion infrastructures. It discusses issues in protecting CII, including emerging cyber threats
targeting critical information infrastructure. This chapter also highlights the importance of
cyber exercises through the incorporation of cyber exercises in Critical Information Infras-
tructure Protection (CIIP) and National Cyber Security Strategies. It also describes cyber
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exercises in several countries. Finally, it introduces our cyber exercise case study, X Maya
in Malaysia.
Chapter 4 - A Cyber Exercise Post Assessment Framework: This chapter explains the two
main components of the research framework. The first component related to participants
assessment, which adopted the four-level Kirkpatrick training model to assess the implication
of the cyber exercise to participants learning effectiveness on four levels: their reaction,
learning, behaviour and results from their involvement in the cyber exercise.
Chapter 5 - An Investigation into the Impacts of X Maya Cyber Exercise in Malaysia. This
chapter investigates the first part of the post assessment framework. It elaborates the im-
plications of cyber exercise for participants using the four-level Kirkpatrick training model.
This study shows of how the benefits of the cyber exercises can be transferred to participants
working organisations. This chapter presents a qualitative study conducted with X Maya
participants in Malaysia.
Chapter 6 - A Preliminary Investigation on Organisation Resilience: This chapter elaborates
a study on organisation resilience using organisation resilience benchmark tool developed by
the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. This chapter provides the investigation on the
correlation between scenario based exercise and organisation resilience of CII sectors
Chapter 7 - An Investigation on Organisation Cyber Resilience of Ten CNII Sectors in
Malaysia: This chapter presents a study conducted to assess the cyber resilience of CNII
sectors involved in collaborative cyber exercises in Malaysia. It provides a detailed data
analysis of cyber resilience and the development of an organisational cyber resilience matu-
rity model for CNII sectors.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion and Future Work: The final chapter of the thesis summarises the
findings of the studies, discussing limitations and proposing new directions for future re-
search in this area.
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Figure 1.2: Map of the Thesis
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Chapter 2
Literature Review on Cyber
Exercises
2.1 Introduction
As described in [GR10], a cyber exercise as an exercise whose objectives primarily focus
on protecting, defending and recovering cyber assets and operations from a cyber attack
or incident . Many educational institutions have used and implemented cyber exercises as
part of their computer science curriculum as shared in [SRB+04], [LC05],[MF06],[Gri04],
[DJRR03],[SFV13],[HRD+05] and [BWS+14]. In addition, some have organised compe-
titions with commercial partners as capstone exercises, ad hoc hack-a-thons, and scenario-
driven competitions [HRD+05]. [RNS13] claimed that cyber security exercises have become
powerful simulating and planning tools for training, competition, and emergency scenarios.
As suggested in [AGLL09] that academic and competitive (CDX) cyber exercises designs
provide a collaborative environment for sharing lesson learned and develop best practices
across academies. While in [SFV13] describes a cross institutional collaboration in design-
ing and developing hands-on practical to discover vulnerabilities in SCADA systems.
With the increasing of cross border cyber incidents and attacks, cyber crisis cross border
cooperation efforts are continuously developing. Countries like the US, the UK, Australia
and Japan have included collaborative cyber exercises in their cyber security strategy. Based
on cyber exercises survey findings in [PT12], 84 countries worldwide have participated in
multinational exercises. A total of 22 European countries were found to have conducted
national cyber exercises . Existing literature on cyber exercises can be categorised into three
types: academic, competitive, and collaborative.
This chapter aims to answer the first research question (RQ1),’What are cyber exercises
categories?’. It was divided into eight sections. Section 2.2 shares a review of academic
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cyber exercises. Section 2.3 provides a review of competitive cyber exercises. Section 2.4
provides information on the use of collaborative cyber exercises in other area of research.
Section 2.5 offers a review of collaborative cyber exercises. Finally, Section 2.6 gives a
summary of research directions of cyber exercises. Section 2.7 emphasises the contribution
of this chapter. Section 2.8 summarises the chapter.
2.2 Academic Cyber Exercises
Most literature on academic cyber exercises focuses on individual learning through formal
education. Four main research topics highlighted in this category are as follows:
1. Curriculum design and development for IT, computer security education, or informa-
tion assurance (IA) training that offers an active learning environment through cyber
exercises. These involve several types and models of curriculum designs as shared in
[SRB+04], [LC05],[MF06],[Gri04],[DJRR03],[SFV13],[HRD+05] and [BWS+14].
2. Development and assessment of the essential security skills needed in an information
security career as described in [AGLL09],[DJHN09],[MF06], [DJRR03], [SFV13],[Gri04]
and [ADMW10] .
3. Configuration of cyber exercise labs or environments for student learning and assess-
ment as explained in [SRB+04],[SFV13],[BWS+14],[LC05],[WM12] and [CPH13].
4. Development of automation tools for scenario development, lab configuration, and
student evaluation elaborated in [WM12].
2.2.1 Information Security Curriculum Development
Cyber security exercises provide professionals in academia and training industries with a
tool to evaluate and assess the ability of students to apply the concepts and skills covered
in their course curriculum [DJHN09]. Such exercises have increasingly been adopted as
capstone exercises for training and education programs [DJHN09]. According to [BWS+14],
to integrate a cybersecurity exercise into the curriculum, required some works to create and
set up new hands-on exercises that can easily be adapted to any specific course. Therefore,
the integration of hands-on cyber exercises into course curriculum involves several types and
models of curriculum design for colleges and universities as follows:
Hands on practice via cyber exercises in the classroom. [SRB+04] designed and delivered
four new hands-on educational exercises in information assurance (IA) for undergraduate and
graduate curricula at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). The exercise
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topics comprised 1) protection against buffer overflow attacks, 2) vulnerability scanning, 3)
password security and policy, and 4) insecurity of the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) pro-
tocol. Each exercise included background material, problem-solving activities, discussion
questions, and supporting software and instructions for the instructor. For each exercise, the
student carries out structured activities using a laptop from a mobile cart that can be rolled
into any classroom. The flexibility of the modular exercises enable students to practice it in
class periods of various lengths of time. It is also suitable for students at various experience
levels.
Practice hands on cyber exercise in lab. [LC05] developed a syllabus for information se-
curity courses that contained a lab component. Lab activities required for students included
: 1) writing port scanners, 2) writing a propagating virus, 3) writing an exploit program, 4)
creating a shell to gain root privilege, 5) packet sniffing, 6) injecting a packet, 7) a war games
competition, and 8) attack teams hacking a secure network. In addition, [MF06] discussed
the IT security curriculum offered at RWTH Aachen University for a two-semester university
degree : The first semester had three elements: (i) a lecture on basic concepts of computer
security, (ii) a lecture on computer forensics, and (iii) a research seminar on current trends in
computer security where students give a presentation. The second semester consisted of (i)
a lecture on security failures in Web applications and (ii) an extensive practical lab in which
students apply offensive and defensive techniques within an isolated test network.
Cyber exercise in organisation information security management courses. Most curriculum
designs focused on the development of technical skills but lacked a focus on organisational
security management. However, [Gri04] described the development and implementation of a
scenario-based information security management exercise as the capstone project in a grad-
uate business information security course at Texas A & M University.The scenario-based
exercise provides students hands on experience in the planning, analysis, design, imple-
mentation, and maintenance of an organizations information security program. Successful
completion of this course is a requirement for students who wish to obtain a certificate in the
Management of Information Security [Gri04].
Cyber defence exercise (CDX) in military colleges. [DJRR03] and [AGLL09] describe the
use of Cyber Defense Exercises (CDX) at a military college. Cyber Defense Exercises pro-
vide two significant benefits to the cadets at West Point: 1) education and 2) leadership
development. Students were assessed on their ability to maintain network services while
detecting and responding to network security intrusions and compromises.
Use of cyber exercise for experiential learning in engineering programs. The use of cyber
exercises was not been integrated only in computer security curriculums. It has also gained
significant attention in engineering programs. In Australia, educators from two universities
have recognised the cultural issues of engineers with SCADA systems engineering skills
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and IT personnel in network security with an IT background [SFV13]. In 2013, [SFV13]
shared their experience designing a learning approach to help students to bridge this gap.
The learning was developed to gain theoretical knowledge of SCADA systems vulnerabil-
ities to cyber-attacks via experiential learning and acquire practical skills through actively
participating in hands-on exercises.
Cyber exercises as a recruitment tool for Computing Science students. [ADMW10] de-
scribed the use of cyber exercises as a computer science student recruiting tool. They used
the exercise to harnesses student interest by providing an eight-hour cyber training and com-
petition framework designed to be attended by computer science candidates .
2.2.2 Information Security Skill Development
Hands-on cyber exercises have been integrated with the Information Security curriculum as
discussed in Section 2.4.1 to provide the four main foundational skill sets of Information
Assurance:
Administrator Skills. Administrator skills are important to provide students with technical
and practical knowledge in configuring networks, servers, databases, and application to cre-
ate information assets and systems for the business environment and operations as mentioned
in [FPB10] and [AD+06]. Moreover, [BWS+14] suggested the development of a security
mind-set with analytical skill. The necessary analytical skill as described in [BWS+14] is
the ability to think about how systems can fail and be made to fail in different ways. These
skill enables people to understand the reasons for these relationships, and the ability to draw
meaningful conclusions or inferences [BWS+14].
Defensive Skills. Defensive security skills are needed for information security students to
understand how to configure and manage various types of security equipment [HRD+05].
Students must know how to use tools and techniques to monitor normal and abnormal ac-
tivities performed in the business environment and address any vulnerability that can risk
the operations and functionality of the business [AD+06]. This is a continuous process that
involves 1) creating security policies, 2) implementing security measures, 3) monitoring the
security state, and 4) fixing any vulnerability found.
Offensive Skills. Offensive skills synonymous with hacking [LC05]. Student use these skills
to test security measures. These skills are needed to perform penetration tests. Students must
know how to use hackers tools and techniques to find vulnerabilities in systems and business
environments [LC05]. Moreover, [MF06] conducted an experiment to prove that teaching
offensive methods yields better security professionals than teaching defensive techniques
alone.
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Forensic Skills. Forensic skills are the ability to identify the source of threats and their impact
on systems, and to restore systems function as described in [MF06] and [CAB+07].
2.2.2.1 Learning Assessment
Regarding the use of cyber exercises to measure outcomes against security standards, [DJHN09]
explained how measure performances against specific standards. He presented an indexed
matrix to be included in cyber exercises. The index matrix was a cross-referencing between
the exercise objectives and selected standards. This approach can be used as a foundation for
cyber exercise development and as a performance measurement against specific standards
[DJHN09].
2.2.2.2 Lab Environment for Cyber Exercises
Several types of lab or environment settings are used to conduct cyber exercises for learning
and assessment:
Isolated Lab. In 2004, [SRB+04] suggested, to prevent inadvertent damage to other systems,
exercises that involve dangerous programs (e.g., worms, viruses, and attack tools) must be
safely isolated. An isolated lab is extremely beneficial for students to learn how to manage
systems through direct experience by acting as administrators of an actual system. This
includes making mistakes and recovering from them [SRB+04]. Furthermore, such a lab can
provide experience of real computers and network hardware, which students can experiment
with [WM12]. In [SJ03] discussed the Information Warfare Analysis and Research (IWAR)
Laboratory. This is an isolated laboratory with a heterogeneous environment and that has
become a vital part of the IA curriculum at West Point. The lab was designed and developed
by a West Point cadet (student) team. As highlighted in [WM12], the limitation of this lab is
that it can only be accessed on campus, is isolated from all other network, and is expensive
to maintain .
Virtual Lab. In [CPH13] discussed the benefits of virtual labs over physical labs as follows:
1) less time is required to set up the lab, 2) it reduces the cost of licensing software, and 3) it
is easy to use because it is simple to copy a configured virtual machine to the desktops in a
lab. They also shared the design of a virtual lab using the VMwares vSphere platform with
vCloud Director that is used to support the academic needs of more than 400 students .The
authors provided a key set of requirements for setting up a hands-on lab [CPH13] : 1) the
lab must be Internet accessible, 2) the lab must be the same for on- and off-campus students,
3) the lab must be self-contained, 4) the lab must allow self-provisioning, 5) the lab must
perform well, and 6) the lab needs to be easy to use. Even virtual lab offers cost reduction
and ease of maintenance, it is lacking in providing a real organisation environment.
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2.2.2.3 Automation Tool for Cyber Exercises
A number of tools have been developed to manage and organise cyber exercises:
Tele-Lab. [WM12] explained about a Tele-Lab platform that combines a virtual lab with a
Web-based training system that allows remote lab access through the Internet. Such a lab is
suitable for local classes and for self- and distance-learning approaches.
Intelligent Training Exercise Environment (itee). [ETM15] elaborated about an intelligent
training exercise environment (ITEE), a fully automated Cyber Defense Competition plat-
form. The essential features of an ITEE are as follows: 1) automated attacks, 2) automated
scoring with immediate feedback using a scoreboard, and 3) background traffic generation.
The main advantages of the platform are that 1) it provides easy integration into existing cur-
riculum, 2) the platform is highly automated to enable execution with up to 30 teams by one
person using a single server, 3) the platform implements a modular approach called learning
spaces for implementing different competitions and hands-on labs, and 4) the ITEE platform
was successfully tested during a live CDX and has proven useful during several hands-on
classes in the context of a university curriculum.
2.3 Competitive Cyber Exercise
Competitive cyber exercises enhance academic exercises by providing a platform for par-
ticipants to demonstrate their knowledge and skills in controlled environments. The use
of competitive cyber exercises as an active and collaborative learning environment allows
coursework to be tested in real environment [Con06]. Furthermore, topics can be set at
varying degrees of difficulty during hands-on competitions, including [SMR+14] network
design, system administration, cost-benefit analysis, forensics, and leadership [AGLL09].
[AGLL09] argued that CDX should be part of any computer security curriculum to strengthen
and enhance classroom learning. The Cyber Defence Exercise or CDX was an early com-
puter security competition designed to foster education and awareness among future military
leaders [AGLL09].The exercise highlighted the important role of information assurance (IA)
in protecting the nations critical information systems [SRS+02]. CDX challenges teams of
students from each academy to design, build, and successfully defend a real-world computer
network against simulated intrusions.
Most competition participants demonstrated more enthusiasm about using their skills in a
cyber environment. Competitive cyber exercises are purposely used to channel this enthu-
siasm and interest [HRD+05]. As addressed in [AGLL09], many students have commented
that they have learned more in the CDX preparation and execution rather than the rest of
their four years as a computer science student.
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[Con05] highlighted that the purpose of competitions are to provide an educational environ-
ment for students to critically examine their abilities. The assessment is different from a
standard examination because : 1) it is team based, which allows students to work in teams
and capitalise on different team members strengths and 2) it is conducted over three days
with continuous feedback to the teams, enabling them to make changes in their approaches
and activities in response to the measured effectiveness. The overall result of the exercise
was that the teams, students, and faculty members achievements in the competition [Con05].
Most literature on competitive cyber exercises focuses on six main topics as follows:
1. Types of competitive cyber exercises described in [HRD+05],[BKGT11] and [CAB+07].
2. Scale of competitive based cyber exercises addressed in [HRD+05].
3. Guidelines to organise a competitive cyber exercises also provided in[DJRR03], [FPB10],
[PF09] and [Mat07]
4. Competition Infrastructure was shared in [CPH13].
5. Assessment rules and methodologies involved in the competitive cyber exercise pro-
vided in [WM08] and [CAB+07].
6. Development of automation tools for participants’ performance evaluation were shared
in [SMR+14] and [CRC+12].
2.3.1 Benefits of Competitive Cyber Exercise
Competitive cyber exercises enhance academic exercises by providing students with a plat-
form to practise their knowledge and skills in a real environment. Several benefits of the
Cyber Defense Competition (CDX) over academic cyber exercises:
CDX provides an integrated environment. One of the major problems of an information secu-
rity program is that knowledge and skill sets are learned through different classes in separate
modules. As suggested in [BKGT11], the CDX competition provides knowledge integration,
which is the key to successful college learning. CDX allows students to demonstrate their
understanding and skills with respect to network security at a detailed level in an integrated
environment .
CDX apply classroom learning to a real-world situation. Subjects that are difficult to ad-
dress in the classroom can be dealt with in the competition environment, which mimics a
real organisation’s work setting [BKGT11]. Besides offering curriculum-based lessons, the
exercise also offers lessons in teamwork, leadership, and coordination, as participants must
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deal with change, and work with other students or faculty from other departments as men-
tioned in [HRD+05] and [AGLL09].
Literature on competitive cyber exercise topics share the experience of organising and par-
ticipating in school competitions, the Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (CDCC), or
Capture the Flag (CTF) exercises:
School Competition Cyber Exercise. Schools were assessed on their students ability to main-
tain network services while detecting and responding to network security intrusions and
compromises as described in [AGLL09] and [DJRR03].
Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (CDCC). In a CDCC setup, each student team is as-
signed to a network that must be defended and secured [HRD+05],[Con06]. As described
in [CAB+07], at the beginning of the exercise, student teams are given a grace period of a
few hours before the competition to take an inventory of their networks. They also try to
secure and patch all the equipment. After the grace period ends, outsider attackers start to
attack their networks. This red team tries to penetrate the network. Attacks are run against
all of the teams, and if successful, further attacks are leveraged against the penetrated sys-
tems [CAB+07]. There is also a white team of industry professionals who act as judges and
monitor the network to verify that services are operational. They score the teams on the com-
pletion of business tasks throughout the competition. Scoring is based on keeping required
services up, preventing security breaches, and completing business objectives throughout
the two days of competition. These tasks contribute to the overall scores of the teams. As
described by [CMZ10] and [BKGT11], the team with the most points wins and goes on to
compete at the US National CDCC .
Capture the Flag (CTF). [CSM08] described CTF cyber exercise competitions, which in-
volve both offensive and defensive components. Students are assigned to a machine or net-
work that they must defend against attack while simultaneously attempting to hack into their
competitors networks. Points are awarded for successfully breaking into a machine as well
as successful defence [CAB+07]. Students use existing security toolkits to assess a scenario
and gain points by obtaining flags. These flags require varying degrees of skill and test stu-
dents knowledge [FPB10] . However, unlike other events, it requires a very diverse skill
set, has a strong focus of teamwork, and emphasise the ability to convey results as well as
achieve specific technical objectives as referred in [CSM08] and [DEC+11].
[CAB+07] compared the International Capture the Flag Competition (iCTF) and the National
Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (CCDC). The International Capture the Flag Com-
petition (iCTF) conducted in 2005 involved 21 teams from universities in North America,
Europe, South America, and Australia. While the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Com-
petition was organized by the University of Texas at San Antonio with major sponsorship
from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Four regional cyber game competitions
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were held across the U.S. included Southeast, Mid Atlantic, Southwest and Midwest. Re-
gional champions were held and a team was jointly fielded by five U.S. military academies.
The comparison was based on the competition approach, competition scale, complexity of
the competition environment, rules of the competition, and scoring mechanism as listed in
Table2.1 .
Table 2.1 Comparison Summary between Capture the Flag (CTF) and Collegiate Cyber
Defense Competition (CDCC) [CAB+07]
iCTF05 CCDC06
Defense vs.
Offense
Offense (without red team) Defense
Content Focused on detective work Emphasizes task completion with
some considerations given to detec-
tive work and problem solving
Scale International, fully distributed Competitions conducted in a single
location with the organizers con-
trolling all the machines
Complexity
of Environ-
ment
Consisted of a single Linux image
loaded on VMware for each site.
All sites are connected via a virtual
network
Multiple machines and network de-
vices with a mixture of operating
systems
Rules All competition network traffic had
to be on the competition network.
Teams were allowed to have exter-
nal Internet access without monitor-
ing
All traffic had to go through com-
petition network. No external me-
dia allowed. Only freeware or ap-
proved commercial software was
allowed.
Scoring Based on service availability, flags
captured, and original exploits. Ex-
cept for evaluating original exploits,
scoring is automated
Equally based on task completion,
service availability, and red team
assessments. A combination of
manual and automated scoring.
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2.3.1.1 Organising Cyber Exercises
In organising a competitive cyber exercise, there are four essential components: the compe-
tition approach, competition environment and scale, performance assessment in the compe-
tition, and competition designs steps that should be considered:
Competition approach. Competition designs could be based on several approaches as sug-
gested by [SH12] and [FPB10] 1) defence oriented, 2) offense oriented, or 3) mixed ap-
proaches. A defence-oriented setup will involve one or several teams that defend systems
against attacks.
An offense-oriented setup will involve one or several teams carrying out attacks. Defensive
teams are often called blue teams and offensive teams are often called red teams. Mixed
approaches involve both active blue teams and active red teams, where the red teams attack
the blue teams’ systems or all teams attack each other [FPB10]. Two other types of actors
are frequently involved in competitions: members of green and white teams [FPB10]. The
green team manages the environment and ensures that the systems used in the competition
operate as intended and that all actors have proper access to the environment [SH12]. The
white team referees the competition and manages the incentives for the red and blue teams
by creating the competition rules and scenario [PF09].
Furthermore, the configuration of the competition can be based on three generic models as
proposed in [HRD+05] : 1) participants receive only requirements and must develop their
own systems or networks; 2) participants receive pre-configured systems and services that
they must maintain and protect; or 3) participants receive specific systems and a network
configuration and must protect them.
Competition environment and scale. The competition environment normally managed by the
green team includes [SH12]: the network topology, operating systems, application software,
configuration, and user account. As in academic cyber exercises, the competition cyber ex-
ercise environment can also employ virtual, heterogeneous, isolated, or distributed network
configurations. For the competition scale as stated in [CAB+07], that small-scale cyber
exercises are often used as capstone exercises for projects, while large-scale exercises are
organised in a distributed way.
Performance assessment in the competition. During the competition, students are strictly
limited in both time and the actions they can perform during the exercise [HRD+05]. The
competition should objectively assess the participants’ skill set within the competition pe-
riod. The participants must be assessed after completion, specifically with regard to know-
ing where and when attacks occurred, whether attacks were identified, and how they were
addressed [HRD+05]. Thus, a scoring system must be designed to measure the students’
performance during the competition.
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The scoring mechanism must be either manual or automatic to count participants’ points.
As suggested in [CAB+07]1) task completion, 2) the availability of services, and 3) pene-
tration assessment as three categories to score cyber game participants. The availability of
services measures participants’ ability to keep required services (e.g., a Web server or mail
server) running [CAB+07]. Two types of penetration assessment measures are required: 1)
participants’ ability to prevent attackers from accessing the computer system and 2) ability
to design new ways to gain access to others’ computer systems [CAB+07].
In [WM08] suggested another scoring system in which the winner will be determined by the
largest number of points earned during the competition. A team may accumulate up to 6,000
points from the various measurements of availability and assessment of performance during
injections. The accumulated point values are set as follows:
1. Functional services (based on periodic polling interval of core services): 2000 points
2. Successful completion of assigned business tasks: Points are awarded based on com-
plete or partial fulfilment of the assigned task and will vary by task with an aggregate
total of 2000 points
3. Red team assessments: Red teams will rate the relative security of the student teams
with a possible total of 2,000 points. The red team will have access to the service
availability information to assist them in the determination of their scores.
Competition Design Steps. Competition design involves seven steps as suggested in [FPB10]
and [PF09] involved: 1) determine the objectives of the exercise, 2) select the competition
approach based on the competition objectives, 3) develop the topology or setting for software
and hardware, 4) build a scenario for the exercise, 5) set up rules for the competition, 6)
provide metrics for measuring the efficiency of the competition, and 7) gather lessons learned
by participants and the organiser.
2.3.1.2 Tools for Cyber Exercises Performance
The development of tools to automate the organisation of competitive cyber exercise includes
the following:
Tracer FIRE software. The software provides participants with a set of commonly used
cyber security software tools [SMR+14]. It also provides detailed measures of moment-to-
moment activities. The Tracer FIRE software environment has been instrumented to log the
use of software tools, including the opening and closing of windows, the content of windows
and keystrokes, and mouse clicks within each window [SMR+14]. These logs provide a
detailed record of participant behaviour within the context of specific challenges that may be
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combined with data concerning correct or incorrect answer submissions, time committed to
challenges, and the abandonment of challenges [SMR+14].
CyberCog software. It designed to emulate a number of tools frequently used for cyber secu-
rity defence tasks, such as security alert monitors, network and system logs, network maps,
network vulnerabilities, user databases, and Internet-based data sources. It also provides a
Web-based system populated with data for analysis during a competition [CRC+12].
2.4 Uses of Cyber Exercise in Other Field of Research
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 shared the usage of cyber exercises in learning context. But the use
of cyber exercises are not limited for educational purposes only, this section addresses the
adoption of cyber exercises to support research from other domains:
Competition network data as a source of labelled dataset. Research on network data analysis
to test network security techniques and intrusion detection systems has used labelled data
available from the DARPA 1998 and 1999 attack datasets. The dataset traffic is labeled in
spesific criteria to support security analysis. However, the DARPA datasets have declined
over time because of aging content and continually emerging threats. To overcome the short-
age of labelled datasets, [SOC+09] demonstrated how network data from cyber exercise
competitions can be instrumented to generate modern labelled datasets.
Cyber exercise to understand problems in water distribution systems. [GOS06] designed a
red team/blue team exercise to help water utilities understand the dynamics of the distribu-
tion system contamination problems. The red team simulates the contamination of a water
distribution system and the blue team defends the system by installing monitors to detect the
presence of the contaminant (CWS) .
Testing on industry system operation. Cyber exercises can also identify particular threats to
specific industries. Through cyber exercises, safety-critical engineers are encouraged to con-
sider adverse behaviour that might be the result of malware rather than a more routine coding
or configuration error. The diagnosis of any attack requires interaction and coordination be-
tween IT service providers, who often have a minimal understanding of the safety-critical
nature of particular operations [Joh12].
Investigation on investment decisions on cyber security. An exercise involved over twenty
five players was conducted at a workshop of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Pro-
tection (I3P) addressing Process Control Systems (PCS). The exercise explored the impact of
potential government regulation on the complex decision processes of determining appropri-
ate investment levels for added cyber security by individual companies. At the workshop the
exercise provided an opportunity for knowledgeable security professionals to collaborate and
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compare their investment decisions against those of other similar companies and against the
results of the expected value decision analysis[CCHL]. Details of research on collaborative
cyber exercises address in Section 2.5.
2.5 Collaborative Cyber Exercises
As critical information infrastructures are based on complex systems of interconnected net-
works [O’R07], security involves complex collective problems. Because of the interdepen-
dencies and tight coupling between systems [SDPS09], any risks faced by organisation will
require significant multi-organisational action across organisations [WDG04]. Collaborative
cyber exercise provide a platform to simulate large scale attacks across sectors, industries
and government.
A collaborative cyber exercise is an important tool to assess the preparedness of a community
against cyber crises, technology failures, and critical information infrastructure incidents
[PT12]. Furthermore, collaborative cyber exercises promote information sharing that helps
a community to detect potential risks and prevent cyber attacks at an early stage. It also
facilitates incident response activities in communities [ZW12].
In addition, collaborative cyber exercises help organisations to strengthen their critical infor-
mation infrastructure by preparing for actual cyber interruptions [PT12]. It provides evalua-
tions and objective assessments of existing cyber incident response policies and procedures
[WDG04]. Through such exercises, cyber incident response plans can be developed, refined,
and tested [RMM10].
2.5.1 Purpose of Collaborative Cyber Exercises
There are three different reasons to conduct collaborative cyber exercises as defined in
[WDG04]:
Awareness exercises. This is the simplest exercise, which aims to expose the participants to
the threats and issues of a particular domain, and make participants aware of their respon-
sibilities. The goal of this exercise is to bring individuals together, to make them aware of
possible security events which their organisation might experience .This will help them to
formulate a response and how to get staff involved with such response.
Education and training exercises. The goal of education and training exercises, is to prepare
participants with response techniques, that they maybe required to perform when security
incident occur. The training exercise is used to train the participants, who are aware of
security issues but are not trained in current technology or methods to address the threats.
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Drill exercises. A drill exercise is conducted in order to provide participants opportunities
to practice processes, procedures and tools to respond to events in a specific domain. The
purpose of this exercise is to test participants’ ability, to detect and respond in a coordinated
manner to an attack or disruption.
The following collaborative objectives were most frequently highlighted in a survey of 84
cyber exercises in [PT12]:
1. To build awareness of cyber threats;
2. To examine the capabilities of participating organisations to prepare for and respond
to the effects of cyber-attacks;
3. To identify and highlight roles, responsibilities, and authority for responding, as well
as to test decision-making and procedures between public and private actors;
4. To assess cyber security emergency readiness, prepare, test, and evaluate (national)
procedures and processes;
5. To raise awareness of infrastructure interdependency issues with a particular focus on
cyber security;
6. To build trust among states, enhancing interstate and inter-agency cooperation.
2.5.2 Findings on Collaborative Cyber Exercises
2.5.2.1 Collaborative Cyber Exercise Categories
Survey results by [PT12] on public and private sector involvement in cyber exercises in
Figure 2.1, revealed that 57% of the exercises involved join exercises between public and
private sectors, while 41% involved public sectors and 2% involved private sector only. The
results shown that the lacking of private sectors in testing their security and contingency
plans. This is important because of major critical infrastructures belong to the private sectors.
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Figure 2.1: Public and private sectors involved in cyber exercises [Adapted from [PT12]]
[WDG04] described joint public and private exercises as:
Sector or industry level exercises. Sector or industry level exercises involve multiple organi-
sations; external entities to an organization, such as customers, suppliers, peer or competing
firms; and assorted government agencies. These exercises are challenging to organise and
require a high degree of cooperation and coordination between entities.
An example of this type of exercise was UK White Noise, the first full-scale exercise con-
ducted in 2009. This was developed by a joint government and industry forum known as
the Electronic Communications Resilience and Response Group (EC-RRG). The exercise
focused on communications failure with cascading effects across the whole public switched
telephone network (PSTN) [Whi10].
Cross-sector exercises. Cross-sector exercises involve two or more industries and require a
high level of coordination. The need for exercises at these levels is important to understand
the impact of interdependencies between industry sectors.
The Blue Cascade cross border tabletop infrastructure interdependencies exercise was held
on June 12, 2002 in Welches, Oregon. It was conducted by the Pacific North West Economic
Region (PNWER) and cosponsored by the U.S. Navy, Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA Region 10), and the Canadian Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). The exercise involved more than 150 representa-
tives from 70 private and public sector organisations. The exercise focused on the linkages
between and among infrastructures that could make the Pacific Northwest vulnerable to cas-
cading impacts in the event of an attack or disruption, and which could complicate response
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and recovery. Critical infrastructures participating in the exercise included energy (electric
power, oil, and natural gas), telecommunications,transportation, water supply systems, bank-
ing and finance, emergency services, and government services [Blu02].
Community based exercise. Community-based exercises include local government opera-
tions represented by local law enforcement, emergency operations, and city management.
If a local utility is owned or operated by the city, it is represented by critical infrastructure
firms. These include telecommunications, local hospitals, ports, and universities [CW06].
For example, the Cyber Storm I community exercise, was conducted in February 2006. It
was organised by National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) under the US Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The full-scale cyber exercise provided participants with a con-
trolled environment in which to exercise a coordinated cyber incident response, including
information sharing mechanisms, procedures for establishing situational awareness, public
and private organisational decision making, and public communications during a cyber inci-
dent related to national crisis [Cyb06].
Over 100 public and private agencies, associations, and corporations participated in the ex-
ercise from over 60 locations and 5 countries. The exercise included participation of more
than 30 private sector corporations and associations in its planning, execution, and after ac-
tion analysis. The exercise scenario simulated a large-scale cyber campaign affecting or
disrupting multiple critical infrastructure elements primarily within the energy, information
technology, transportation, and telecommunications sectors [Cyb06].
2.5.2.2 Types of Collaborative Cyber Exercise
[GR10] defines two types of cyber exercises as in Table 2.2:
Discussion-based. Discussion-based exercises enable planners and participants to examine
scenarios, develop response procedures, test those procedures, and test decision-making.
Participants discuss topics developed based on the scenario rather than acting them out. Such
exercises include seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, or games as described in [EO09]
and [GR10] are as follows :
Seminar. Seminar provides an overview of new plans, strategies, concepts, ideas, instructions
and discussion of plans and procedures, to instruct staff of new or changed procedures.
Workshop. In a workshop, experts and managers gather to engage in a constructive discus-
sion of a theoretical scenario, considering implications, procedures, interdependencies, and
decisions. This exercise is useful for jointly developing new procedures to cope with possible
incidents.
Tabletop. In a tabletop exercise, participants work through a scenario and existing proce-
dures. A facilitator will guide participants through the session, while participants describing
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the procedures they would use and the decisions they would make as the scenario unfolds.
This exercise is useful for preparedness and familiarity with procedures.
Game. A game is similar to a tabletop exercise except that participants are divided into two
or more teams that work through the scenario separately in a competitive atmosphere. A
game also used to explore decision making process and the consequences of these decisions.
Operations-based. Operations-based exercises enable the testing of procedures in practice.
They are often narrow to focus on a specific operation or function, such as a drill to test
a communications link, or they may involve a larger scale, involving the coordination of
different departments or organisations. They can be much larger in scale, involving many
organisations, many departments, and large numbers of people acting out their roles through
a scenario.
Table 2.2 Types of Cyber Exercises [GR10]
Discussion Based Cyber Exercise Operation based Cyber Exercise
Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Simulation
Seminar Drill
Workshop Functional Exercise
Game Full Scale Exercise
The results of a survey reported in [PT12], as presented in Figure 2.2, showed that 43% of the
exercises executed were distributed tabletop exercises, 19% were full-simulation exercises,
and 5% were workshops. Types of exercises described in [PT12] :
Desk check. Use in early-stage of validation for a new plan or amendments to a plan. It
involved one-to-one discussion with the author of the planned procedures against a simple
scenario to demonstrate the stages that are in place and how they operate.
Comm check. Use to validate systems or infrastructures. A different form of initial activity
used to validate communications methodologies or notification systems.
Walk through. The response team convenes to consider planned procedures and roles. The
response team is convened in one room and a simple scenario is used to demonstrate the
progression of the planned responses and what each responder should do.
Command post. Used to enable a team to test their response facilities. Usually involve
management-level only. Response center based with role-play of players and the external
environment.
Full simulation. Use to stress test the players with a real time environment that is close to
reality. Players respond in real time, immediately as information is received, interacting with
other teams and role players as the response requires.
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Figure 2.2: Type of cyber exercises [PT12] [Adapted from ENISA survey 2012]
2.5.2.3 Organising Collaborative Cyber Exercise
There are several guidelines provided by [PT12], [EO09] and [GR10] for organising a cyber
exercise. These guidelines systematically examine the life cycle of a cyber exercise, which
involves the following phases :
Phase 1: Identifying the exercise
In the first phase, the organiser must determine a need for an exercise, including the identifi-
cation of procedures or measures that should be explored. Based on the need, organisers can
select the type of exercise to be conducted and the organisations that need to participate.
Phase 2: Planning the exercise
In the second phase, the organiser engages in the planning process. This will involve recruit-
ing the participants; acquiring financial resources for the exercise; selecting (and booking)
the location; developing the scenario, rules, tools, and training materials for the exercise; se-
lecting monitors and other role-players and specifying what and how they will perform their
duties; and planning the evaluation process.
Phase 3: Executing the exercise
In this phase, the exercise is executed as specified in the planning process. Participants are
involved either through discussion or simulation of the scenario and their response proce-
dures and decisions. Monitors observe and note these actions and inject information into the
scenario.
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Phase 4: Evaluating the exercise
Finally, exercise evaluation is conducted after the exercise is completed. This process tends
to include a final evaluation report or multiple reports tailored to different audiences. These
reports review the exercise, identify weaknesses, and recommend improvements. Further-
more, this process may be followed by a forum to address identified weaknesses and recom-
mendations.
2.5.2.4 Monitoring and Evaluation Methodologies of Collaborative Cyber Ex-
ercises
The findings of stocktaking survey in [PT12], as shown in Figure 2.3, defined the monitoring
methodologies of cyber exercises as real-time monitoring, status report, the use of experts
for monitoring, and other combined methodologies. The survey revealed that 31% of cyber
exercises used real-time monitoring, 27% used experts for monitoring, 22% used periodic
status reports, and 20% of used a combination of methodologies.
Figure 2.3: Cyber Exercises Monitoring Methodologies [PT12] [Adapted from ENISA sur-
vey 2012]
Figure 2.4 illustrates the survey findings in [PT12], showing the post evaluation methods
used in collaborative cyber exercise. Reports were the most evaluation method used for
post assessment (31 %), followed by Other (24%), Hot Washed session (17%), Debriefing
Workshop (16%) and Self-evaluation (12%). These cyber exercise evaluation methodologies
are explained as follows:
Report. The cyber exercise post evaluation report as described in [PT12] is a tool used to
inform the organiser about the overall achievements and the results of the exercise.
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Debriefing. Debriefing after the exercise when participants are brought together to describe
what had occurred to account for the actions that had taken place and to develop new strate-
gies as a result of experience. The purpose of the debriefing is to provide information to par-
ticipants about what they have gone through rather to gather information from them [Led92].
After Action Review (AAR). AAR is an analytical review of training events that enables the
training audience to examine actions and results during a training event through a facilitated
professional discussion [Jas14].
Hot Wash. The hot wash session described as a discussions and evaluations of an agency’s
(or multiple agencies’) performance following an exercise [RB13]. A hot wash discussion
used to capture comments and suggestions while the exercise is still fresh in participants’
minds [AS12]. The session should be led by a moderator and consist of a focused discussion
on what worked well, what must improve, and what the organisation should consider for
the next exercise [GR10],[AS12]. Further discussion on the limitation of collaborative cyber
exercise evaluation methodologies are explained in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.4: Evaluation Methodologies of Cyber Exercises [Adapted from [PT12]]
2.6 Summary of Research on Cyber Exercises
Figure 2.5 illustrates a summary of research on academic, competitive, and collaborative
cyber exercises as described in previous sections. Academic cyber exercises highlight four
main research topics: curriculum design and development, technical skills development and
assessment, lab configurations for cyber exercise environments, and newly developed au-
tomation tools for practising cyber exercises. The focus of academic cyber exercises is on
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developing individual skills needed for information security. The performance measure-
ments are tightly based on the designed module and curriculum objectives.
The focus of competitive cyber exercises is on sharing experiences through participating and
organising competitions with three different approaches, school exercises, the Collegiate
Cyber Defense Competition (CDCC), and Capture the Flag (CTF), which are organised as
annual events at the regional, national, and international levels. Most research on these com-
petitions addressed the environment of the exercise, which can involve virtualisation and
distributed settings. The competition infrastructures are supported by manual and automated
tools. The focus of competitive exercises is on team performance. Participants are forced
to apply their knowledge and skills to analyse and understand unfamiliar, complex sets of
interdependent components that are similar to real-world networks and malware infrastruc-
ture. The competition simulated infrastructure is used to test participants ability to build and
defend a network from attackers. For the performance measurement, several methodologies
are used, either manual or automated, to score the competition and to determine the winner.
Collaborative cyber exercises are used to simulate operational cyber exercises to test com-
munity preparedness in emergency situations related to cyber incidents. Collaborative cy-
ber exercises involve participants from industries, governments, and academia to test their
awareness of current threats, interdependencies among sectors, and communication during
the incidents. Collaborative cyber exercises are also used to test the policies and procedures
of emergency preparedness at the organisational, national, and international levels. Collab-
orative cyber exercise performance evaluation uses the post-assessment methodologies of
reports, debriefing, hot wash, and after-action review to review the overall exercise, identify
weaknesses, and recommend improvements for the next exercise. As this chapter provides
the research overview of collaborative cyber exercise, more implementations of collaborative
cyber exercises in critical information infrastructure protection discussed in Chapter 3.
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2.7 Chapter Contribution
This chapter provides a general overview of academic, competitive, and collaborative cyber
exercises in terms of the purpose, scope, and research direction of the exercises.
Figure 2.5: Research Overview on Cyber Exercises
2.7.1 Strength and Weaknesses of Cyber Exercises Category
This section provide a summary of strength and weaknesses of cyber exercises by category
as describe in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3 A Summary of Strength and Weaknesses of Cyber Exercises Categories
Cyber Exer-
cise Category
Strength Weaknesses
Academic Cy-
ber Exercise
1)Used to develop fundamen-
tal skills of information secu-
rity personnel.
2)Used in curriculum de-
sign for Information security
courses
3)Labs were provided for
practising the knowledge.
4)Student practise their skills
in campus within control en-
vironment.
1)Curriculum oriented, might limit
the important knowledge and skills
needed.
2)Assessments were individual
based and rigidly following the
curriculum.
3)Limitation of skills can be prac-
tised because limitation in the cur-
riculum designed which might not
cover theories and skills needed
Competitive
Cyber Exer-
cise
1)Used to provide a platform
for students to practise their
security skills and knowledge
in competition settings.
2)Skills and knowledge can
be practise in integrated man-
ner, not limited to specific
curriculum.
3)Student team with highest
point will be rewarded and
win the competition.
1) Assessments have different cri-
teria based on type and levels of
the competition. Every type of
competition has its own assessment
methodology.
2)Student needs to perform within
limited time and resources.
Collaborative
Cyber Exer-
cise
1)Promote cooperation across
multi sectors and cross bor-
ders.
2)Provide platform for col-
laboration and knowledge
sharing.
3)Global coverage of cyber
crisis.
1)The cyber exercise involved
many sectors and people with
varies in background and skills.
2)Varieties in background cause
difficulties to assess the effective-
ness of the exercise.
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2.8 Summary
This chapter provides a literature review of three types of academic, competitive and col-
laborative cyber exercises. Academic, cyber exercises have become an important tool to
provide hands-on learning and assessment environments for information assurance students
in college, universities, and the training industry. The advancement of networks, operating
systems, and software has enhanced the cyber exercise environment into virtual, distributed,
and remote access, which make learning easier to conduct on and off campus. Students are
not limited to developing their security knowledge and skills in class and lab activities. They
can further explore and apply their skills through competitive cyber exercises, which help
them to strengthen their understanding and knowledge on how to monitor, maintain, and
protect network operations. Simulated operations used in competitive cyber exercises were
used in collaborative exercises to test the preparedness of communites against cyber crises,
technology failures, and critical information infrastructure incidents at organisation, state,
national and international levels.
34
Chapter 3
Contributions of Cyber Exercises to
Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection (CIIP)
3.1 Introduction
Academic, competition-based and collaborative cyber exercises have been discussed in Chap-
ter 2. The main purpose of academic and competition-based cyber exercises are developing
participants’ skills and knowledge, while collaborative cyber exercises differ in scope, which
involved multiple organisations at national and international levels. Exercises simulate cyber
operations across multiple organisation to highlight the awareness of interdependencies, to
coordinate in cyber emergency situations, and to promote cooperation and communication
during a cyber crisis. This chapter highlights the importance of cyber exercises by focusing
on the contributions of these exercises to CIIP. This chapter continues to answer the sec-
ond research question, of (RQ2): how do cyber exercises contribute to critical information
infrastructure protection?.
This chapter is divided into ten sections, Section 3.2 identifies several definitions of criti-
cal infrastructure (CI) and explains issues related to CIIP, while Section 3.3 discusses the
emerging cyber threats that target critical information infrastructure (CII) and the effect of
cyber attacks on CI in some countries. Section 3.4 dicusses issues and challenges cyber se-
curity in CII. Section 3.5 highlights the importance of collaboration efforts for CIIP. Section
3.6 discusses the importance of cyber exercises through the incorporation of cyber exercises
in cyber security strategies and Section 3.7 shares cyber exercises implementations in some
countries. Section 3.8 shares the background of critical national information infrastructure
(CNII) in Malaysia including the national cyber security policy (NCSP), cyber incidents that
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happened in Malaysia, and national and international collaborative cyber exercises activities.
Section 3.9 shares the contributions of this chapter, and Section 3.10 summaries the chapter.
3.2 Definitions of Critical Infrastructure (CI)
Definitions of CI are different between countries as highlighted in [Cho10]. Various def-
initions of CIs in some countries are reviewed here. The UK defines its critical national
infrastructure (CNI) as ’critical certain elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise
of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential
services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life’ [cpn09]. In the
UK, infrastructure is divided into the nine sectors: food, energy, water, ICT, transport, health,
emergency services, government, and finance. Assets within these that have been identified
by the government to be of importance to basic service delivery and national security are
collectively known as CNI [cpn09].
Critical Infrastructure, as defined in [Bal04], is as follows: Systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters .
The National Strategy for Homeland Security in the US has identified the following 14 areas
of CI as: agriculture and food, water, public health, emergency services, government, de-
fence industrial base, information and telecommunications, banking and finance, energy,
transportation, chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, national
monuments and icons, and critical manufacturing [Bal04].
In Australia, is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies
and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an
extended period, would adversely impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the nation
or affect Australias ability to ensure national security[CIP10]
In Germany, critical infrastructures are organisations or institutions with major importance
for the public good, whose failure or damage would lead to sustainable supply bottlenecks,
considerable disturbance of public security or other dramatic consequences[CIP09]. [CS12]
argued that in various definitions of CI, the focus alternates between physical and virtual
aspects of CI, because there are no official distinctions between CI and CII, and both terms
were interchangeably used in some countries .
Current debates in critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and CIIP topics alternate between
defending the physical aspect of CI and the protection of data and software residing on
computer systems that operates these physical infrastructures [CS12]. According [CS12],
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both CIP and CIIP terms should not be discussed as separate concepts. These concepts
are shaped by three main components: CIP, CIIP and National Information Infrastructures
(NII), as depicted in Figure 3.1. While CIP is more than CIIP, CIIP is an essential part of
CIP [CS12]. However, there is at least one characteristic to differentiate between the two:
While CIP comprises all critical sectors of a nation’s infrastructure, CIIP is only a subset
of a comprehensive protection effort, as it focuses on securing the critical information. The
concept was addressed as [CS12]:
• The CIIP is only a subset of a broad Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) effort,
which targets on Critical Information Infrastructure (CII).
• The CII defined as part of the global or NII that is essential for the continuity of critical
infrastructure (CI) services.
• Cyber security is defined by International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as, ’the
collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets’.
Figure 3.1: CIP, CIIP and Cyber security terminologies[CS12]
The importance of CII serves as a backbone of CIs that provide a continuous exchange of
data, which is crucial to the operation of infrastructures and the services that they provide
[Cav07]. Due to the role of CII in intertwining various other infrastructures, if not properly
secured, this provides possibilities that they can be targeted as a source of attack [Bia06].
Thus, protection on CIs should strongly focus on the protection of specific information in-
frastructures rather than focus on all CI sectors and other aspects [CS12]. In conjunction to
the importance of CIIs, in providing continuous support to the essential services, this study
focuses on collaborative cyber exercises as collaborative protection efforts in CIIP, as shared
in Section 3.6.
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3.3 Emerging Cyber Threats Targeting Critical Infor-
mation Infrastructure
The CII is a subset of CI, as described in Figure 3.1, which is composed of a vast range of
components and systems, extending from hardware (satellites, routers), to software (operat-
ing systems, applications, databases), to data (database tables),and processes and operations
[Hys07]. Moreover, CIIs are vulnerable to natural hazards, human errors and technical prob-
lems, In addition, they are also vulnerable to cybercrimes by hackers, criminals, state actors
and terrorists.
The US National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) defines vulnerability as the charac-
teristics of an asset, system, or networks design, location, security posture, process, or oper-
ation that render it susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by mechanical
failures, natural hazards, terrorist attacks or other malicious acts [O’R07].
Normally, vulnerability assessments are conducted by private-sector infrastructure owners,
stakeholders, and government agencies to identify asset, facility, system, and other vulner-
abilities. Cyber-attacks have increased dramatically in sophistication and have been able
to sabotage CIs, although the cyber defences are in place [Cav07]. Threats to CII involve
various sectors and share cross-border vulnerabilities and interdependencies, which are ex-
plained as follows:
3.3.1 Perpetrators Targeting CII
[Cav07] and [Nic06] described potential perpetrators targeting CII are ranging from teenagers,
crackers, sophisticated expert hackers, criminal, terrorists and even nation as :
Crackers, Malicious, Hackers and Script Kiddies. Individuals, who have differing levels of
technical expertise that break into systems by challenging security mechanisms. They launch
attacks for thrill or for boasting rights in their communities.
Insider Threats. Disgruntled insider in an organisation is a major threat. An insider may
not have a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions, but his/her knowledge of and
access to the targeted system enables the possibility of causing considerable damage.
Malware Writers. Malicious code writers produce software (viruses, worms or Trojan horses)
designed specifically to damage or disrupt systems. This so-called malware can be specific
(i.e., it targets particular systems or organisations), or it can be generic.
Criminal Groups. Criminal groups frequently attack systems for monetary gain. Their at-
tempt to steal sensitive information for resale or for blackmail, extorting money by threaten-
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ing to attack computing assets, and for committing various types of fraud (e.g., attempting
to influence stocks) or forgery (e.g., changing payment information in invoices).
Hacktivist. Hacktivism refers to politically-motivated attacks on computing assets. Hack-
tivists may overload e-mail servers or hack into websites to send political messages. Their
actions against infrastructure assets are usually motivated by environmental, safety or na-
tionalistic reasons.
Terrorist Group. Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or prop-
erty in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further certain
political or social objectives.
Information Warfare. Several nations are aggressively developing information warfare doc-
trines, programs and capabilities. These capabilities can be used to disrupt the supply chain
and cause considerable damage to the various infrastructure sectors, ultimately affecting the
economy and the residents of the targeted region or country.
3.3.2 Availability of Tools for Cyber Attacks
Unlike natural disasters and man-made and many other areas of risk to human welfare, there
is very limited organised historical data to estimate on cyber-attacks, successful attacks, and
consequences of the attack. According to [Amo12], in all cases, cyber-attacks are less effec-
tive and less disruptive compared to physical attacks or natural disaster. The only advantage
is that cyber-attacks are cheaper and easier to carry out compared to physical attacks.
However, as network performance and bandwidth have advanced, attack methods and attack
tools have reached a maturity that could easily be used for cyber-attacks. With automated
tools freely available on the Internet, cyber-attacks can be performed remotely within a few
seconds, and the attacks easily launched and challenging to trace [Nic06]. Several attacks
involving CII in some countries are presented in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.3 Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructures Sectors
The existence of cyber threats has been reported since 1980s and has been rapidly increasing.
Beside the scope of attack that cross borders, threats has evolved from destructive threats to
espionage mission, as described in Table 3.1
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Table 3.1 List of Cyber Attacks on Critical Sectors [MR12], [ISS14]
Year Attack Target Sector The Impacts of the Attack
2012 Gauss Mal-
ware
Iran, Lebanon,
Syria, Sudan
Finance The Gauss code includes com-
mands to intercept data required
to work with several Lebanese
banks (e.g., Bank of Beirut, By-
blos Bank, and Fransabank.
2011 Night
Dragon
Five global
energy and oil
firms
Energy SCADA systems werent directly
attacked, but 5 global energy and
oil firms companies that operate
SCADA were attacked. Oper-
ational blueprints were reported
stolen
2010 Stuxnet Iranian nu-
clear facility at
Natanz
Nuclear Stuxnet altered the frequency
of the electrical current to the
drives causing them to switch
between high and low speeds for
which they were not designed.
This switching caused the cen-
trifuges to fail at a higher than
normal rate [FR11].
2007-
Now
Red October Diplomatic and
governmen-
tal, agencies,
research insti-
tutions,energy,
nuclear groups,
trade and
aerospace
ICT Infiltrated over 1000 high level
government computers around
the world. There are sensi-
tive geopolitical information be-
ing stolen, 7 terabytes stolen
data and 55,000 connection tar-
gets within 250 different IP
addresses, Switzerland, Kaza-
khstan and Greece.
2005 Daimler
Chrysler
Manufacturing
plants and
business
Manufacturing Infected business and industrial
control network causing 13 man-
ufacturing plants to shut down
production lines costing 1.4 mil-
lion Dollar
2000 Maroochy
Water Sys-
tems
Maroochy
Shire, Australia
Water The Maroochy Shire attack was
not one attack but a whole series
of attacks over a prolonged pe-
riod
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As failure of CII considered being a significant risk in global society, securing CII security
systems and their sub-systems is crucial. The overall CIIP requires broader community atten-
tion, including from academia, the private sectors, and government who must work together
to understand emerging threats and to develop proactive security solutions to safeguard CIIs
and their reliance [Hys07].
3.4 Issues and Challenges in Critical Information In-
frastructure Protection
In the US, the Presidents 2013 Executive Order produced the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Cyber security Framework Version 1.0, of the voluntary standard,
which is being implemented by individual companies to assess and improve cybersecurity, as
well as to create a common language for discussion and collaboration on security intelligence
and response tactics [LEP+13].
Moreover, the International Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (ICIIP) handbooks
have included research reviews on 25 countries that shared the importance of CIIP through
development of security strategies and collaboration efforts between public and private to
better understand the vulnerabilities and threats to their CII [BS09]. Some possible solu-
tions have also been drafted to protect their CII assets. Several cybersecurity issues that are
discussed in the book also expressed demanding needs to effectively protect the CIIs from
cyber threats. The effects of cyber threats that potentially disrupt CII operations and services
to the nations are discussed next [PF07] :
3.4.1 Nature of Cyberspace
In February 2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC) specifically defines
cyberspace as the hundreds of thousands of interconnected ’computers, servers, routers,
switches and cyber optic cables that make ... critical infrastructures work ’ [PF06]. To
expand the complication of cyberspace, a new term, the Internet of Things (IoT) has been
defined in [Wig14] as ’an environment in which objects, animals or people are provided with
unique identifiers and the ability to transfer data over a network without requiring human-
to-human or human-to-computer interaction’ . The IoT has evolved from the convergence of
wireless technologies, micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) and the Internet [Wig14].
It is well known that cyberspace is globally designed without a single owner or a controller
and provides broad open access to anyone, anywhere in the world [PF07]. Although cy-
berspace is pervasive,CII components rely heavily on cyberspace resources for their oper-
ation [Hys07]. To emphasise this, Gartner, Inc. forecasts that 6.4 billion connected things
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will be in use worldwide in 2016, up 30 percent from 2015, and will reach 20.8 billion by
2020 [vdM15]. In 2016, 5.5 million new things will get connected every day [vdM15]. The
impact of the sudden expansion of the internet use will boost the economic effect of the IoT
to consumers, businesses, city authorities, hospitals, and many other entities [vdM15]. Un-
fortunately, this also encouraged a growing number of adversaries looking to use cyberspace
to steal, compromise or destroy critical data, which will increase the disruptive influence
across all industries and all areas of society [Wig14].Thus, protecting and controlling the
cyberspace are overwhelming challenges.
3.4.2 Dependencies and Interdependencies
Identifying, understanding and analysing such dependencies and interdependencies of CIs
are significant challenges due to the wideness and complexity of the CIIs as described in
Section 3.4.1. These infrastructures, which affect all areas of daily life, include electric
power, natural gas and petroleum production and distribution, telecommunications (infor-
mation and communications), transportation, water supply, banking and finance, emergency
and government services, agriculture, and other fundamental systems and services that are
critical to the security, economic prosperity, and social wellbeing of nations [Hys07]. The
CIs have a broader range, covering an economy branch or sector and are closely related to
the CIs of other countries or even regions [O’R07]. There are several perspectives in en-
visioning the high level of CIs interdependencies. For these reasons, the 3.2 distinguishes
CIs intra-dependencies and interdependencies as represented in a high level model with four
layers [Bia06] as follows:
• The physical infrastructure layer. This layer consist of physical devices and infrastruc-
tures, such as building, an electric plant with power distribution lines, oil/gas pipelines
and pumps, and telecommunications cables service provider that deliver essential ser-
vices.
• The cyber layer. This layer contains computers, networks and data gathering sensors
such as ICT systems, automation control (PLC and SCADA), and supervision systems,
which are used to monitor and control the physical layer. Most SCADA systems are
the main part of this layer.
• The organizational layer. This layer contains main business functions involving the
whole organisation through communication and interaction of people, processes, and
systems.
• The strategic business layer. This layer consists of top management, strategic manage-
ment and policy makers of the CI stakeholder
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Intra-dependencies exist between physical infrastructure, cyber layer, organisational layer,
and strategic layer that contribute to CII of each sector. The interdependency between vary-
ing sectors of CI is one of the most essential relationships that shape the CII [Bia06]. Today,
CI functions depend solely on an extensive network of infrastructures that are highly con-
nected, forming a complex mesh of interdependencies which facilitate exchange of services
of various forms.
Figure 3.2: Dependencies and Interdependencies in Four Layers Model [Bia06]
In addition, [PDHP06] identified that interaction in CI can be through direct connectivity,
policies and procedures, or geospatial proximity. These interactions often create complex
relationships, dependencies, and interdependencies that cross infrastructure boundaries, ren-
dering the entire system extremely complex and prone to domino failures [O’R07]. The
effects of disruption involving interconnected systems are discussed in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.3 Consequences of Interdependencies
As explained in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, CIIs are complex system that interlink and demand
high requirements in availability, resilience and security [Bia06]. It is important to raise
awareness of these interdependencies among CI owners and operators [Bia06]. Any failures
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affecting interdependent infrastructures can be described in terms of three general categories
[PF07]:
Cascading failure. A disruption in one infrastructure causes a disruption in a second infras-
tructure. For example in 1998, the failure of the Galaxy IV satellite system degraded US
telecommunications services, resulting in cascading effects in other infrastructures, causing
40 million pagers to fail to work [Amo11]. More than 20 United Airlines flights were delayed
due to the lack of high altitude weather data [Amo11]. Consequently, the road transportation
infrastructure was also affected because highway refuelling stations were unable to process
credit cards, as their satellite links were down[Amo11].
Escalating failure. A disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an independent disruption
of a second infrastructure. In the event of electricity disruption in Manhattan in 2003, it
immediately affected the telecommunications services. The global Internet was also imme-
diately disrupted, and the effects were felt as far away as South Africa [Hys07].
Common cause failure. A disruption of two or more infrastructures at the same time is the
result of a common cause. For instance, following the Hurricane Katrina, which struck the
Gulf Coast of the United States in August 2005, simultaneously affected electric power,
natural gas, petroleum, water supply, emergency services, telecommunications, and other
infrastructures [PF07].
3.5 Importance of Collaboration Efforts
The security of cyberspace has become an important consideration in many countries. More-
over, the malicious actors have the ability to compromise and control millions of computers
that belong to government, private enterprises, and ordinary citizens [Cho10] as shared in
Section 3.3.3. These cybercrimes might affect society as a whole, not only threatening in-
dividual privacy but also potentially compromising a countrys CI and its ability to provide
essential services to its citizens [Cav07]. Consequently, governments, international organi-
sations, the private sectors, and civil society are required to work together in strengthening
collaboration and escalating cybersecurity as a shared responsilibity [Rid11].
Traditionally, the public-private collaboration has been viewed as a partnership or as con-
tractual interaction between government agencies and private sector companies [KB04]. The
public-private interface offers opportunities for decision makers at all levels of government
and privates entities to build resilience by proactively coordinating and positioning the ca-
pabilities of stakeholders to collaboratively manage disaster consequences, especially in-
volved cyber incidents [Lin03]. The impact of cyber-attack on CI sectors, as addressed in
Section 3.3.3 involves cross-border vulnerabilities and geographic interdependency. Strong
3.6. Cyber Exercise in Cyber Security Strategy 44
international partnerships between governments and CI owners and operators are becoming
essential.
In addition, [Lin03] wrote the following: Collaboration is about co-labour, about joint ef-
fort and ownership. The end results is not mine or yours, it is ours. Collaboration occurs
when people from different organizations produce something together through joint effort,
resources, and decision making and share ownership of the final product or service. The
focus is often on producing or implementing something . Inter-organisational collaboration
is an interesting concept, as it represents the paradox of hierarchical boundaries and coopera-
tion, of autonomy and interdependence, as multiple organisations come together to approach
a common issues [SB09].
Collaboration is especially important in complex, dynamic situations that effect community
public security and safety [SB09]. Many cyber threats are difficult to detect and identify by a
single organisation. Collaborative information sharing among different sectors is necessary
and important to community cyber security and was implemented in collaborative cyber
exercises shared in the next section.
3.6 Cyber Exercise in Cyber Security Strategy
Cyber exercises are an important tool to assess the preparedness of a community against
cyber crises, technology failures and CII incidents [PT12]. Some countries, like the US,
the UK, Australia and Canada have incorporated collaborative cyber exercises in their cyber
security strategy as shared in Table 3.2.
[WDG04] suggested that exercises that are required that test not only an individual organ-
isations ability to respond to cyber security events, but also the ability of related external
entities, such as cities and states or other industry sector members, to respond in a coordi-
nated manner. Besides, exercises enable competent authorities to test existing emergency
plans, target specific weaknesses, increase cooperation between different sectors, identify
interdependencies, stimulate improvements in continuity planning, and generate a culture of
cooperative effort to boost resilience [PT12].
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Table 3.2 Incorporation of Cyber Exercise in Cyber Security Strategy
Year Country Cyber Security
Strategy
Cyber Exercise in Cyber Security Strategy
2009 Australia Australia
Government
Cyber Security
Strategy
Highlights priorities under Threat Awareness and Re-
sponse: to improve the detection, analysis, mitigation,
and response to sophisticated cyber threats with a focus
on government CI and other systems of national inter-
est; conduct a programme of cyber security exercises to
test and refine event response arrangements, including
the Cyber Storm series of exercises coordinated by the
US.
2010 Canada Canada Cy-
ber Security
Strategy
Highlights priorities under Partnering with the Private
Sector and CI Sectors: Collective cyber security ef-
forts will be refined through training and exercise pro-
grammes. The result of these exercises, some of which
are already underway, will be improved understanding
of the dynamics among partners in cyber security. Par-
ticipation in these exercises will also support the im-
provement of procedures to prevent cyber security fail-
ures.
2011 US International
Strategy for
Cyberspace.
Prosperity,
Security, and
Openness in
a Networked
World
Highlights priorities under Protecting Our Networks:
enhancing security, reliability, and resiliency; ensuring
robust incident management, resiliency, and recovery
capabilities for information infrastructure. The US will
also work to engage international participation in cyber
security exercises to elevate and strengthen established
operating procedures with our partners.
2011 UK The UK Cy-
ber Security
Strategy
In Objective 2: Making the UK more resilient to cyber-
attack and better able to protect interests in cyberspace;
defending national infrastructure from cyber-attacks by
ensuring new national procedures for responding to cy-
ber incidents (ensuring key services can be maintained
or restored quickly) are fully tested, within the UK and
in exercises with international partners. This includes a
programme countering terrorist use of the Internet and
exercises and plans for an EU-wide event in 2012. This
builds on a minister-led incident management/response
exercise (July 2011) and the governments on-going ex-
ercise programme.
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3.7 Cyber Exercises Implementation
The broad spectrum of global economies indicates that cyber threats can occur at an inter-
national level [Rid11]. This highlights the need for CII protection action at four different
levels: international, national, private sector, and individual [Cav07]. This means that gov-
ernments must work closely with those infrastructure operators to ensure continuity of ser-
vice by building resilient infrastructures [Hys07]. This section shares the implementation
and contribution of collaborative cyber exercises involved various methods, such as large-
scale and cross-boundary implementations, as summarised in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4
Table 3.3 Collaborative Cyber Exercise Implementations -Part I
Cyber Exercise
/Year /Partici-
pants
Cyber Exercise Objectives Cyber Exercise Methods
Cyber Europe (
2010) 30 EU and
EFTA (22 player
with 8 observer)
1) To trigger communication and col-
laboration between countries in Eu-
rope. 2) To try to respond to large-scale
attacks.
Distributed table-top exercise,
with players participating from
their office locations and as part
of their daily routine.
Cyber Europe (
2012) 29 EU and
EFTA(25 player
and observer) 339
organizations, 571
individuals
1)To test the effectiveness and scala-
bility of mechanisms, procedures and
information flow for public authori-
ties’ cooperation in Europe. 2) To
explore the cooperation between pub-
lic and private stakeholders in Europe.
3) To identify gaps and challenges on
how large-scale cyber-incidents could
be handled more effectively in Europe.
Scenario based exercise using
-Fictional adversaries joined
forces in a massive cyber-attack
against Europe, mainly through
Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks against public
electronic services.
Cyber Storm I
(2006) 100(public
and private agen-
cies, associations,
corporations) (60
locations and 5
countries)
1) To exercise communication, incident
response policies, and operational pro-
cedures in response to various cyber in-
cidents. 2) To identify future planning
and process improvements.
Scenario based simulation on
a large-scale cyber campaign
affecting or disrupting multi-
ple critical infrastructure ele-
ments primarily within the en-
ergy, information technology,
transportation, and telecommu-
nications sectors.
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Table 3.4 Collaborative Cyber Exercise Implementations (Continue Part II)
Cyber Exercise
/Year /Partici-
pants
Cyber Exercise Objectives Cyber Exercise Meth-
ods
Cyber Storm II
(2008) Private
sector, federal,
state, and interna-
tional governments
(Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and
the UK)
1. To examine the capabilities of partici-
pating organisations to prepare for, protect
from, and respond to the effects of cyber-
attacks. 2. To exercise senior leadership de-
cision making and interagency coordination
of incident responses in accordance with na-
tional policies and procedures. 3. To val-
idate information-sharing relationships and
communication paths for the collection and
dissemination of cyber-incident situational
awareness, response, and recovery informa-
tion. 4. To examine the means and processes
to share sensitive and classified information
across standard boundaries in safe and se-
cure ways without compromising proprietary
or national security interests.
Scenario-based cyber-
attacks focused on CI in
the IT, communications,
chemical, and transporta-
tion (specifically rail and
pipe) sectors, requiring
action from foreign
and domestic partners
in the cyber response
community.
Cyber Storm III
(2010) 8 Cabinet-
level departments,
13 states, 12 inter-
national partners,
and 60 private-
sector companies
and coordination
bodies
1. To identify and exercise the processes, pro-
cedures, relationships, and mechanisms that
address a cyber incident. 2. To examine the
role of DHS and its evolving National Cyber
Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). 3. To as-
sess information sharing issues. 4. To exam-
ine coordination and decision-making mech-
anisms. 5. To practically apply elements of
on-going cyber initiatives, such as the Cy-
berspace Policy Review and findings from
past exercises.
Distributed exercise
allowing players to par-
ticipate from their office
locations worldwide. The
exercise control centre
was located at a DHS fa-
cility in Washington, D.C.
The scenario progressed
as players received ’in-
jects’ via e-mail, phone,
fax, in person, and the
Web. Exercise play
simulated adverse effects
through which the partici-
pants executed their cyber
crisis response systems,
policies, and procedures
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3.8 Cyber Exercise in Malaysia
3.8.1 National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) in Malaysia
In advance of the emergent and sophisticated cyber threats growing and threatening the
Malaysian nation, the Malaysia Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI)
conducted a study to develop policies and processes to address cyber security issues in the
country since 2005 [bH11]. The study was conducted by consultants and relevant ministries
and government agencies. The objectives of the study as highlighted in [DSZ09] as follows:
• To assess the current situation of cyber security risks within the CNII sectors;
• To ensure that the critical infrastructures are protected to a level that commensurate
the risks faced; and
• To develop and establish a comprehensive road map and action plans for the imple-
mentation of a Cyber Security Framework.
On 7th April 2006, the result of the study was presented at the National IT Council (NITC).
Consequently, the NCSP was endorsed and accepted for implementation on 31 May 2006
[DSZ09]. The NCSP is a comprehensive cyber security approach that provides a perspective
on how cyber security should be implemented in an integrated manner [Has11]. Further-
more, the Malaysian government has adopted the NSCP as a comprehensive cyber security
approach to increase the resiliency of the CNII [bH11].
In addition, NCSP states that objective that Malaysias CNII must be secure and resilient,
which means immune against threats and attacks to its systems [bH11]. For an effective
NCSP and policy implementation and to support all possible cyber security cooperation, this
demands public-private partnership to bring together various cyber security experts from the
government, industry, academia and individual experts to share, elaborate and debate various
relevant cyber security issues and challenges [Has11].
As mentioned in [Has11] in his paper on Malaysia’s NCSP, the NCSP is divided into seven
areas as shown in Table 3.5, which are referred as the policy thrusts. While thrust drivers
are the ministries that have the authority of their respective thrust areas, leading the thrusts
with the assistance of their respective working group. The policy thrusts include effective
governance, legislative and regulatory frameworks, which are are governed by the Attor-
ney General’s Chambers. The MOSTI is the thrust driver of the cyber security technology
framework; culture of security and capacity building; research and development towards
self-reliance; and compliance and enforcement.
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A major initiative was to recommend that Malaysia’s CNII organisations implement and
adopt the MS ISO/IEC 27001-2007 as a security baseline and obtain a certification [DSZ09].
This will ensure that these organisations are implementing the required security measures on
their SCADA systems. CNII organisations are instructed to follow this since 2013 [bH11].
Table 3.5 Policy Thrust and Thrust Driver in NCSP Malaysia [Has11]
Policy Thrust Thrust Driver
Effective Governance National Security Council
Legislative and Regulatory Framework Attorney General Chambers
Cyber Security Technology Framework Ministry of Science, Technology
and Innovation (MOSTI)
Culture of Security and Capacity Building Ministry of Science, Technology
and Innovation (MOSTI)
Research and Development Towards Self-
Reliance
Ministry of Science, Technology
and Innovation (MOSTI)
Compliance and Enforcement Ministry of Science, Technology
and Innovation (MOSTI)
Cyber Security Emergency Readiness National Security Council
3.8.2 Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) in Malaysia
Malaysia’s CNII defined as: ’Assets (physical and virtual), systems and functions that are vi-
tal to the nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a devastating impact on the;
National economic strength; National image; National defence and security; Government
capabilities to function; and Public health and safety’ [Has11].
National cyber security policies (NCSP) are designed based on a national security frame-
work that includes legislation and regulatory, technology, public and private cooperation,
institutional and international aspects (NICT, 2000) [bH11]. The policy is created to focus
on the CNII, which comprises of 10 sectors of banking and finance, information and com-
munications, energy and gas, transportation, water, health services, and food and agriculture,
government, emergency services, and national defence and security [Has11]. Moreover, the
NCSP vision is to ensure that the CNIIs are secure, resilient and self-reliant to consider the
critical and interdependent nature of the CIs.
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3.8.3 Cyber Incidents in Malaysia
Growing dependency on digital information systems has increased vulnerabilities and cyber
risks, especially to the CNII in Malaysia. Several attacks have occurred on CIs in Malaysia,
which affect public facilities and critical sectors, such as railway operation, stock exchange,
and the postal system as well as government agencies as discussed as follows [AMZJ12]:
Defacement Attacks on Malaysia Websites. Malaysia experienced cyber-attacks codenamed
’Operation Malaysia’ in 2010. The attacks appeared in the headlines of the mainstream me-
dia in Malaysia. The attack were prolonged attack from 15th to 19th June in 2010 by a hack-
tivism group known as ’Anonymous’. During the five-day period of attack, 210 Malaysian
websites were defaced by the ’Anonymous’ group which are recognised as high profile, so-
phisticated and politically-motivated [cyb11].
Technical failure involved the railway services. As reported by The Star on 25th July in
2006, during busy hours, the state-linked Light Railway Transit (LRT) system experienced a
computer glitch that resulted in the lost of train tracking on the monitor screen in the control
centre. The situation that followed was a service disruption every five minutes, and the trains
were running at a much slower pace. Due to a failure of backup system, the situation become
worse and caused a thousand passengers to be stranded hours in the trains and at the stations.
Management quoted unexpected technical failure as the cause of disruption.
System malfunction occured at the national stock exchange. Another incident reported by
The Star on 4th July in 2008 involved a computer system malfunction at Bursa Malaysia, the
national stock exchange, suspending a whole-day trading. According to the president of the
Malaysian Investors Association, the interruption to the stock trading caused a government
loss estimated of RM 1 million, which involved stamp duty of contracts, while brokers’ loss
RM 5 million during the non-trading day. The significant effects were not on the monetary
losses to the stock exchange and Malaysian economy but also from the credibility losses.
Malicious attack have occured on government websites. Among the latest incident was a
series of unauthorised access and modifications by anonymous hackers against several gov-
ernment websites by The Star on 17th June 2011. The attacks were series of revenge to the
government’s latest decision to crackdown websites that are allegedly conduct activities in
violation of copyright law. Although the damage was considered minor, the series of in-
tended attack against government websites but it indicated that the national reputation was
at risk.
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3.8.4 National Cyber Exercises in Malaysia
In order to increase the awareness on cyber threats to organisations categorised under CNII,
the Malaysia National Security Council with the support of Cyber Security Malaysia (CSM)
has organised the collaborative National Cyber Crisis Exercise since 2008. The collabora-
tive cyber exercises, known as X-MAYA [Ahm14], have involved the ten CNII sectors, as
described in Section 4.2.The collaborative cyber exercises are conducted to assess the capa-
bilities of CNII agencies to deal with cyber incidents [Ahm14]. As shown in Table 3.6, the
first cyber exercise started in 2008 was X-Maya 1. Then, a series of X Maya exercises were
conducted until the fifth exercise, which took place in 2013. The cyber exercises have been
accepted by the community with an increasing number of participants of 11 agencies in 2008
to 28 agencies in 2009, 34 agencies in 2010, 51 agencies in 2011 and the largest number at
96 agencies in 2013, as shown in Table 3.6. This study involved participants of X-Maya 5,
which are further discussed in studies in Chapter 5 and 6.
Table 3.6 Collaborative Cyber Exercises in Malaysia
Cyber Exercise Date Participants
X Maya 1 24 July 2008 11 Agencies
X Maya 2 10 December 2009 28 Agencies
X Maya 3 4 August 2010 34 Agencies
X Maya 4 15 November 2011 51 Agencies
X Maya 5 25 November 2013 96 Agencies
3.8.5 International Cyber Exercises in Malaysia
Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation - Computer Emergency Response Teams (OIC-
CERT). At the international level, Malaysia has participated in an annual cyber drill that in-
volves the Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (CSIRT) from Asia Pacific economies
and the OIC groups. The theme of the drill was countering cyber-ops with regional coordi-
nation. This exercise exposed real incidents and problems that exist on the Internet, in which
every team performed tracing elements of cyber-op stages. These stages concluded to a point
where CSIRTs/CERTs had to break up the infrastructure that was set up by the hacktivists,
before a denial of service attack unfolds a government service [AH11].
Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT). Malaysia is on the steer-
ing committee of APCERT, which provides a network of security experts in the Asia Pacific
region to improve awareness and competency regarding computer security incidents. This
includes enhancing regional and international cooperation, joint measures to deal with secu-
rity incidents, information-sharing, collaborative research and development, and assistance
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and helps to address legal issues related to information security across boundaries. Today,
APCERT consists of 26 member teams across 19 economies [APc15].
3.9 Chapter Contribution
This chapter highlights the importance of collaborative cyber exercises contributions to CIIP
and cyber security strategy implementations. It also shares some collaborative cyber exercise
implementations in other countries.
3.10 Summary
This chapter reviews the definitions of CI and CII in some countries. The importance of CIIP
was highlighted due to emerging cyber threats that target CII and due to implications of cyber
incidents on critical sectors involving stability of the economy and society. The importance
of collaborative cyber exercise was highlighted through public-private commitments and the
incorporation of collaborative cyber exercises into national cyber security strategies and im-
plementation of cyber exercises in some countries. This chapter also shared the background
of the CNII definitions and sectors in Malaysia, the NCSP, and collaborative cyber exercises
at national and international levels.
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Chapter 4
A Cyber Exercise Post Assessment
Framework
4.1 Introduction
Cyber exercise was initiated to simulate a cyber environment used to develop and assess
the knowledge and skills of information security personnel, which is discussed in Section
2.4.2. The importance of cyber exercise has been expounded as a platform used to assess
the preparedness of a community against cyber incidents. Furthermore, cyber exercises im-
plemented in some countries involving different communities backgrounds and services in
public and private efforts to support cyber security.
Cyber exercises, such as the Blue Cascade exercise conducted in 2010, involve people from
various sectors, including military, finance, telecommunications, and governments, each of
whom had diverse backgrounds, skills, and experiences in cyber incidents [Mar09]. The ex-
ercises incorporating more than one sector are particularly challenging to conduct [WDG04].
To have an effective cyber exercise, a cyber exercise planning team must give careful con-
sideration to the diversity of participants [RMM10].
[MFS+11] argues the simulation environment for cyber exercises often does not perfectly
mirror participants working environments. Meanwhile, post assessment methodologies focus
on organisation and management of the exercise rather than participants outcomes [BVH02].
Thus, how well the lessons are learned from cyber exercises and how they can be transferred
to the participant organisations are still looming questions [MFS+11]. In order to under-
stand the implications of cyber exercises on participants and the benefit to the participants’
organisations, this chapter contributes to the development of a cyber exercise post assess-
ment (CEPA) framework. This framework proposed to answer the third research question
(RQ3), ’how can cyber exercise involved various sectors be beneficial to participants and
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their organisations?’.
This chapter elaborates on the theories related to the post assessment framework in nine sec-
tions. The first three sections explain the first part of the framework, the participant assess-
ment component, which focuses on what benefits participants gain from the cyber exercise
and how they transfer the benefits to their organisations. Section 4.2 addresses the process
of organising cyber exercises. Section 4.3 highlights the limitations of the CEPA methodolo-
gies. Section 4.4 presents the four-level Kirkpatrick model and compare it with other training
models. Section 4.5 explains the adoption of the four-level Kirkpatrick model in the CEPA
framework. Section 4.6 describes the second component of the post assessment framework.
Two main tools suggested to evaluate at organisation level are organisation resilience and
organisation cyber resilince. Section 4.7 provides research designs and implementations of
studies using the proposed post assessment framework. Section 4.8 highlights the chapter’s
contributions, and Section 4.9 summarises the chapter.
4.2 Organising A Cyber Exercise
According to [WDG04], creating and conducting a cyber exercise is a valuable experience for
all participants but can be a major undertaking . A cyber exercise planning team must give
careful consideration to the diversity of participants’ backgrounds [Jas14]. This involves
different IT assets, network monitoring methods, and cyber incident response policies in
participants’ organisations [Mar09]. The exercise master scenario events list (MSEL) must
presents a reasonable scenario to all participants [Jas14]. So that, each event can easily be
mapped back to exercise objectives [RMM10]. The MSEL defined in [Jas14] is a collection
of pre-scripted events intended to guide an exercise towards specific outcomes [Jas14].
The process of organising a cyber exercise involves structured 1) planning, 2) designing, 3)
conducting, and 4) evaluating processes as described in Table 4.1. Some guidelines have
been developed for these processes, as discussed in [GR10] and [EO09]. A major concern
is in the evaluation phase, as shown in Table 4.1. The cyber exercise evaluation phase of
[EO09] focuses on the improvement of one cyber exercise to the next. Meanwhile, the eval-
uation phase of [GR10] has no direction on how the improvement action should be applied
in participants’ environments. Further, limitations of the post assessment methodologies are
discussed in the next section.
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Cyber Exercises Guides
Methods for Enhanced Cyber Exercises:
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) Volume I [GR10]
Good Practice Guide on National Exercises [EO09]
Foundation: To provide the foundation for
an effective exercise: create a base of sup-
port (i.e., establish buy-in from the appropri-
ate entities and/or senior officials); develop
a project management timeline and estab-
lish milestones; identify an exercise planning
team; and schedule planning conferences
Identifying the exercise: In this segment, the orga-
nizer must identify the need for an exercise. This
need will include identification of procedures or
measures that require practice or improvement and
should be exercised. Based on this need, organizers
can then select the type of exercise to conduct, and
which organizations should participate
Design and Development: Building on the ex-
ercise foundation, the design and develop-
ment process focuses on identifying objec-
tives, designing the scenario, creating doc-
umentation, coordinating logistics, planning
exercise conduct, and selecting an evaluation
and improvement methodology.
Planning the exercise: In this segment, the organizer
will drive the planning process. This process will in-
volve recruiting the participants; acquiring financial
resources for the exercise; selecting (and booking)
the location, developing the scenario, rules, tools,
and training materials for the exercise; selecting
monitors and other role-players, and specifying what
and how they will perform their duties; and planning
the evaluation process.
Conduct: After the design and develop-
ment steps are complete, the exercise takes
place. Exercise conduct steps include set up,
briefings, facilitation/control/evaluation, and
wrap-up activities
Executing the exercise: In this segment, the exercise
itself takes place. As specified in the planning pro-
cess, participants go through (by discussing or actu-
ally acting out) the scenario and their response pro-
cedures and decisions. Monitors observe and note
these actions, and inject information into the sce-
nario.
Evaluation: The evaluation phase for all exer-
cises includes a formal exercise evaluation, an
integrated analysis, and an After-action Re-
port (AAR)/Improvement Plan (IP) that iden-
tifies strengths and areas for improvement in
an entitys preparedness. Recommendations
are identified to help develop corrective ac-
tions to be tracked throughout the improve-
ment planning phase.
Evaluating the exercise: Finally, after the exercise it-
self, the evaluation process takes place. This process
tends to include a final evaluation report, or multi-
ple reports tailored for different audiences. These
reports review the exercise, identifying weaknesses,
and recommending improvements. Furthermore,
this process may include an ongoing process or fo-
rum by which to continue to address the weaknesses
and recommendations identified.
Improvement Planning: During improvement
planning, the corrective actions identified in
the evaluation phase are assigned, with due
dates, to responsible parties; tracked to im-
plementation; and then validated during sub-
sequent exercises.
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4.3 Limitations of Cyber Exercises Post Assessment
Methodologies
Post assessment methodologies used for cyber exercises are AAR report, debriefing and hot
wash, were mentioned in Section 2.5.2.2 of Chapter 2. The ENISA survey result in the
section showed that reports were common post assessment methods used to evaluate the
exercise. However, their scope is often limited to management and the organisation of the
exercise.
A limitation of these post assessment methodologies is that they only focus on the event
performance for the exercise designer, facilitators, and consultants (observers) [BVH02].
The learning outcomes for ’players’ are difficult to define and measure [BVH02]. [PT12]
further suggested that the monitoring and evaluation process will be more efficient if good
practices are shared among several exercise organisers.
Limited evidence exists for monitoring and evaluation methods to further help exercise or-
ganisers to structure feedback from participating organisations in the implementation of
lessons learned from cyber exercises [PT12]. Consequently, the study in this chapter pro-
posed a post assessment framework to explore the impacts of the exercise on participants
and their organisations.
4.4 Cyber Exercise Post Assessment Framework
The proposed CEPA framework consists of two main components for participants and organ-
isations, as shown in Figure 4.1. Participants assessment adopted the four-level Kirkpatrick
training model that analyses the participants’ learning outcomes as reactions, learning, be-
haviour, and results. These are explained in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.1: A Cyber Exercise Post Assessment Framework
4.4.1 Kirkpatrick Training Model
In 1954, Don Kirkpatrick was at the University of Wisconsin working on his PhD disser-
tation on evaluating the effectiveness of a supervisory management programme, which he
developed on four simple words: reaction, learning, behaviour, and results. In 1959, Bob
Craig asked him to write an article for the American Society for Training and Develop-
ment (ASTD) journal. Instead of one article, he wrote four articles that summarised of the
Kirkpatrick four levels. In the 1970s, the use of the model grew worldwide as a standard
for training evaluation [Kir09b]. Since then, the Kirkpatrick model of training evaluation
criteria has had widespread and enduring popularity as described in [Bat04] and [Kir75].
The Kirkpatrick four levels: reactions, learning, behaviour, and results as elaborated in
[MA12] and [Bat04]:
Level 1: Reaction: The first level is called reactions; most of this stage involves gather-
ing feedback from participants regarding the training contents, training facilitators, training
environments, and how much the training relates to the participants’ job functions. If the
participants showed a positive reaction after the training, this indicates that the participants
were satisfied with the training programme and applied the skills and knowledge in their
workplaces.
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Level 2: Learning. Learning is defined as new knowledge and skills gained, which are shown
through changes in participants’ behaviours and attitudes.
Level 3: Behaviour. Behaviour measures whether the new knowledge, new skills, and devel-
oped attitudes are transferred to the workplace to reflect positive changes in behaviour and
job performance. As Kirkpatrick highlighted, if learning is not transferred to the job, then it
cannot have any effect on the job and the organisation [Kir09a].
Level 4: Results. The last level is the results. Results are the effects on the organisation’s
business or environment, resulting from the improved performance of the participants.
4.4.1.1 Comparison on Training Models
The Kirkpatrick training model has served as a tool for training evaluators and has led to a
number of other evaluation models [SA93]. This section provides a comparison of training
models. The early Kirkpatrick model was developed in 1959 and updated in 1975, while
other models, such as Tannebum’s, was expanded from Kirkpatrick. [ASG04] provides a
comparison of the four training models as:
Kirkpatrick (1959a, 1959b, 1960a, 1960b): The Kirkpatrick model four dimensional mea-
surement levels: reactions, learning, behaviour, and results. It is the most frequently cited
technique. Learning is measured during training and refers to attitudinal, cognitive, and
behavioural learning. Behaviour refers to on-the-job performance and is measured after
training. Additionally, reactions to training are related to learning, as learning is related to
behaviour, and behaviour is related to results.
Tannebum et al. (1993): This is an expansion of the Kirkpatrick model by adding post train-
ing attitudes and dividing behaviour into two outcomes for evaluation: training performance
and transfer performance. However, reactions to training and post training attitudes are not
related to evaluation. Learning is related to training performance, while training performance
is related to transfer performance, and transfer performance is related to results.
Holton (1996): This model includes three evaluation targets: learning, transfer, and results.
Reactions are not a part of Holton’s model because reactions are not considered a primary
outcome of training; rather, reactions are defined as a mediating and/or moderating variables
between trainees motivation to learn and actual learning. Learning is related to transfer, and
transfer is related to results.
Kraiger (2002): This model emphasises three multidimensional target areas for evaluation:
training content and design, changes in learners, and organisational payoffs. Reactions are
considered a measurement technique for determining how effective the training content and
design were for the tasks to be learned. Kraiger asserted that reaction measures are not
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related to changes in learners or organisational payoffs but that changes in learners are related
to organisational payoffs.
The Kirkpatrick model was selected for its popularity. Discussions on the popularity of the
Kirkpatrick model are explained in the next section.
4.4.1.2 Popularity of the Kirkpatrick Training Model
The Kirkpatrick model has made valuable contributions to training evaluation thinking and
practice by focusing only on training evaluation outcomes [Bat04]. Furthermore, the distinc-
tion between learning (level two) and behaviour (level three) has drawn increased attention
to the importance of the learning transfer process [SA93]. There are other factors that make
the Kirkpatrick training model a popular choice [Bat04]:
Systematic evaluation.The four-level Kirkpatrick model helps to understand training evalu-
ation in a systematic way. It offers a straightforward system, taxonomy, or language that
describes training outcomes. This information can be used to assess the achievements of a
programs objectives.
Simple.The four-level model simplifies the complex process of training evaluation. The
model performs this in several ways: First, the model shows a straightforward guide for
questions that should be asked and the appropriate criteria to be used. Second, the model
reduces the complexity of measurement demands for training evaluation.
Eliminate pre assessment. As the model evaluation process only focuses on four-level out-
come data that are collected after the training has been completed, this eliminates the need
for pre-course measures (pre-evaluation) of learning or job performance measures, which are
not essential to determining the programme effectiveness.
Focus on outcome. Training effectiveness is based solely on outcome. The model greatly
reduces the number of variables that training evaluators need to consider. In effect, the model
eliminates measurements on the surrounding factors that interact with the training process.
This model helps collect outcomes straight from post assessment without a need for pre-
assessment. This was the strongest point supporting the adoption of the model into the post
assessment framework as described in Section 4.5
4.4.1.3 Kirkpatrick Training Model in Other Research
This section describes the use of the Kirkpatrick training model to evaluate several exercises
in banking, education and university training:
Evaluation on learning outcome of a course. [Bas01], conducted research that examined
two cohorts of students that engaged in the same course of study using different means of en-
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gagement. One cohort of 90 students completed a real-time learning programme integrating
group dynamics. A second cohort of 171 students completed the same course in an online
environment. The study examined the learning outcomes of the online cohort using level
two, level three, and level four of the Kirkpatrick model .
Evaluation on a training program in banking sectors. [MA12] used the four levels of the
Kirkpatrick model to examine the effectiveness of the Intermediate Central Banking Course
in Malaysia. The study examined 1) the reactions of the employees to the training pro-
grammes, 2) the level of employee learning, and 3) the employees transfer of training. They
used training feedback questionnaires, pre- and post-tests, face-to-face interviews, learner
development plan reports, and behavioural surveys. The overall result of the study showed
that the effectiveness of the bank training only supported evidence up to level three of the
Kirkpatrick model. The findings of the study contributed to the decision of the policy maker
in the Central Bank of Malaysia justifying the return on investment of the training.
4.5 Adoption of the Kirkpatrick Training Model
4.5.1 Participant Evaluation
The adoption of the four-level Kirkpatrick model to the CEPA is to evaluate the participants’
learning outcomes from their participation in cyber crisis exercise involved multisectors to
test national cyber incidents handling policies and procedures, as depicted in Figure 4.1. This
section explains Part I of the framework, which consists of evaluation of participants based
on the four levels of the Kirkpatrick training model:
Level 1 : Reactions
At the reactions level, we examine participants’ perception about the exercise in terms of:
1. Objective of the exercise,
2. Scenario created for the exercise,
3. Environment setting for the exercise,
4. Participants’ expectation of the exercise, and
5. Result at the end of the exercise,
This feedback contributes to the participants’ perceptions based on what they have experi-
enced during the exercise.
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Level 2: Learning
The knowledge development of individuals is related to a mental model [BP97]. Mental
models are built and developed during a lifetime and are shaped by social and cultural back-
ground, education, and experience [BP97]. Mental models change as people gain experience
and learn from it [ML15]. From a cognitive perspective, people learn as they change their
perceptions after surveying and evaluating the outcomes of their actions [Onw12].
In Chapter 2, the security knowledge and technical skills of information security employees
are developed through continuous learning experiences in their educational life at college
until their working life at their organisations. The knowledge and skills were continuously
developed as participants were involved with more security training and cyber exercises. Cy-
ber crisis exercises has two categorise, first category used to test the cyber incident response
procedures and policies designed in an organisation or at national level. Second exercise nor-
mally to increase information security employee knowledge and skills of new cyber threats
that might potential to effect their organisation as described in Section 2.5.1. Through these
exercises, its intended to give a hands-on, technical experiences to participants. However as
suggested in [AD+06] that these exercises can also be used to further demonstrate the im-
portance of non-technical plans and policies.At this learning level, new conceptual learning
models and new technical skills developed from variants of cyber incident scenarios as a
result of participants’ experiences during cyber exercises. Cyber exercises help to develop
operational capability that support the types of skills and knowledge that lead to cyber situ-
ational awareness (CSA) [ML15].
Level 3 : Behaviour
New knowledge and skills developed during the exercise become a benefit to participants
performing new actions at the behaviour level. These new capabilities of participants in-
clude how to detect relevant situational aspects or new threats and how participants can act
upon them [SPGM11]. As a key challenge for cyber security operators is to develop an
understanding of what is happening within and outside of their networks [TGM12]. This
understanding or CSA provides the cognitive basis for human operators to take appropriate
actions within their environments [TGM12]. Furthermore, defending a valuable digital in-
frastructure requires pursuing two interrelated goals: to maintain the production and at the
same time prevent hackers from gaining access and acting on the network (e.g., stealing
or corrupting data or interfering with process production) [Mar09]. For more effective de-
tection and prevention of cyber threats, the security analyst requirements are an up-to-date
knowledge of cyber threats and how to mitigate the threats.
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Level 4 : Results
At the result level, results are the implementation of decisions and actions of the cognitive
processes at the learning stage and the actions performed at the behaviour stage that directly
affect the organisational environment.
4.6 Organisation Evaluation
Part II involves assessment of organisation resilience (OR) and organisation cyber resilience
(OCR) of the participated organisation in collaborative cyber exercises. The OR used a
benchmark resilience tool (BRT-53) developed by University of Canterbury in New Zealand.
This tool assess OR perceptions in three dimensions of Situation Awareness (SA), Manage-
ment of Keystone Vulnerabilities (KV), and Adaptive Capacity with 15 indicators developed
by Resilient Organisations Research at the University of Canterbury [Ste10]. This tool has
been chosen because it has an indicator that access perception on ’Participation in Exercises’.
Furthermore it has been tested to assess ORs of critical sectors in Auckland [Ste10]. Details
of the BRT-53 was presented in Chapter 6.
The assessment on OCR used the C-Suite Executive cheklist developed by the World Eco-
nomic Forum in 2012. The tool based has three main components of governance, programme
and network. It was developed based on 4 core principles of 1) recognition of interdepen-
dence, 2) role of leadership, 3) integrated risk management and 4) promote uptake. Details
of the tool was elaborated in Chapter 7.
4.7 Chapter Contribution
This chapter proposed a CEPA framework. The framework adopted the Kirkpatrick train-
ing model to assess the participants outcomes and how it benefits their organisations, while
the organisational resilience assessments used surveys developed from organisational cyber
resilience research.
4.8 Summary
This chapter provides the theories used to propose the CEPA Framework. The framework
consists of two main assessment components: participants and participants organisations.
The participant evaluation component adopted the four-level Kirkpatrick training model for
CEPA outcomes: reaction, learning, behaviour, and results.
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Chapter 5
An Investigation into the Impacts of a
Cyber Exercise in Malaysia
5.1 Introduction
The limitations of the current cyber exercise post assessment methodologies were addressed
in Section 4.3. These tend to focus on the participants’ performance during the exercise in
organising and managing the event. As a result, a cyber exercise post assessment framework
was proposed in Section 4.4 to assess the outcome of the cyber exercise, especially the ben-
efits to the participants and their organisations. This chapter describes an investigation that
used the framework.
The investigation involved a cyber exercise called X-Maya 5. The X Maya was organised
to test a new national policy and procedures on cyber crisis in Malaysia which involved 10
CNII sectors as explained in Section 3.8.4. The main objective of the exercise is to test the
communication between 10 CNII sectors during cyber incidents. The X Maya provide a
platform for effective communication and knowledge sharing for incidents handling. The
exercise tests the participants ability to identify threats targeting their cyber environment and
how they handle and solve the incident. For a particular attack, how they can categorised the
attack into a certain level of crisis and how they can response to the attack. The exercise also
provide a platform for knowledge sharing in terms of defend and recovery with other sectors.
Data collected through interviews with X-Maya 5 participants were coded and categorised
according to the four-level Kirkpatrick training model.
This chapter presents the investigation in 11 sections. Section 5.2 explains the purpose of this
study. Section 5.3 describes the semi-structured interviews. Section 5.4 elaborates on two
pilot studies conducted to test the research instrument. Section 5.5 describes data collection
for this study. Section 5.6 provides information on the demographic data of the respondents.
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Section 5.7 provides a data analysis for the study. Section 5.8 presents the finalised cat-
egorises according to the four-level Kirkpatrick training model. Section 5.9 discusses the
results of the study, and Section 5.10 addresses the contributions of this chapter. Section
5.11 summarises the chapter.
5.2 An Investigation into impacts of the X Maya Cy-
ber Exercise
5.2.1 Purpose of the Study
This study aims to answer research question three (RQ3): How do cyber exercises benefit
participants and their organisations? This investigates the effects of the X-Maya exercise
on participants reactions, learning, behaviours, and results, proposed in the post assessment
framework in Section 4.5. The focus of this study is on people who were involved in collab-
orative cyber exercises. Post assessment was used because:
1. The X-Maya cyber exercise involved different participants from 10 different sectors,
which have different working environments and various cyber incident handling poli-
cies and procedures.
2. The X-Maya exercise is a national series organised once a year.
3. Participation was voluntary and on an invitation basis. Thus, no pre-assessment was
involved in the selection process.
4. The people involved with the exercise have different backgrounds in working experi-
ences, skills, and expertise.
5. The participation experiences in X-Maya differ from one participant to another.
6. Data in this study was collected seven months after the exercise event.
5.2.2 Ethical Approval
As this study focusses on human participants, this study complies with the British Pyscho-
logical Society (BPS) ethical guidelines of the University of Glasgow. The ethics appli-
cation proposed using interview questions; organisational resilience and organisational cy-
ber resilience surveys for the research were applied for in 16 May 2014. The application
was approved by the FIMS ethics committee of the University of Glasgow in June 2014.
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The application approval information is displayed in Figure 5.1, with the application no. of
300130005.
Figure 5.1: Ethical Approval for Data Collection on X Maya Participants
5.3 Research Methodology
An interview is designed to elicit the knowledge and beliefs of individuals [Bur94]. The use
of an interview methodology, as recommended in [Bur94], offers one way of collecting data
about peoples subjective experiences, views, and perceptions.
5.3.1 Semi Structured Interview
This study used a semi-structured interview because of the following advantages [LBW94]:
1. It is well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions on specific issues.
It enables probing for more information and clarification on a respondents answer.
2. Semi-structured interviews can provide reliable and comparable qualitative data. It
can facilitate comparability by ensuring that all questions are answered by each re-
spondent.
3. The wording and sequence of all questions are standardised for all respondents. There-
fore, the differences in the respondents answers are due to differences among them
rather than in the questions asked.
4. The analysis process of a semi-structured interview is relatively straightforward. All
responses to a question from each of the respondents can be grouped together, and
various themes can easily be identified [Bur94].
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Semi-structured interviews are suitable for data collection from X-Maya participants from
multiple sectors with different security backgrounds and experiences. Differences exist in
participation experience in X-Maya exercises. Some of the participants had been involved
with cyber exercises for several years, while some had just joined for the first time. The
respondents experience with X-Maya is shown in Table 5.4.
The Kirkpatrick model normally uses to assess individual performance in training. As this
study aims to assess the impact of X Maya on individual and their organisation using this
model. The development of the interview questions in Table 5.1 were based on the four-level
Kirkpatrick model, guiding the interview topics to be discussed.
Table 5.1 Interview Questions Involved X Maya Respondents
No Interview Questions
1 When did you start getting involved with cyber exercise?
2 How many times have you been involved with cyber exercise, including X-
Maya?
3 Would you like to share your experience in X-Maya in terms of its objectives,
the scenario, setting environment, and facilitator? What was the scenario used
in the X Maya 5 exercise? Do you think it was easy to understand?
4 What have you learnt from the X-Maya 5 exercise and other cyber exercises
in which you have been involved?
5 How did X-Maya 5 help you to contribute to cyber security in your organisa-
tion?
6 Did you revise the existing security standards, policies, and guidelines after
attending the X-Maya exercise?
7 Has there been any improvement on standards, policies, and guidelines that
you have proposed after attending the X-Maya exercise?
8 Do you think the scenario and infrastructure used in X-Maya should be im-
plemented in your organisation?
9 Do you plan to run your own cyber exercise in your organisation?
5.4 Pilot Study
The interview questions in Table 5.1 were initially tested on two security experts. The first
test was on the confidentiality of interview items. A set of interview questions was sent to
an officer from Malaysia National Security (MSN). The officer was involved in the X-Maya
exercises. The test was to ensure the confidentiality and suitability of the interview questions
to be used to collect data from X-Maya participants. The officer agreed that the interview
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questions have not asked any confidential information about X-Maya. He also agreed that the
questions could be used to collect data. Based on his agreement, emails were sent to 10 CNII
sector leaders involved in the X-Maya 5 exercise to recruit respondents for the interview.
The second test was on the suitability of interview items. An interview was conducted with
an officer who was involved as a sector leader in a participating sector in the interview.
The test found that people who were not directly involved with the exercise had limited
information to answer Questions 3, 4, and 5, which related to operational and technical
aspects of the exercise. Based on this situation, one of the requirements for the participants
for the study is that they were fully involved in the exercise, as described in Section 5.5.1.
5.5 Data Collection
According to [CH96], it can be impractical to obtain measures from a total population due
to accessibility, expense, and time. Because of these limitations, data collection for this
research involved a smaller group or subset of the population with an assumption that the
information generated will represent the population under study. This smaller group or subset
is called the sample . This study used a sample from X-Maya 5 participants to investigate
the impact of national cyber exercises called X-Maya in Malaysia.
5.5.1 Sampling Strategy
Details information on X Maya has been asked during the interview with the X Maya or-
ganiser (Malaysia National Security), but limited information were revealed by the officer
because of confidentiality issues. However, we have tried to gather as much information re-
garding X Maya through, X Maya video [Ahm14], participants and Cyber Security Malaysia.
Information on X-Maya 5 participants was from a public source [Ahm14]. This sampling
technique was recognised as a convenience sampling technique. Two characteristics of par-
ticipants were required:
1. The participants must be representatives of the 10 CNII sectors identified by the Malaysian
National Cyber Security Policy as defence and security, banking and finance, informa-
tion and communications, energy, transportation, water, health services, government,
emergency services, and food and agriculture.
2. The participants must have been fully involved as players in the X-Maya 5 exercise.
From all the sector leaders contacted, only 15 participants replied and agreed to be inter-
viewed: five from government agencies, three from the military sector, and seven from
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telecommunication sectors. Each sector represented by one organisation except government
which involved two different agencies. All participants are players during the X Maya ex-
ercise. Most of them have well technical background and skills. They also involved with
system and network administrations at their organisation.
Table 5.2 Interview Participants
Sector No of Participants
Government 5
Military 3
Telecommunication 7
X Maya involved a group of players that performed in the cyber crisis to represent their
organisation and sector. So the post assessment interviews were conducted in groups inter-
views as displayed in Table 5.2. Interviews were conducted in July 2014. All interviews
were conducted at the participants offices, and all conversations were recorded in mp3 for-
mat. The interviews lasted for 60 to 130 minutes. Details of the interview activities are listed
in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Information on Interview Activities
Interview
Date
Number of
Participants
Audio File Audio File Size (Kilo-
byte)
16 July 2014 7 MCMC.mp3, 10554KB
17 July 2014 3 KML.mp3 13475KB
18 July 2014 2 SPPM.mp3 10554KB
25 July 2014 3 AF.mp3 21624KB
5.6 Demographic Data
Before each interview started, some background data of participants were collected, includ-
ing their experience with the X-Maya exercise, as shown in Table 5.4; their working expe-
rience with the organisation, as shown in Table 5.5; and their experience with the industry
sector, as shown in Table 5.6. Other information on their participation in preparation training
organised by Cyber Security Malaysia is illustrated in Table 5.7.
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5.6.1 Experience in X Maya Exercises
The participation in the X-Maya exercise is on an invitation and voluntary basis. Most partic-
ipants from the public sector and government agencies received orders from their respective
ministries to get involved with the exercise. All the respondents of the interview were partic-
ipants of X-Maya 5, which was conducted in November 2013. Some had participated since
the first X-Maya exercise in 2008.
Table 5.4 Experience in X Maya Exercises
X Maya (Exercise Series) 1 2 3 4 5
Experience in X Maya (No of People) 5 6 9 12 15
5.6.2 Response on Working Experience in Organisation
As described in Table 5.5, three respondents have more than 20 years of working experience.
There are five respondents in each category of four to 10 years and 11 to 20 years of working
experience. Two respondents have less than three years of working experience.
Table 5.5 Response on Work Experience in Organisation
Working Experience in Organisation Frequency
1 to 3 years 2
4 to 10 years 5
11-20 years 5
>21 3
5.6.3 Response on Working Experience in Industry Sector
Table 5.6 shows that three respondents have more than 20 years of working experience.
Seven respondents have working experiences between 11 to 20 years. Five respondents have
four to 10 years of working experience.
Table 5.6 Response on Work Experience in Industry Sector
Working Experience in Industry Sector Frequency
4 to 10 years 5
11 to 20 years 7
>21 3
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5.6.4 Participation in Security Training
Cyber Security Malaysia has organised training for X-Maya participants. Before the ex-
ercise started, participants were invited to attend this training. However, according to the
respondents, seats for the training were limited, and the cost of the training was paid by their
organisations. Data regarding involvement in the training is shown in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7 Response on Cyber Security Training
Cyber Security Training Frequency
YES 10
NO 5
Total 15
5.7 Data Analysis
Data analysis for this study used a deductive approach based on the proposed collaborative
cyber exercise post assessment framework. As referred to [BGS+08], there are two funda-
mental approaches to analyse qualitative data, each of which can be handled in a variety of
different ways :
Deductive Approach. This approach involves a structure or predetermined framework to
analyse the data. Normally, the researcher imposes a structure or set of theories on the data.
They used the theories to analyse the interview transcripts.
Inductive Approach. This approach analyses data with little or no predetermined theory,
structure, or framework and uses the data to derive the structure of the analysis. The approach
is comprehensive and time consuming. It is most suitable where little or no information is
known about the subject.
Although coding an interview is widely recognised as a common step in the analysis process,
many researchers do not fully explain how this process is done [DGMM11]. One qualitative
interview data analysis method in [Bur91] involved 14 stages. Interview data analysis for
this study involved six stages as depicted in Figure 5.2
5.7. Data Analysis 71
Figure 5.2: Data Analysis Process
Stage 1: Audio Transcription:
Data analysis for this study started with transcribing audio interview data in mixed Malay
and English in its original format. During the interview, the participants were encouraged to
speak any language with which they were comfortable. In the first round of the interviews,
the interviewer found limited responses from the interviewee if they were asked in English;
therefore, in order to eliminate any language barriers, the interviews were conducted in En-
glish and Malay. The interview audio was played repeatedly, and the interview data were
transcribed into six individual documents, one for each interview. Transcribed data was also
sent to participants to get more clarification and agreement from participants. Samples of the
transcripts are displayed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
Stage 2: Transcripts Translation:
The original transcripts in Malay and English were read through, translated, and documented
in English. The aim was to standardise the text used in the coding processes. Two colleagues
were invited to validate the translation transcripts. Figure 5.4 shows a sample of the transcript
in English.
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Figure 5.3: A Sample of Interview Transcript in Original Form
Figure 5.4: A Sample of Interview Transcript in English
Stage 3: Text Cleaning:
For each translated transcript, interview Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 and their answers were
extracted from the script and transferred into a table shown in Appendix G. These questions
provide questions and participant’s answer at each of Kirkpatrick level. At this stage, only
text that specifically answered the interview questions was transferred into the table, while
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dross remained in the original transcripts. [Mos85] defined dross as text that occurs in the
transcripts that is not related to the interview topic. Extracted scripts are ready for coding in
the next stage, while the remained scripts kept in original format and will be used in a future
project.
Stage 4 : Code Development and Coding:
This stage involved two important processes 1) code development and 2) coding.
Code development: [MHS13] described a code as a label that assigns symbolic meaning
or inferential information, which is compiled during a study. Codes are usually attached to
data chunks of varying size and can be in the form of a straightforward, descriptive label or
more evocative and complex labels . The code for a chunk of data is determined by carefully
reading and reflecting on its core content or meaning [MHS13]. For this study, transcripts
were read through and code themes generated according to the four-level Kirkpatrick model,
as in Table 5.8. Code generation was done iteratively to ensure that all data was coded against
the right themes.
Coding: According to [MHS13] coding is a heuristic method of discovery. Coding is a
data condensation task that enables analysts to retrieve the most meaningful material and
to assemble the chunks of data together [MHS13]. At this stage, clean transcripts are read
through. Codes and code themes are generated.
Some code themes developed according to the four-level Kirkpatrick model of reaction,
learning, behaviour, and results, as described in Table 5.8. As proposed in Section 4.5.1,
the four code themes defined at the reaction level were 1) objective, 2) scenario, 3) environ-
ment, and 4) expectation. At the learning level, the three code themes generated from the
scripts were 1) new skills, 2) experience, and 3) communication. At the behaviour level, two
code themes were generated 1) situation awareness and 2) safeguard environment. At the
results level, four code themes were generated: 1) new policy, 2) new procedure, 3) revised
policy, and 4) revised procedures. Every code theme has its own code. These codes were
used to annotate the transcripts on a line-by-line basis, this process is called coding. The
sample of the coded transcripts is shown in Appendix G.
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Table 5.8 Code Themes for Coding and Categories Interview Data
Interview Questions Kirkpatrick Levels Themes Code
Question 3: What are partic-
ipants’ reactions regarding the
cyber exercise objective, sce-
nario, environment setting, and
facilitator?
Level 1: Reaction(RE) 1) OBJECTIVE (RE:OBJ), 2)
SCENARIO (RE:SC), 3)ENVI-
RONMENT(RE:ENV), 4) EX-
PECTATION(RE:EXP)
Question 4: What did the partic-
ipant learn during the cyber ex-
ercise? (new skills, policy, com-
munication, procedure, etc.)
Level 2: Learning(LE) 1) NEW SKILL(LE:SK), 2)EX-
PERIENCE (LE:EX), 5) COM-
MUNICATION(LE:COMM),
Question 5: What are the effects
of changes in behaviour due to
the cyber exercise experience?
Level 3: Behaviour(BE) 1) SITUATION AWARE-
NESS(BE:SA), 2) SAFE-
GUARD ENVIRON-
MENT(BE:SE)
Questions 6 & 7: Any new im-
plementation in the organisation
after participating in cyber exer-
cise?
Level 4: Result(RS) 1) NEW POLICY (RS:NEW
PS), 2)NEW PROCE-
DURES(RS: NEW PRO), 3)RE-
VISED PROCEDURES(RS:RE
PRO),4)REVISED POL-
ICY(RS: RE POL)
Stage 5: Data Categorisation:
At this stage, all text with the same code is combined into categories. The categories rep-
resented by the four-level Kirkpatrick model were reaction, learning, behaviour, and results.
This stage finalised the coded text. Repeated data were removed from the lists. Table 5.9
provides definitions of the final code themes and their categories.
Two people were invited to match the generated category system. One of them are partic-
ipant of the X Maya.Themes code description are presented in Table 5.9 and a list of text
with 48 items were given to them. They have to match the code with the items. Forty-eight
categorised items were analysed using SPSS. Every item which matched correctly with the
code theme will given a score of one and labeled as similar, while false item were score as
zero and labeled as different.The aim of this stage is to enhance the validity of the categori-
sation method and to avoid researcher bias. Kappa metrics were then used to measure the
differences in categorising the text.
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Table 5.9 Description of Themes Code
Kirkpatrick
Levels or
Category
Themes Code Code & Code Description
Level 1:
(RE)
1)OBJECTIVE RE:OBJ-1) To describe the participant’ reactions to-
wards the objective of the exercise.
2)SCENARIO RE:SC-2) To describe the participants’ reactions to-
wards the scenario of the exercise.
3)ENVIRONMENT RE:ENV-3) To describe the participants’ reactions
towards the environment of the exercise.
4)EXPECTATION RE:EXP-4) To describe the participants’ reactions
regarding their expectations towards the exercise.
Level 2:
(LE)
1)NEW SKILL LE:NS-1)To describe the participants’ perceptions
of new skills developed from the exercise.
2)EXPERIENCE LE:EX-2) To describe the participants’ perceptions
in experiencing the exercise situation.
3)COMMUNICATION LE:COMM-4)To describe the participants’ percep-
tions in communicating solutions during the exer-
cise.
Level 3:
(BE)
1)SITUATION AWARE-
NESS
BE:SA-1)To describe the participants’ perceptions
of the increment of their situation awareness by
changes in their monitoring behaviour towards the
cyber environment in their organisations.
2)SAFEGUARD ENVI-
RONMENT
BE:SE-2) To describe the participants’ perceptions
of behaviour towards the cyber environment in their
organisations.
Level 4:
(RS)
1)NEW POLICY RS:NEW PS-1)To describe the participants’ percep-
tions of changes to the current policy in their work-
ing environments.
2)NEW PROCEDURES RS:NEW PRO-2) To describe the participants’ per-
ceptions in implementing new incident handling
procedures in their organisational environments.
3)REVISED PROCE-
DURES
RS:RE PRO-3)To describe the participants’ percep-
tions of the revision of current incident handling pro-
cedures in their organisational environments.
4)REVISED POLICY RS:RE POL-4) To describe the participants’ percep-
tions of the revision of current incident handling
policies in their organisational environments.
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Inter-rater reliability was checked for each item. Table 5.10 illustrates the Kappa value for
the categorisation results, which was 0.833. As suggested in [Fle81], the interpretation of
the Kappa value is shown in Table 5.11. Values exceeding 0.75 suggest strong agreement
above chance, and values in the range of 0.40 to 0.75 indicate fair levels of agreement above
chance, while values below 0.40 indicate poor levels of agreement above chance. The Kappa
agreement shows that the two research assistants (RAs) have achieved almost perfect cate-
gorisation on the list of text, according to the code themes, and the results are statistically
significant (<0:0005).
Table 5.10 Inter-rater reliability for text categorisation
Value Asymp. Std Error Approx. T Approx Sig
Measure of Agreement Kappa 0.833 0.114 5.855 0.000
N of Valid Cases 48
Table 5.11 Kappa Coefficient Values and Interpretation
Kappa Value Interpretation
Below 0.00 Poor
0.00-0.20 Slight
0.21-0.40 Fair
0.41-0.60 Moderate
0.61-0.80 Substantial
0.81-1.00 Almost perfect
Stage 6: Results Presentation:
Final results presented in form of individual comments and group merged results. The in-
dividual data extracted from the translated transcripts presented as participants’ comments
at each Kirkpatrick level. While the merged results were the final categorised system which
provide a group outcome as presented in Section 5.8 in form of a tabular table. The group
outcome will be used to develop a quantitative survey for the X Maya assessment in the
future study as proposed in Section 8.4.
Table 5.12 Final Category and Number of Items
Category Frequency
Reactions Objective (5), Scenario (10), Environment (3), Expectation (3)
Learning New Skills(9), Experience(2), Communication(3)
Behaviour Situation Awareness (2), Safeguard Environment (3)
Results New Policy(3), New Procedure (1), Revised Policy (1), Revised Procedure(3)
5.8. Categorised Results 77
5.8 Categorised Results
This section presents the findings of participants’ perceptions on how the X-Maya national
collaborative cyber exercise benefits participants and their organisations. This section presents
the participants’ individual comments and group merged views for each theme and category
as follows.
5.8.1 Level 1: Reactions
Level one presents the participants’ reactions concerning the cyber exercise, which fall under
four categories:
1. objective of the exercise,
2. scenario,
3. environment, and
4. expectations.
Regarding the objective, all participants have agreed that the objectives of the X-Maya ex-
ercise are 1) sharing information on cyber threats, 2) sharing solutions among collaborator
sectors and agencies, 3) promoting interdependency awareness among sectors, and 4) es-
tablishing communication among sectors during a cyber crisis. These were supported by
participants’ response as follows:
”Technical skills is not their main aims. Previously, in the first X Maya, they announced
the winner at the end of the event. Usually people from ISPs won, because they got the right
skills.... what they really want us to achieve is not the technical skills but the effective com-
munication. Awareness to participants, where to communicate when incidents happened.”
(Military Officer 1, Male).
”Whatever things happened, all the agencies should have the incidents response teams
response to the incidents, this is what we are tested, in how we tackle the issues and how we
resolve the issues.” (Telecommunication Officer 1, Male).
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”Every team got different attack, we need to share how to solve and mitigate the attack. If
real incidents happened we will help each other. Establish communication and sharing the
knowledge among us.” (Government Agency 1, Officer 2, Male).
”One of the X Maya objectives is to coordinate the government and private organisations
in incidents handling and reporting.” (Military Officer 2, Male).
”X Maya is more on management in how to manage incidents.” (Government Agency 2,
Officer 1, Female).
Participants’ perceptions on the scenario are categorised into a simulated scenario used in
X Maya, types of attacks used in the X-Maya scenario (i.e., Trojan, Distributed Denial-of-
service ( DDoS) , etc.) and levels of attacks (i.e., web, sever, or application). Regarding the
environment, participants specifically identified the setting of X-Maya exercise as 1) an iso-
lated area 2) using virtualisation (i.e., virtual machine) and 3) using a virtual private network.
Some positive and negative comments from X Maya participants as stated:
”The attacks were on server....using virtual servers, they sent us a server with free BSD
configured environment, which we have not familiar with. Our systems used Windows envi-
ronment....We are not being train with free BSD and it has no realism.” (Military Officer 3,
Male).
”There are several attacks techniques....Malware, DDos, Trojan and Botnet.” (Military Of-
ficer 1, Male).
”Each scenario is different, as in Apache, they changed the configuration and put a flag on
the directory. DDos was the last scenario. Various scenario used as application, email, web,
server dierctory.” (Government Agency 1, Officer 2, Male).
”Scenario in X Maya 5 are similar with previous X Maya. In X Maya 1 and 2 they used
attacks on Apache server and web defacement. In X Maya 5, it involved more technical, the
DDos.” (Government Agency 1, Officer 1, Male).
”..., the X Maya scenario is not helping much because the scenario is more suitable for an
organisation and not for ISPs.” (Telecommunication Officer 2, Male).
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”...the differences between X Maya and our cyber drill..X Maya use more defacement, ISPs
cyber drill used DDos high volume, X Maya test on 10 CNII sectors, the organiser has to
cater all threats, Defacements, sql injection....” (Telecommunication Officer 3, Male).
”We can simulate the X Maya environment for our organisation exercise, we can create
the worms and bugs. The only thing that a bit difficult is to fix the threats, it’s really need
knowledge and skills.” (Government Agency 2, Officer 3, Male).
”...they provide us with a pen drive installed with VM with console. We need to install
and activate a key to establish a communication to the host server, through a VPN tunnel,
simultaneous attacks launch from the host server. We are in an isolated area in a cloud..”
(Government Agency 1, Officer 1, Male).
Participants’ perceptions regarding expectations were gaining defensive skills as new capa-
bilities that the organiser expects from the participants, improving participants’ skills for the
exercise, and solving the incidents within a set time frame. Some participants’ comments as
follows:
”For the exercise....we need certain skills in incidents handling. For example analyse mal-
ware skills, analyse IP skills, tracing logs and how to analyse information from news, social
network, they used news and social network as a medium.” (Military Officer 2, Male).
”....in previous exercise, the expectation was to solve the issue. During X Maya 5 we were
not just to resolve the issue but we have to trace and identify the attacker....try to attack back
the attacker.” (Military Officer 3, Male).
Details of participants’ merged and categorised results presents a level 1 of Kirkpatrick
Model as showed in Table 5.13.
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Table 5.13 Results Categorised in Level 1: Reactions
Objective Participants realised that the X-Maya exercise is not for competition. All partici-
pants agreed that X-Maya is not for testing the participants’ skills but for assessing
the incident handling reporting procedures and processes. All participants agreed
that the X-Maya exercise is a platform to provide knowledge sharing in solving in-
cidents and sharing solutions between agencies. The participants comprehended that
the exercises test the communications between sectors during an emergency or cri-
sis. Participants understood that the cyber exercise objective was to achieve effective
communication. The participants also understood that the exercise was used to de-
velop awareness of interdependencies and proper communication during a crisis.
Scenario Participants perceived that each scenario has a different purpose. They also found
that the simulation scenario lacked realism. While from ISP perspectives, the sce-
nario created was insufficient for the ISP sector because the scenario was too general,
which was suitable for other sectors but not for ISPs. The participants agreed that the
cyber exercise scenario could easily be implemented in their organisations, but the
methods to fix vulnerabilities are a bit difficult. The threats used in the X-Maya sce-
nario are quite general and of multiple types, including threats on web, file, network,
and server (apache). Some ISP participants felt that the exercise should focus more
at the network level, which suits their business. The organiser purposefully used dif-
ferent attacks launched simultaneously to different agencies. Some attacks were sent
by email. Trojan attacks were also used in the exercise scenario.
Environment The participants noticed that the environment setup used in X-Maya 5 was similar to
previous exercise setups. The simulation operated on a virtual machine (VM) envi-
ronment with a virtual private network connection. Copies of VM were distributed
to participants and operated at their isolated area within the cloud.
Expectation The organisers were expecting more defensive action from the participants, including
fighting back against the attacker. Participants believe that certain skills are needed
for the exercise, importantly analysing network traffic and incident handling skills.
The participants agreed that time is an important element because they needed to
solve every incident within an allocated time.
5.8.2 Level 2 :Learning
At level two, learning developed as the participants agreed that they developed new techni-
cal skills during the exercise, especially skills related to cyber incident handling. They learnt
new procedures to determine cyber threats according to national cyber threat levels, and they
learnt how to address incidents and coordinate through communication between agencies as
described by participants:
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”We work in a close system, we are less likely to see a real incidents. What we got only a
theory....In X Maya we can see how attacks happen. We need to work in team and discuss in
how to mitigate the attacks. We learnt new skills and procedure...” (Military Officer 2, Male).
”All agencies under Sector Lead share their solutions. They followed steps by steps. It
was not for race, they want to see how we handle the situations...using different method-
ologies...either fast or slow response...how long we used to solve the issues” (Government
Agency 2, Officer 1, Female).
”At the beginning of the exercise, we were confused..all participants were also confused...we
try to understand the scenario ...we discuss among agencies....we try to get a clear picture
of the attack” (Government Agency 1, Officer 1, Male).
”There were limited seat for X Maya training. We have to pay for the training....” (Govern-
ment Agency 2, Officer 1, Female).
”Skills to handle incidents has already been developed in organisation..but because of cyber
is very dynamic, we need creativity to solve the incidents” (Military Officer 2, Male).
”..we can see which technical part we need to improve. In one exercise expose us that our
technical experience and skills are not up to the national level...In some cyber drill expose
us that our SOP was not good enough” (Telecommunication Officer 1, Male).
The merged participants’ outcome on level 2 of Kirkpatrick Model described in Table 5.14.
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Table 5.14 Results Categorised in Level 2: Learning
New Skill All cyber exercise participants agreed that they have learnt new technical
skills during the exercise, specifically, in how to identify an attack when it
occurs. Participants learnt how to handle incidents and how to share their
problem if they cannot solve them. Some participants have not had oppor-
tunities to be involved in the training provided before the X-Maya because
the seats for the course were limited. Some participants have already ac-
quired skills from previous government training. The participants could
identify the use of latest trends of DDoS attacks and knew how to mitigate
risks. Participants learnt how to recognise and classify cyber threats based
on national threat levels as low, moderate, high, and crucial. General rules
should be applied during a crisis. Organisations need to define crisis stages,
and business must run as usual.
Communication Participants knew how to establish communication during incidents. If an
incident happened, they knew how to share solutions between agencies in
handling the issues because they understood how to coordinate communi-
cation between the sector leader and other agencies.
Experience Participants felt confused at the beginning of the exercise and not noticed
of any attack scenario used in the exercise. Some participants felt that they
did not have enough experience in Linux, while some participants agreed
that their skills have already been developed in their organisation. They just
practised their skills and gained experience, which required more creativity
in using the skills.
5.8.3 Level 3 : Behaviours
At level three, the X-Maya helped develop the cyber exercise situation awareness by in-
creased network monitoring activities and develop an enthusiasm to safeguard their working
environments.
”The X Maya help us to increase our monitoring activities in our agency.” (Government
Agency 2, Officer 1, Female).
”After attending the X Maya exercise, we become aware on our cyber environment. We
updated the anti virus, patches everything to ensure that our environment secure from at-
tacks...we try to safeguard everything in our environment.” (Government Agency 1, Officer
1, Male).
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”...We advise our system administrator to upgrade the systems...” (Military Officer 2, Male).
The merged outcome on level 3 of Kirkpatrick Model are displayed in 5.15.
Table 5.15 Results Categorised in Level 3: Behaviour
Situation
Awareness
All participants agreed that the X-Maya exercises have improved their situa-
tion awareness, especially in network monitoring. Furthermore, with X-Maya
experience, the participants have increased their monitoring activities in the
agency.
Safeguard Participants have started asking the system administrator in the organisation
to regularly update and patch their computers. They have to ensure that the
working environment is secured. They took full responsibility to safeguard all
the facilities in their work environments.
5.8.4 Level 4 : Results
At level four, the coding results showed how their organisations benefited from the cyber ex-
ercise were through reviewing the existing organisation policies in handling cyber incidents
and through new procedures to report incidents.
Some response from the participants’ as the following:
”We reviewed our incidents handling procedures...Previously we report all incidents to the
Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU)...Now
the direction of reporting incidents change to Sector Leads.” (Military Officer 2, Male).
”As awareness to system administrator..anything happened we have to report to the sector
lead first before escalates the incidents to other agencies” (Military Officer 3, Male).
”The sector leads need to update the incidents following the National track levels of low,
medium, high and crucial...based on colours...For low level, business has to operate as
usual” (Military Officer 1, Male).
”The lead sector will lead to update the NC4. The NC4 belongs to MKN. Whatever direction
or instructions given by the NC4 will be channel only to the lead sector. Lead sectors then
need to communicate to their agencies.” (Telecommunication Officer 2, Male).
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”We tested our SOP during the X Maya especially on the network communication.” (Telecom-
munication Officer 1, Male).
Participants’ outcome for Level 4 of Kirkpatrick Model merged and presented in Table 5.16.
Table 5.16 Results Categorised in Level 4 : Results
New Policy Participants ensured the system administrator in their organisation up-
graded and patched the entire server on a periodic basis. At the national
level, the lead sector needs to update the NC4 policy. The lead sector
then escalates the report to the agencies.
Revised Policy Participants were involved in creating new organisational incident pro-
cedures that suit the agencies.
Revised Proce-
dures
Participants have revised their organisational cyber incident handling
procedures and improved the procedure. The previous procedure stated
to report any incidents to MAMPU. Now, it has changed the report di-
rection to the sector lead. Reports must be based on flag level. Every
level involved different working groups.
New Procedures Participants were involved in creating new organisational incident pro-
cedures that suit the agencies.
5.9 Discussion
This section discussed the categorised results according to the four-level Kirkpatrick model
of reactions, learning, behaviour, and results. At level one, it presents the participants re-
actions about the cyber exercise, including the objectives of the exercise, the scenario, the
environment, and expectation. At this level, three main purposes of the X-Maya objectives
addressed are 1) to provide knowledge sharing on cyber threats, 2) to provide knowledge
sharing in solving incidents between agencies, 3) to increase awareness of interdependen-
cies between sectors, and 4) to develop proper communication during a cyber crisis. These
findings support the objectives of X-Maya as presented in [Ahm14], which focussed on as-
sessing the effectiveness of action, communications, and national security coordination in
dealing with existing cyber crises. The X Maya objectives also match the general purposes
of collaborative cyber exercises as presented in Section 2.5.1 and are similar to other collab-
orative cyber exercise implementations in other countries, as described in Section 3.6. This
indicated that Malaysia has awareness regarding the importance of protecting the CNII from
cyber threats and developing strategies and implementations as described in Section 3.8.1.
In terms of scenarios, it addressed 1) the simulated scenario used in the X-Maya, 2) types
of attacks used in the X-Maya scenario, and 3) levels of attacks. The limitation of using a
5.9. Discussion 85
virtualisation environment was less realism. Furthermore, the differences in business back-
grounds of participants also affected the participants satisfaction in terms of attack types
and levels used in the exercise, which may be suitable for other sectors, but not for ISPs, as
their business mainly focusses on telecommunications and networks. Thus, they were not
really satisfied with the scenario provided. The organiser purposely used several types of
attacks (i.e., DDoS, Trojan, etc.) and several levels (web, application, server, etc.), which
have different purposes to increase participants awareness of the possibility of sources of
cyber-attacks at their organisations. In terms of environment, the participants claimed that
the setting was quite similar to previous exercises that used a VM with a Linux environment,
and some agencies felt unfamiliar with the environment. The differences in participants
environments from the X-Maya exercise reduced the ability for lessons learnt from the exer-
cise, as it could not be transferred to their organisations. To match participants expectations
in terms of scenario and environment, the organiser should involve the participants at the
planning stages of the exercise, as suggested in [GR10]. Participants perceptions of expec-
tations were 1) gaining defensive skills as new capabilities that the organiser expected from
the participants, 2) improving participants skills for the exercise, and 3) solving the incidents
within a set time frame. In terms of expectations, they were expecting to solve every inci-
dent within the time given and to see how they could communicate to solve the crisis. The
communication process and procedures were tested during the exercise. This is to increase
the participants awareness of interdependencies and consequences of the crisis if they failed
to solve it.
Level two shows how participants benefited from the X-Maya exercise. Learning developed,
as the participants agreed that they developed new technical skills during the exercise, es-
pecially skills related to cyber incident handling. They learnt new procedures to determine
the cyber threats according to national cyber threat levels. They learnt how to address the
incidents and coordinate them through communication between agencies. However accord-
ing to organiser, most participants defence capabilities are still lacking because they were
only manage to recover from attacks but not able to respond to the attacker (attack against
the attacker).The defending skills are still lacking and need to be increased through future
training and practices.
At level three, the behaviour that developed during the cyber exercise was situation aware-
ness that increased their network monitoring activities. It also developed enthusiasm to
safeguard their working environments. These individual behaviours contribute to situation
awareness of the organisation towards cyber threats. The result at level four showed how
their organisations benefited from the cyber exercise through their actions on creating new
policies and procedures on cyber incident reporting, which increased coordination and coop-
eration during cyber crises.
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5.10 Chapter Contribution
This chapter contributes to the use of the first part of the post assessment of cyber exercise
framework to investigate the effect of the exercise on the participants. This chapter also
shares the data analysis process for the interview data, including the code generation and
the validation of the categories for the interview data. The inter-rater reliability results for
categorised items showed the Kappa agreement for the two research assistants (RAs) have
achieved almost perfect categorisation on the list of text, according to the code themes.
5.11 Summary
This chapter explained the investigation on the effect of the cyber exercise on participants
and their organisations using the cyber exercise post assessment framework. The study uses
an interview as a methodology to collect data on participants perceptions on the collabora-
tive cyber exercise called X-Maya in Malaysia. Interview data were coded and categorised
according to the four-level Kirkpatrick training model for levels of reactions, learning, be-
haviour, and results, as adopted in the collaborative cyber exercise post assessment frame-
work.
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Chapter 6
A Preliminary Investigation on
Organisation Resilience
6.1 Introduction
Many cyber threats are difficult to detect and identify by a single organisation. Collaborative
cyber exercises use scenarios to help collaborators practise their crisis management within an
interconnected network of the participants [WG04]. In general, a Scenario-Based Exercise
(SBE) is defined as a methodology for an organisation to understand its business environ-
ment during a disruption, and to put in place efficient and effective plans for surviving the
damage caused by those events [PCC03].
Through SBEs, participants can simulate cyber risks that could affect their business opera-
tions. They provide the opportunity to validate policies, plans and procedures, and processes
in their organisations [BP97] , [MCD08]. This can enhance their capabilities in the prepara-
tion, prevention, response, recovery and continuity operations which contribute to resilience
[PCC03].
However, collaborative cyber exercise scenario development is challenging due to the di-
versity of participants, as well as their different in information assets and cyber incidents
response policies [WG04]. This causes difficulty for cyber exercise planning teams in build-
ing exercise scenarios across-sectors, which challenge participants and, at the same time,
satisfy exercise objectives [PCC03].
The objective of cyber crisis management through SBEs is to transfer useful learning out-
comes for future and unexpected cyber crisis situations to participants’ organisations, and
to promote resilience in critical information infrastructures [MCD08],[Wyb08]. Measuring
the effectiveness of SBEs in supporting resilience is still subject of research [MCD08]. This
preliminary study investigates the suitability of existing organisation resilience tools to as-
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sess organisations participating in scenario based cyber exercises. Subsequently, this study
investigates the relationship between SBE and organisation resilience (OR). The suitable OR
tool, will be used as a second components of the post assessment framework proposed in
Section 4.4.
This chapter is organised into nine sections: Section 6.2 provides a background study on
SBE. Section 6.3 shares information on organisation resilience and organisation resilience
benchmarking tools. Section 6.4 explains details of the investigation. Section 6.5 describes
the research methodology and the research instruments used in the study. Section 6.6 shares
data collection of the study. Section 6.7 focuses on data analysis, including the reliability,
the one-way ANOVA and the correlation tests. Section 6.8 discusses the results of the study.
Finally, Section 6.9 summarises the chapter.
6.2 Scenario and Scenario-Based Exercise (SBE)
Scenarios were initially pioneered by Herbert Kahn in response to the difficulty of creating
accurate forecasts [12]. Scenarios help organisations to deal with uncertainty [MCD08]. A
scenario consists of descriptions or narratives of possible future situations that might im-
pact upon the organisation and its environment. They are often used for strategic planning
purposes [PCC03].
Today, scenarios are largely used in scenario planning (SP), scenario-based training (SBT)
and scenario-based exercises (SBE). In [MCD08] suggested SP and SBT as two cutting-
edge methods for organisational leaders to better understand their business environments.
These methods allow disaster and crisis response to evaluate numerous outcomes from crisis
scenarios [12]. Furthermore, a successful scenario planning effort should enhance the ability
of people to cope with future change [PCC03]. Decisions can be made, policies changed,
and management plans implemented to direct the system towards a more desirable future
[PCC03].
In contrast to SP, SBT and SBE provide learners with opportunities to interact with a possible
future [MCD08]. SBT presents participants with an interactive story and places them in
a specific environment in which the problem would be encountered [MCD08]. [WG04]
explored the use of SBEs in various sectors. Such exercises are used to identify and test
the resources and capabilities necessary for preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber
security incidents. The authors mentioned three purposes of SBE: 1) to conduct an exercise
for awareness, 2) to use it for education and training, and 3) to test their ability to detect
and respond in a coordinated manner to an attack or disruption [WG04]. The use of cyber
exercise has been enhanced to simulate large-scale attacks in a collaborative manner across
sectors, industries and governments [WG04].
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6.3 Organisation Resilience
Organisational resilience can be defined as a sum of essential concepts. These essential
concepts include enterprise risk management, governance, quality assurance, information
security, physical security, business continuity, culture and values supported by adaptive
leadership [BB10]. Horne and Orr defined resilience : Resilience is a fundamental qual-
ity of individuals, groups, organisations, and systems as a whole to respond productively
to significant change that disrupts the expected pattern of events without engaging in an ex-
tended period of regressive behaviour [HO97]. Meanwhile, [PEF+12] defined three common
characteristics of resilience as follows: 1) capacity to absorb a shock or a deformation, 2)
capacity to restore the state of the system after a shock, and 3) capacity to operate correctly
even if part of the system is degraded. An organisation with high resilience is able to quickly
identify and respond to those situations that present potentially negative consequences, and
find solutions to minimise these impacts .
While there is an increasing acceptance of organisational resilience within academic publi-
cations as in [McM08] and [Ste10], the concept and features of organisational resilience are
still largely undefined and ambiguous [PEF+12]. The development of a resilience measure-
ment methodology is also part of research in this area [McM08], [Ste10].
Recent work has developed tools for measuring organisational resilience described in [Ste10],
[McM08] and [WKR+13]. The organisation resilience tool, BRT-53, was developed by the
University of Canterbury in New Zealand in 2010. It was selected to be used in this study;
because SBE is one of the indicator attributes under the BRT-53. Furthermore, the tool was
used to measure OR in Auckland organisations in 2010. Section 6.3.1 provides the back-
ground of the tool.
6.3.1 Background of Organisation Resilience Benchmark Tool
(BRT-53)
[McM08] used grounded theory to explore organisational resilience in New Zealand. She
conducted a qualitative study using semi-structured interviews and a case study of 10 organ-
isations . She provided a relative overall resilience (ROR) metrics which consists of three
dimensions: situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and adaptive ca-
pacity. she also proposed 15 indicators for each dimension [McM08]. [Ste10] enhanced
the organisation resilience concept developed in McManus (2008) [Ste10]. She developed a
survey-based online benchmark tool known as BRT-53 [WKR+13] , [Ste10].
BRT-53 is an organisation-level resilience quantification methodology that empirically as-
sesses behaviour and perceptions connected to the organisation’s ability to plan for, respond
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to, and recover from emergencies and crises [Ste10]. Using the tool, organisations can re-
view their scores for each of the indicators of organisational resilience, which addresses their
organisation weaknesses [Ste10]. As a result, organisations can plan how to leverage their
strengths in a crisis [Ste10] . The tool was tested on a random sample of Auckland organi-
sations, and factor analysis was used to develop the instrument [SVS+10]. Table 6.1 shows
the three dimensions : Situation Awareness (SA), Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities
(KV), and Adaptive Capacity with 15 indicators developed by Resilient Organisations Re-
search at the University of Canterbury [Ste10]. This tool was used to assess organisation
resilience in this study.The researcher gained permission to use the tool from the University
of Canterbury in New Zealand, as described in the email in Appendix B.
Table 6.1 Organisation Resilience Benchmark Tool (BRT-53) [Ste10],[WKR+13]
Code OR Dimensions & Indicators
SA SITUATION AWARENESS
SA1 Role and Responsibilities
SA2 Insurance Awareness
SA3 Connectivity Awareness
SA4 Recovery Priorities
SA5 Internal & External Situation Monitoring & Reporting
KV MANAGEMENT OF KEYSTONE VULNERABILITIES
KV1 Planning Strategies
KV2 Participation in Exercises
KV3 Capability & Capacity in Internal Resources
KV4 Capability & Capacity of External Resources
KV5 Organisational Connectivity
AC ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
AC1 Silo Mentality
AC2 Innovation & Creativity
AC3 Devolved & Responsive Decision Making
AC4 Information and Knowledge
AC5 Leadership, Management & Governance Structures
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6.4 An Investigation into Organisation Resilience of
CII sectors
6.4.1 Purpose of the Study
This study select the BRT-53 survey to assess OR of organisation participated in cyber crisis
exercise because the previous study by [Ste10] has showed a correlation between OR and
exercises. [Ste10] used the BRT-53 tool to assess OR in organisations in Auckland.
The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between SBE and organisation
resilience in CII sectors using the BRT-53 Organisation Resilience (OR) benchmark tool, as
follows:
1. Experience in SBE:
This study investigates the correlation between OR and SBE across two groups of CII organ-
isations with SBE experience and without SBE experience.
2. Correlation between SBE experience and ORs dimensions:
The aim of the study is to investigates correlations between SBE experience and OR dimen-
sions through the following hypotheses:
H1: There is a relationship between SBE experience and OR
H2: There is a relationship between SBE experience and Adaptive Capacity (AC)
H3: There is a relationship between SBE experience and Management of Keystone Vulnera-
bilities (KV)
H4: There is a relationship between SBE experience and Situation Awareness (SA)
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6.5 Research Methodology
In order to investigate a relationship between SBE experiences and OR perspective, a pre-
liminary study was conducted using the BRT-53 organisation resilience survey.
6.5.1 Research Instrument
BRT-53 uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree [Ste10].
The online survey was developed using Qualtrics software and published online.It has a
total of 82 questions divided by three sections which cover Background Information (10
questions), Leadership and Culture (24 questions), Network (17 questions), and Change
Readiness (31 questions). Our version of the survey was published for two months (from
September to November 2013). The online survey can be seen in Appendix J and accessed
at https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/OrganizationResilience. It covered the three organisa-
tion categories from BRT-53: Situation Awareness, Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities
and Adaptive Capacity [Ste10] as shows in Table 6.1
6.5.2 Ethical Approval
As this study focusing on human participants, this study complied to the BPS ethical guide-
lines of the University of Glasgow. The Ethics application proposed to use interview ques-
tions, organisation resilience and organisation cyber resilience surveys for the research were
applied in 10 February 2014. The application was approved by the FIMS ethics committee
of the University of Glasgow in June 2014. The approval information presented in Figure
6.1, with the reference no of CSE01346.
Figure 6.1: Ethical Approval for Data Collection on Organisation Resilience Study
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6.6 Data Collection
A convenience sample was used.The LinkedIn social network was used to distribute the OR
online survey through emails to people who work in information security in several criti-
cal infrastructure organisations. LinkedIn is a business-oriented social networking service.
Founded in December 2002 and launched on May 5, 2003 , it is mainly used for professional
networking. As of October 2015, LinkedIn reports more than 400 million acquired users
in more than 200 countries and territories [Lin15]. LinkedIn also supports the formation of
interest groups, and as of March 29, 2012 there are 1,248,019 such groups whose member-
ship varies from 1 to 744,662 [wik16]. The majority of the largest groups are employment-
related, although a very wide range of topics cover mainly professional and career issues,
and there are currently 128,000 groups for both academic and corporate alumni [wik16].The
survey was emailed to people in six LinkedIn discussion groups, as shown in Figure 6.2. The
groups comprise:
1. Information Security Community
2. Malaysia Oil and Gas
3. ISTT - Information Security Think Tank
4. Critical Infrastructure Protection
5. International Association of Critical Infrastructure
6. Telecoms Professionals
Figure 6.2: LinkedIn Groups
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6.7 Data Analysis
6.7.1 Demographic Analysis
This study used a sample from 10 critical information infrastructures: Electricity/Power,
Water Supply, Nuclear, Telecommunications, Internet Service Provider, Transport, Oil and
Gas, Banking and Finance, Government Service, and Health. In total, there were 102 re-
sponses to the survey from 200 emails sent to people in the respective sectors. As shown in
Table 6.2, the highest respondents were from Government Service (55%), followed by Oil
and Gas (13%), Telecommunications (8%), Health (6%), and other (5%). While 4% were
from Electricity/Power and Internet Service Provider, 3% were respondents from Banking
and Finance. The lowest (1%) were respondents from Water Supply, Nuclear, and Transport.
Unfortunately, there was no respondent from the Food Supply sector.
Table 6.2 Participants’ Response to Organisation Resilience Survey
Sector Response %
Electric/Power 4 4
Water Supply 1 1
Nuclear 1 1
Telecommunication 8 8
food Supply 0 0
Internet Service
Provider
4 4
Transport 1 1
Oil and Gas 13 13
Banking and Finance 3 3
Governance Service 56 55
Health 6 6
Others 5 5
Total 102 100
6.7.1.1 Response on Organisation Type
Table 6.3 shows 69 (68%) respondents of the survey, were from public organisations and 33
(32%) were from private organisations.
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Table 6.3 Participants’ Response on Organisation Type
Sector Frequency %
Public 69 68
Private 33 32
Total 102 100
6.7.1.2 Response on Organisation Size
Table 6.4) shows the highest number of respondents 34 (33%) were from companies with 10-
49 employees, 32 (31%) were from companies that have more than 500 employees, 22(22%)
from companies with 250-499 employees, 10 (10%)from companies with 50-249 employees,
and 4(4%) from the smallest scale company (fewer than 10 employees).
Table 6.4 Participants’ Response on Organisation Size
Organisation Size Frequency %
<10 4 4
10 to 49 34 33
50 to 249 10 10
250 to 499 22 22
>500 32 31
Total 102 100
6.7.1.3 Response on Participants’ Role
Table 6.5 shows that the highest member of respondents 39(38%) were support staff, fol-
lowed by 32 (31%) in management. Sixteen(16%) were engineers and five(5%) were in
administration.
Table 6.5 Participants’ Response on Role in Organisation
Role Frequency %
Management 33 32
Administration 5 5
Engineer 16 16
Support 39 38
Other 33 32
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6.7.1.4 Response on Work Experiences in the organisation
Table 6.6 shows that the highest number of respondents 64 (63%) have less than 10 years of
experience followed by 25 (25%) between 10 to 15 years and seven(7%) between 16 and 20
years. Six(6%) have more than 20 years of work experience.
Table 6.6 Participants’ Response on Work Experience in Organisation
Work Experience Frequency %
Below 10 Years 64 63
10 to 15 Years 25 25
16 to 20 Years 10 10
Above 20 Years 22 22
Total 102 100
6.7.2 Reliability Analysis
A reliability test was conducted using Cronbach’s alpha to assess the internal consistency of
the benchmark tool [San99]. The reliability test was conducted on organisation resilience
indicators to measure the internal consistency of the tool used. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
is commonly used as an indicator of internal consistency and should have values of 0.7 or
above to indicate strong item covariance [Pal13]. Table 6.13 shows that Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient for organisation resilience indicators ranged from 0.709 to 0.837. Thirty nine
items that have Cronbach’s alpha coefficient below 0.7 have been removed. Remains of
thirty three items used in data analysis. The reliability test result was then used to calculate
the Relative Overall Resilience (ROR) score.
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Table 6.7 Reliability of OR Dimensions and Indicators
Dimension/Factor/ Indicator Cronbach
Alpha
Cronbach
Alpha
based
on Stan-
dardised
Items
No of
items
Adaptive Capacity (AC)
Information & Knowledge 0.729 0.727 3
Leadership, Management & Governance Struc-
tures
0.724 0.716 5
Innovation & Creativity 0.729 0.738 3
Devolved & Responsive Decision Making 0.784 0.788 3
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities (KV)
Participation in Exercises 0.804 0.804 2
Capability & Capacity of Internal Resources 0.837 0.840 2
Capability & Capacity of External Resources 0.745 0.749 2
Organisational Connectivity 0.824 0.829 2
Situation Awareness (SA)
Role & Responsibilities 0.707 0.713 3
Connectivity Awareness 0.709 0.709 2
Recovery Priorities 0.796 0.799 3
Internal & External Situation Monitoring & Re-
porting
0.734 0.733 3
6.7.3 Correlation Analysis
Pearsons correlation is a measure of the strength of association between two or more vari-
ables [Pal13]. The strength of the relationship between two variables was determined by
the correlation coefficient and the significance [Pal13]. The correlation coefficient normally
used is Pearsons r, which shows a strong positive or negative relationship between -1 and +1.
It also provides the direction of a relationship between two variables [CH96]. Meanwhile,
the significance (Sig.) shows confidence in the obtained results. This study investigates any
relationship between SBE experience and OR, as explained in the next section.
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6.7.3.1 Correlation Test between SBE Experience and OR Dimensions
To study the correlation between OR and two SBE groups, the data has been grouped into
participants that have SBE experience and without SBE experience. Table 6.8 shows the
distribution of the 39 (38%) participants with SBE experience and 61 (62%) participants
without SBE experience.
Table 6.8 Distribution of Respondents with SBE Experience
SBE Experience Frequency
YES 39
NO 63
Total 102
Table 6.9 shows the results of Pearsons correlation r value of 0.112, which indicates a weak
relationship between SBE experience and OR. This relationship is also not statistically sig-
nificant, with Sig. = 0.271, which falls outside 0.05. This rejects the hypothesis which
indicates that there is a relationship between SBE experience and OR.
Table 6.9 Correlation between SBE and OR
SBE Experience OR
Pearson Correlation (r) 0.112
Sig.(2-tailed) 0.271
N 102
6.7.3.2 Correlation Test between SBE Experience and OR Dimensions
This correlation test determine if there is any relationships between SBE Experience and or-
ganisation resilience dimensions including: Adaptive Capacity (AC), Management of Key-
stone Vulnerabilities (KV) and Situation Awareness (SA). Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 show
the results of Pearsons correlation r value of 0.03 for AC and r value of 0.100 for KV, both
of which indicate a weak relationship between SBE Experience and AC, and also a weak
relationship between SBE Experience and KV. Both results were not statistically significant,
with values of Sig=0.977 for AC and Sig=0.325 for KV, this rejects the H2 and H3 hy-
potheses. There is no relationship between SBE Experience with Adaptive Capacity and no
relationship between SBE Experience with Keystone Vulnerabilities.
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Table 6.10 Correlation Test between SBE and Adaptive Capacity
SBE Experience Adaptive Capacity (AC)
Pearson Correlation (r) 0.003
Sig.(2-tailed) 0.977
N 102
Table 6.11 Correlation Test between SBE and Management Keystone Vulnerabilities
SBE Experience Management Keystone Vulnerabilities (KV)
Pearson Correlation (r) 0.100
Sig.(2-tailed) 0.325
N 102
Table 6.12 shows the results of a Pearsons correlation r value of 0.209 for Situation Aware-
ness (SA). Even though it shows a weak relationship between SBE Experience and SA, this
result is statistically significant with Sig=0.038 within 0.05, so hypothesis H4 is accepted.
This indicates that there is a relationship between SBE Experience and Situation Awareness.
Table 6.12 Correlation between SBE Experience with OR Indicators
SBE Experience Situation Awareness (SA)
Pearson Correlation (r) 0.209
Sig.(2-tailed) 0.038
N 102
6.7.3.3 Correlation Test between SBE Experience with OR Indicators
Table 6.13 shows the correlation test for organisation resilience indicators. The test on the 12
organisation resilience indicators showed that only three indicators have a relationship with
SBE experience. Meanwhile, it shows weak relationships with Pearsons correlation r value
of 0.220 for Capability and Capacity of External Resources, Pearsons correlation r value of
0.250 for Connectivity Awareness, and Pearsons correlation r value of 0.201 for Recovery
Priorities. Moreover, the result showed a negative relationship between SBE and Devolved
& Responsive Decision Making with r=-0.197, and a negative relationship between SBE and
Capability & Capacity of Internal Resources with r=-0.116.
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Table 6.13 Pearson Correlation between SBE with OR Dimensions and Indicators
Dimension/OR Indicator Pearson Corre-
lation
Sig.(2-
tailed)
n=102
Adaptive Capacity (AC)
Information & Knowledge 0.089 0.382
Leadership, Management & Governance Struc-
ture
0.153 0.132
Innovation & Creativity 0.028 0.782
Devolved & Responsive Decision Making -0.197 0.051
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities (KV)
Participation in Exercises 0.147 0.148
Capability & Capacity of Internal Resources -0.116 0.255
*Capability & Capacity of External Resources 0.220 0.029
Organisational Connectivity 0.044 0.669
Situation Awareness (SA)
Role & Responsibilities 0.140 0.167
*Connectivity Awareness 0.250* 0.013
*Recovery Priorities 0.201* 0.046
Internal & External Situation Monitoring & Re-
porting
0.088 0.386
6.7.4 A OneWay ANOVA of OR Significant Test
6.7.4.1 An Significant Test on OR between Two SBE Groups
A one-way ANOVA test was used to investigate whether there were statistically significantly
different OR means between two groups with scenario-based exercise experiences and with-
out scenario-based exercise experiences.The hypothesis is that there is no significant differ-
ence between groups with and without experience in scenario-based exercises in relation to
organisational resilience.
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Ho: There are no statistically significant difference means between groups with Scenario-
Based Exercise and without Scenario-Based Exercise
Ha: There is statistically significant difference between means groups with Scenario-Based
Exercise and without Scenario-Based Exercise
Table 6.14 Descriptive Analysis of SBE Groups
OR
SBE experience N Mean df
YES 39 2.23 0.55
NO 63 2.24 0.43
Table 6.15 ANOVA Tests on Scenario Based Exercise Experience Groups
Organisation Resilience
SBE Sum of Square df Mean Square F Sig
Between Groups 0.004 100 0.004 0.019 0.891
Within Groups 22.733 101 0.227
The one-way ANOVA result in table 6.15 showed that the p value is 0.89. Furthermore,
because 0.891>0.05, there is no statistically significant difference between means of two
groups with experience in scenario-based exercise (mean =2.23) and without experience in
scenario-based exercise (mean=2.24) in relation to OR as in Table 6.14.
6.8 Result Discussion
Regarding the investigation on the relationship between SBE experiences and OR perspec-
tives, the correlation test results indicate that there is not enough evidence to support our
hypotheses. Meanwhile, the investigation between SBE experiences and organisation re-
silience indicators showed a weak relationship with Situation Awareness (SA). However, the
result supports theories that SBE experiences contribute to Situation Awareness, as discussed
in [BVH02] and [MFS+11]. Moreover, the qualitative study in Section 5.7.4 supported the
contributions of SA to participants’ behaviour after participating in collaborative cyber exer-
cises.
Although Adaptive Capacity and Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities contribute to an
organisations resilience in coping with disasters, as addressed in [BB11], there is a lack of
evidence supporting the relationship between SBE experiences with both indicators. Other
correlation results show relationships between SBE experience and organisation resilience
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indicators Capability and Capacity of External Resources, Connectivity Awareness, and Re-
covery Priorities. Overall, the results of this study have not provided enough evidence to
relate the relationship of SBE to organisation resilience.
The results of the one-way ANOVA tests for the OR mean difference between groups with
scenario-based experiences and crisis experiences were not supported. Some other factors
that influence the results and need further investigation are as follows: the role of respondents
in the organisation and their experiences, which might have an influence on the results as
shown in tables 6.5 and 6.6. The role of top management has significant direct and indirect
influences on employees’ attitudes towards, and the subjective norm of, perceived behaviour,
as explained in [HO97]. Another factor that needs to be considered is the sample size. In
order to achieve a representative sample, the sampling frame must be unbiased and complete;
however, this is very difficult when surveying multiple organisations as no complete list is
available [GRM03].
As a result of the study, due to limited evidence to support the relationship of SBE with
OR, the BRT-53 tool will not be included in the proposed post assessment framework. Next
study proposed in Chapter 7, is an investigation of organisation cyber resilience using C-Suite
Executive tool developed by World Economic Forum and data collected from participants of
the X Maya national collaborative cyber exercise in Malaysia. The tool used to investigate
the Executive-level awareness and leadership of cyber risk management that contributes to
organisational cyber resilience in CNII sectors participated in collaborative cyber exercise.
6.9 Summary
This chapter provides an investigation of the correlation between scenario-based exercises
and organisation resilience perspectives. The preliminary investigation was conducted using
a resilience benchmark tool developed by the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. A
correlation test was conducted to see relationships between OR and SBE experiences. Other
investigations were conducted, on correlations between SBE experiences with OR dimen-
sions and indicators of Adaptive Capacity (AC), Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities
(KV), and Situation Awareness (SA). Correlation test results indicate that there is not enough
evidence to support the relationship between SBE experiences and OR perspectives, includ-
ing the OR dimension, except for a weak relationship between SBE experiences with SA.
Furthermore, the one-way ANOVA test of ORs significant difference between groups with
SBE experiences and without SBE experiences showed no differences between them. This
support our decision to use the organisation cyber resilience survey developed by the World
Economic Forum in the next study.
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Chapter 7
An Investigation on Organisation
Cyber Resilience of Ten CNII Sectors
7.1 Introduction
The framework for collaborative cyber exercise proposed in Chapter 4 consists of participant
and organisation components. The participant element was investigated in the qualitative
study of Chapter 5. This chapter presents the second component of the framework on organ-
isational cyber resilience (OCR). It focuses on research Question 5 (RQ5), ’how to assess
organisation cyber resilience of CNII sectors involved in collaborative cyber exercises?’.
The resilience of critical infrastructure is usually examined within a technical setting [GMP11].
Critical infrastructure resilience has a broad impact because of its capacity to affect the oper-
ation of nations to shape public confidence [BG13]. When critical infrastructure is resilient,
it continues to function even under challenging circumstances [LEP+13]. This is important
to raise awareness on CI interdependencies among CIs stakeholders.
Collaborative cyber exercises implementations in Chapter 3 shares how the exerise can be
use to promote interdependencies awareness of participated organisation. However as ad-
dressed in Section 1.3, the lack of interest of organisation to participate in a collaborative
due to the difficulties of senior management to find suitable by emergency planning groups,
which organisation could not easily commit resources to the activities that have a high so-
cial value, but no significant value in financial contributions in return [The13]. This study
used the C-Suite Executive checklist to investigate the participants’ perceptions on executive
level awareness of interdependencies and their commitment to cyber risks management in
their organisation. The checklist has three main components of governance, programme and
network which contribute to organisation cyber resilience.
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This chapter focuses on OCR perceptions of the 10 CNII sectors involved in the X-Maya
exercise. This chapter explains the study in 13 sections. Section 7.2 defines the background
of cyber resilience Section 7.3 provides details of the investigation. Section 7.4 discusses
the research methodology, research instruments, and pilot test. Data collection covered in
Section 7.5. Section 7.6 elaborates on the data analysis. Section 7.7 provides details of
a reliability test. Section 7.8 provides a Pearson correlation test also conducted to assess
the consistency of items in the C-Suite Executive survey developed by the World Economic
Forum. Section 7.9 describes the significance of the study on the OCR of 10 CNII sectors.
Section 7.10 specifies the development an OCR maturity model. Section 7.11 discusses
the overall results of the study. Section 7.12 addresses contributions of the study. Finally,
Section 7.13 summarises the chapter.
7.2 Cyber Resilience
Cyber resilience is defined in the literature in many different ways, such as the following: 1)
the ability of systems and organisations to withstand cyber events, measured by the combi-
nation of a mean time to failure to a mean time to recovery [BG11], 2) the ability of systems
to absorb external stress [LEP+13], and 3) the system capability to create foresight and to
recognise, anticipate, and defend against risk before adverse consequences occur [BG11].
The literature on cyber resilience also has diverse focus:
The cyber resilience definitions in these literature are more focused on system resilience.
Cyber resilience is multidisciplinary, which requires a different mindset than a traditional IT
security and information security disciplines which more focuses on implementing security
standards and security measures [HS14]. [Rid11] suggested that an organisation is resilient
to cyberattacks when it adopts an intelligence-driven approach to cyber security and layers
security controls.
This study focuses on OCR by building on an initiative developed by the World Economic
Forum in 2012. The core principles of the World Economic Forums Partnering for Cyber
Resilience initiative were established to raise awareness of cyber risk and to build commit-
ment regarding the need for more rigorous approaches to cyber risk mitigation [Wor15].
This chapter describes the investigation of OCR perceptions in 10 CNII sectors involved in
X-Maya. The World Economic Forum and its cyber activities are summarised in the next
section.
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Table 7.1 Research on cyber resilience
Cyber Resilience
Topic
Research Focus on Cyber Resilience
Vocabulary of cyber re-
silience techniques
[BG13] proposed a vocabulary to describe the effects of cy-
ber adversary activities in the context of the cyberattack
lifecycle, such as recon, weaponise, deliver, exploit, con-
trol, execute, and maintain. This vocabulary was mapped
to cyber resilience techniques of adaptive response, an-
alytic monitoring, coordinated defence, deception, diver-
sity, dynamic positioning, dynamic representation, non-
persistence, privilege restriction, realignment, redundancy,
segmentation, substantiated integrity, and unpredictability.
Cyber resilience matrix
for cyber systems
[LEP+13] provided a cyber resilience matrix of four do-
mains taken from the network centric warfare (NCW) doc-
trine of physical, information, cognitive, and social to four
stages of the event management cycle: plan/prepare, absorb,
recover, and adapt taken from the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS).
Resiliency techniques [GMP11] provided several classes of resiliency techniques
in two approaches: ’proactive techniques’ and ’reactive
techniques’. Proactive techniques include data availability,
data integrity, and segmentation. Reactive techniques apply
the response to adversary activities through dynamic com-
position, diversity, dynamic reconstitution, dynamic recon-
figuration, and deception.
CERT resilience man-
agement model (CERT
RMM) [AD10]
The CERT resilience management model includes and inte-
grates activities from security, business continuity, and as-
pects of IT operation management. The CERT RMM has
26 process areas (PAs). The CERT RMM PAs are organised
into four high level operational resilience categories of engi-
neering, enterprise, management, and operation and process
management.
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7.2.1 Organisation Cyber Resilience
7.2.2 World Economic Forum
The World Economic Forum was established in 1971 as a not-for-profit foundation and is
head quartered in Geneva, Switzerland [Wor12b]. The Forum is an international institution
committed to improve the state of the world through public-private cooperation. It is inde-
pendent, impartial and not tied to any special interests.It builds, serves and sustains commu-
nities through an integrated concept of high level meetings, research networks, task forces
and digital collaboration [Wor12b].
In 2012, a group of business leaders attended the World Economic Forums panel discussion
on cyberattacks. This provided a strong indicator regarding the uncertainty of cyber security
in the majority of businesses [Wor12a]. While there seemed to be growing sense of urgency
and attention from business leaders, there also seemed to be a growing principle for cyber
resilience derived from stakeholder dialogue across multiple regions and sectors [Wor15].
The core principles identified are [Wor12a]:
1. Recognition of interdependence: All parties have a shared interest in fostering a com-
mon, resilient digital ecosystem;
2. Role of leadership:Executive-level awareness and leadership of cyber risk management
are encouraged.
3. Integrated risk management: A practical and effective implementation programme that
aligns with existing frameworks should be developed.
4. Promote uptake: Suppliers and customers alike are encouraged to develop similar lev-
els of awareness and commitment.
These core principles were used to formulate the C-suite executive checklist used for the
study discussed in Section 6.4.1.
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7.3 An Investigation on Organisation Cyber Resilience
of Ten CNII Sectors in Malaysia
The National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) states that Malaysias Critical National Infor-
mation Infrastructure (CNII) must be secure and resilient, that is, immune against threats
and attacks to its systems [bH11]. As discussed in Section 3.8.1, in the Malaysia critical
information infrastructure, as defined by the NCSP, 10 critical sectors:
1. National defence and security,
2. Banking/finance,
3. Information and communications,
4. Energy,
5. Transportation,
6. Water,
7. Health services,
8. Government,
9. Emergency services, and
10. Food and agriculture.
The Malaysia National Security Council with the support of Cyber Security Malaysia or-
ganised the national collaborative Cyber Crisis Exercise, known as X-MAYA [Ahm14] as
discussed in Chapter 3. This program was conducted to assess the capabilities of CNII agen-
cies to deal with cyber incidents [Ahm14].
7.3.1 Purpose of The Study
The purpose of this study was as follows:
1. To ensure the suitability of the C-Suite Executive checklist to assess the OCR percep-
tions.
2. To assess the OCR perceptions of 10 CNII sectors involved in collaborative cyber
exercise, X Maya in Malaysia, and
3. To develop the OCR perceptions Maturity Model of 10 CNII sectors involved in the
exercise.
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7.3.2 Ethical Approval
As this study focuses on human participants, it complies to BPS ethical guidelines of the
University of Glasgow. The Ethics application proposed to use organisation cyber resilience
surveys was submitted on 16 May 2014. The application was approved by the FIMS ethics
committee of the University of Glasgow in June 2014. The approval is presented in Figure
5.1 of Section 5.2.2.
7.4 Research Methodology
This study used the C-Suite Executive checklist developed by the World Economic Forum in
2012 for data collection, as listed in Table 7.2. The researcher gained permission to use the
C-Suite Executive checklist from the World Economic Forum committee, as presented in the
email in Appendix A.
7.4.1 Research Instrument
We used an online version of the C-Suite Executive checklist in [Wor12a], which is attached
in Appendix F. The questionnaire contains 19 questions that cover three main categories :
Governance (eight questions), Programme (eight questions) and Network (three questions).
Using a five-point Likert scale, defined from 1: does not describe my organisation at all to 5:
accurately describes my organisation. The average score from all items provides the OCR
result. In order to ensure the suitability of the tool used to measure the OCR, a reliability
test on the C-suite executive items was conducted. The online survey can be accessed at
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/Cyber_Resilience.
7.4.2 Pilot Study
The term pilot study referred as a feasibility study involved small scale version or trial run of
research instruments for a major study [BR94]. For this study, a pilot study was conducted
from 12 to 13 February 2014 to test the C-Suite Executive Checklist. The pilot survey was
distributed to 15 participants during the Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Eu-
rope (2014) conference in London. This was attended by people from various critical infras-
tructure sectors based in Europe. The study used a printed version of the online survey, as
shown in Appendix F. The pilot test was conducted to collect an expert perspective in terms
of the survey format, confidentiality, structure, and the meaning. Participants’ views were
collected using the form attached with the survey, as displayed in Appendix E. The pilot test
results are discussed next.
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Table 7.2 C-Suite Executive Checklist Survey Items [Wor12a]
Item Code Governance(GV)
GV1 The chief executive and executive management team are responsible for
overseeing the development and confirming the implementation of a pro-
gramme of best practices for cyber risk management
GV2 The chief executive and executive management team ensure that the pro-
gramme is reviewed for effectiveness and, when shortcomings are identi-
fied, corrective action is pursued
GV3 The chief executive and executive management team demonstrate visible
and active commitment to implementation of the principles
GV4 Executives and managers are responsible for understanding at the appro-
priate level how cyber risks could impact and originate from their line of
business
GV5 Senior leadership understands who is responsible for managing cyber risks
when managing security incidents
GV6 The organisation has access to cyber expertise at its highest management
levels
GV7 The organisation continuously improves the integration of its cyber risk
management with its other risk management initiatives
GV8 The chief executive(or equivalent) has a clear decision path for action and
communication in response to a significant security failure or accident
Item Code Programme (PRG)
PRG1 The organisation conducts comprehensive assessments for its vulnerabili-
ties to internal and external cyber risks that are appropriate for its industry
and sector
PRG2 The organisation monitors the effectiveness of its cyber risk management
strategy
PRG3 The organisation periodically internally verifies its compliance with rules
and regulations
PRG4 The organisation’s commitment to the programme it reflected in its policies
and practices
PRG5 Managers, employees and agents receive specific training on the pro-
gramme, tailored to relevant needs and circumstances
PRG6 The organisation has identified its data and information as vital assets and
organise its programme around the recognition that data and information
have value that can be separately and recognised and protected
PRG7 The riks management programme includes all material third party relation-
ships and information flows
PRG8 The organisation conducts comprehensive internal short and long term cy-
ber riks impact assessments
Item Code Network(NTW)
NTW1 The organisation seeks to ensure that its suppliers and relevant third par-
ties adhere to the organisation’s spesific cyber risk management standards
or industry best practices, in line with the principles and formalises this
requirements using contractual obligations
NTW2 The organisation has built relationships with its peers and partners to
jointly manage cyber risks and more effectively deal with cyber incidents
NTW3 The riks management programme includes all material third party relation-
ships and information flows
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7.4.2.1 Demographic Analysis of Participants
The number of respondents involved in the pilot test by sectors, as displayed in Table 7.3,
shows most participants were from the government and the information and communication
sectors (four respondents from each sector), followed by the energy and the banking and
finance sectors with two respondents from each. This was followed by representatives from
the transportation, the emergency service, and the national defence and security sectors.
There were no representatives from the water, the health services, or the food and agriculture
sectors.
Table 7.3 Demographic Analysis of Participants in the Pilot Study
Sector Response Per cent Response Count
National Defence and Security 6.7% 1
Energy 13.3% 2
Banking and Finance 13.3% 2
Information and Communication 26.7% 4
Transportation 6.7% 1
Water 0.0% 0
Health Services 0.0% 0
Government 26.7% 4
Emergency Service 6.7% 1
Food and Agriculture 0.0% 0
Total 15
7.4.2.2 Response on the Appropriateness Use of Language in the Survey
Questions
As described in Table 7.4, in terms of appropriateness of the language used in developing the
items of the survey, 10 people rated the governance items as good, three found it very good,
and two rated it as fair. While for the second component, programme, 9 rated it as good,
four rated it as fair, and two rated it as very good. The last component was network, seven
respondents chose fair and good, while one rated it as very good.
Table 7.4 Response on the Appropriateness of Language of the Survey
Answer Options Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent Average
Language of governance questions 0 2 10 3 0 3.07
Language of programme questions 0 4 9 2 0 2.87
Language of network questions 0 7 7 1 0 2.60
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7.4.2.3 Response on the Number of Questions of Each of Component
Table 7.5 describes the response on the number of questions in each component: governance,
programme, and network. For governance, 12 people rated it as good, and three rated it as
very good. For the number of items in the programme component, 11 respondents rated it as
good, three rated it as very good, and one rated it as fair. For the number of questions in the
network component, 11 rated it as good, three rated it as fair, and one rated it as very good.
Table 7.5 Response on the Number of Question in Survey
Answer Options Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent Average
No of questions of governance 0 1 12 3 0 3.20
No of questions of programme 0 1 11 3 0 3.13
No of questions of network 0 3 11 1 0 2.87
7.4.2.4 Response on the Content of Each Component
As referenced in Table 7.6, most participants (11 respondents) found the governance content
of the survey was good, three found it very good, and one found it fair. While for programme,
10 found the content of the items was good, three found it very good, and two found it fair.
Lastly, for network item content, 10 found it good, three found it fair, and two found it very
good.
Table 7.6 Response on OCR’s Components
Answer Options Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent Average
Rating content of the governance 0 1 11 3 0 3.13
Rating content of the programme 0 2 10 3 0 3.07
Rating content of the network 0 3 10 2 0 2.93
7.4.2.5 Response on the Confidentiality of the Survey Questions
Table 7.7 shows the responses on confidentiality of the survey items. For governance, 13
found the confidentiality of the survey good, and two found it very good. For the programme
component, 12 people found the confidentiality good, two found it very good, and one found
it fair. While for the network component, 12 found the confidentiality of the items good, two
found it very good, and one found it fair
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Table 7.7 Response on the Confidentiality of the Survey
Answer Options Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent Average
Confidentiality in the governance 0 0 13 2 0 3.13
Confidentiality in the programme 0 1 12 2 0 3.07
Confidentiality in the network 0 2 12 1 0 2.93
Based on good responses on the OCR survey format including the appropriateness of the
language, content and confidentiality in the pilot study, the survey was used to collect data
from the participants that experienced the X-Maya exercise in Malaysia.
7.5 Data Collection
Data for this study was collected using an online version of the C-Suite Executive checklist
in Appendix F. Participants were involved with the X Maya 5 exercise in November 2013.
Five sector leaders were contacted to distribute the online survey to the ten CNII sectors.
They were from Government, national defence and security, banking and finance, energy,
information and communication. Sector leaders then forwarded the survey to all participants
under their sector. The survey also being given to the interview respondents in Section 5.5.1.
7.6 Data Analysis
Data analysis involved the following two types of demographic analyses and three statistical
analyses:
1. Demographic data on participants provide background information including sectors,
size of their organisations, roles, and work experience in their sectors. It also included
data on the cyber risk management programmes in participants’ organisations, the date
of the cyber security training attended, and the security certification.
2. Demographic data on cyber exercises, such as the types of cyber exercises that partic-
ipants have attended and the level of the exercises.
3. Reliability test on the instrument used.
4. Correlation test between the components of OCR; governance, programme, and net-
work.
5. Significance analysis on the OCR scores for each CNII sector.
Details of the analyses are provided in the following sections.
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7.6.1 Demographic Analysis
A total of 83 participants answered the online survey. Figure 7.1 shows the number of re-
spondents involved in this study. It showed a high frequency of respondents from information
and communication (13), banking and finance (12) and the transportation (10) sectors. While
the same number of respondents were from energy (6), Water (6), and the health (6) sectors.
Figure 7.1: Number of Respondents
7.6.1.1 Response on Organisation Size
Respondents were asked about the size of their respective organisations. The results in Table
8 indicate that the largest group of employees (73; 88%) were from large organisations that
had 500 or more employees. The remaining four (5%) were from organisations with between
250 and 499 employees, three (4%) were from organisations with 50 to 249 employees, two
(2%) were from organisations with 10 to 49 employees, and one (1%) was from a small
organisation with less than 10 employees.
Table 7.8 Response in Organisation Size
Number of Employee Frequency %
<10 1 1
10 to 49 2 2
50 to 249 3 4
250 to 499 4 5
>500 73 88
Total 83 100
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7.6.1.2 Response on Participants’ Roles
Data collected on participants’ role in the organisations are presented in Table 7.9, which
showed that 36 (43%) were technical advisor to their organisation, 18(22%) were in other
role as asked in the survey, 17(21%) were decision makers, while the same number of people
(6;7%) were policy maker and (6;7%) strategic planner.
Table 7.9 Response on Role in Organisation
Role Frequency %
Decision Maker 17 21
Strategic Planner 6 7
Policy Maker 6 7
Technical Advisory 36 43
Other 18 22
Total 83 100
7.6.1.3 Response on Work Experience in the Organisation
In terms of respondents’ work experience in organisations, Table 7.10 shows that 40 (48%)
had 4 to 10years of experience with their organisation, 26(32%) had 11 to 20 years of experi-
ence, 14 (17%) had 1 to 3 year experience, and three(3%) had 21 or more years of experience
in their respective organisations.
Table 7.10 Response on Work Experience in Organisations
Working Experience in Organisation Frequency %
1 to 3 years 14 17
4 to 10 years 40 48
11-20 years 26 32
>21 3 3
Total 83 100
7.6.1.4 Response on Work Experience in Industry Sectors
In terms of respondents’ work experience in their industry sectors, Table 7.11 shows that
46 (55%) had 4 to 10 years of experience, 34(41%) had 11 to 20 years of experience, and
three(4%) had 21 or more years of experience in their respective work sectors.
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Table 7.11 Response on Work Experience in Respective Sectors
Working Experience in Industry Sector Frequency %
4 to 10 years 46 55
11 to 20 years 34 41
>21 3 4
Total 83 100
7.6.1.5 Cyber Risk Management Programme
Data on Cyber Risk Management Programmes in the participants’ organisations are based
on multiple responses shown in Table 7.12 : 56 (67.5%) have risk management plans in their
organisations, 51(67%) have business continuity plans, 51(61.4%) have crisis management
plans, 45 (54.2%) have emergency plans, three (3.6%) have disaster recovery plans, four
(4.8%) were still waiting for any approval of a plan, and five (6.0%) were not sure about any
plan in their organisations, while 12 (14.5%) have different plans from those listed above.
Table 7.12 Response on Cyber Risks Management Programme in Organisations
Cyber Risk Management Programme Frequency %
Business Continuity Plan 52 67
Emergency Plan 45 54.2
Crisis Management 51 61.4
Risk Management 56 67.5
Disaster Recovery 3 3.6
Waiting for Approval 5 6.0
Not Sure 5 6
Others 12 14.5
7.6.1.6 Participants’ Involvements in Cyber Risk Management Programmes
In terms of respondents’ involvement in the cyber risk management programme in their
organisations as showed in Table 7.13, 59(71.1%) were involved in risk management plans,
and 46 (55.4%) were involved in business continuity plans. Emergency plans and crisis
management plans have the same rates at 37 (44.6%) respondents, while 14 (16.9%) were
involved with other types of plans. Two (2.4%) were involved in simulation, and one (1.3%)
was involved in a disaster recovery plan.
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Table 7.13 Response on Involvement in Cyber Risks Management Programme
Cyber Risk Management Programme Frequency %
Business Continuity Plan 46 55.4
Emergency Plan 37 44.6
Crisis Management Plan 37 44.6
Risk Management 59 71.1
Disaster Recovery 1 1.3
Simulation 2 2.4
Others 14 16.9
7.6.1.7 Participation in Security Training
Data regarding involvement of the participants in cyber security training is shown in Table
7.14; 70 (84%) respondents have attended cyber security training, while 13(16%) have not
attended any cyber security training.
Table 7.14 Response on Cyber Security Training
Cyber Security Training Frequency %
YES 70 84
NO 13 16
Total 83 100
7.6.1.8 Participants with Security Certification
Responses on security certification that the participants had obtained is shown in Table 7.15.
Only 25 (30%) have security certification, while the rest (58;70%) have no security certifi-
cation. Certifications are provided by Cyber Security Malaysia for those who attended their
collaboration programs and training which cover Computer Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs), Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), Business Continuity Man-
agement (BCM), Wireless Technology, Penetration Testing, SCADA, and Digital Forensics
Table 7.15 Response on Security Certification
Security Certification Frequency %
YES 25 30
NO 58 70
Total 83 100
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7.6.2 Data on Cyber Exercise
7.6.2.1 Response on Level of Cyber Exercise
Data on cyber exercises experience was collected from respondents and categorised by level
and type. In cyber exercise levels, as demonstrated in Table 7.16, 55% have cyber exercise
experience at a national level, 28% have experience at an organisation level, 16% have expe-
rience at training level, and 1% have experience at the state level. None of the respondents
have experienced any cyber exercises at the regional or international levels.
Table 7.16 Response on Cyber Exercise Involvement by Cyber Exercise Levels
Level of Cyber Exercise %
Organisation 28
Regional 0
State 1
National 55
International 0
Training 10
7.6.2.2 Response on Types of Cyber Exercise
In terms of cyber exercise types, Figure 7.2 shows that 65% of participants have experi-
ence with simulation cyber exercises, 34% of participants have attended seminars, 16% of
participants have attended workshops, 9% of participants have attended conferences, 1%
of participants have attended other types of cyber exercises, and 1% of participants have
attended table-top cyber exercises.
7.7 A Reliability Test on C-Suite Executive Survey
This section focuses on validating the C-Suite Executive checklist survey items using a Cron-
bach’s alpha reliability test to check the internal consistency of the items that will be used as
tools to assess OCR. As emphasised in [Cro51], summated scales are often used in survey
tools to inquire about underlying constructs that need to be measured . The tool contain a
set of indexed responses, which are later summed to arrive at a subsequent score associated
with a particular respondent [Pal13]. Usually, the development of such scales is not the only
aim of the research but rather is a means to collect predictor variables to be use in an objec-
tive model [Cro51]. However, the question of reliability increases as the function of scales
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Figure 7.2: Response on Cyber Exercises Attended by Cyber Exercise Type
is strained to include prediction [Cro51]. One of the most popular reliability statistics used
today is Cronbach’s alpha [San99].
7.7.1 Croncbach’s Alpha On C-Suite Executive Checklist Items
According to [San99] the OCR items in the C-Suite Executive checklist survey has good
internal consistency if the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is more than 0.7. In this study, the
reliability test was satisfied by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient values of 0.974 and 0.975, as
described in Table 7.17.
Table 7.17 Cronbach’s Alpha Analysis
Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of items
0.974 0.976 19
0.975 0.977 17
All items achieved a corrected item-total correlation ranging from 0.682 to 0.906. As sug-
gested by [San99], items that have a score less than 0.7 indicates that the items are measuring
something different from the scale as a whole [Cro51]. As in Table 7.18, items PRG5 and
PRG8 showed corrected item-total of 0.682 and 0.689, respectively, which are below 0.7.
Removing the items from the set showed a small difference in score of 0.001(0.975-0.974),
as shown in Table 7.18, with minimal effect. For this reason, both items will not be removed
from the original set.
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Table 7.18 Item Total Statistics for C-suite Executive Checklist Survey
Item Code Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Cronbach
Alpha if Item
Deleted
GV1 69.5 256.4 0.865 0.972
GV2 69.5 252.45 0.870 0.972
GV3 69.9 250.91 0.778 0.973
GV4 69.6 253.68 0.846 0.972
GV5 69.6 252.54 0.888 0.972
GV6 69.8 254.11 0.807 0.973
GV7 69.5 257.33 0.823 0.973
GV8 69.5 252.06 0.906 0.972
PRG1 69.98 250.98 0.721 0.974
PRG2 69.94 250.98 0.767 0.973
PRG3 69.47 256.50 0.824 0.973
PRG4 69.53 252.64 0.897 0.972
PRG5 69.93 256.56 0.682 0.974
PRG6 69.73 253.72 0.905 0.972
PRG7 69.96 253.13 0.721 0.974
PRG8 69.96 253.91 0.689 0.974
NTW1 69.59 253.81 0.853 0.972
NTW2 69.63 256.60 0.811 0.973
NTW3 69.65 252.96 0.817 0.972
7.8 Pearson Correlation Test on Organisation Cyber
Resilience Components
The Pearsons product moment coefficient of correlation is one of the best-known measures
of association. It is a statistical value ranging from -1.0 to +1.0 to express the relationship
in quantitative form [Pal13].The coefficient is represented by the symbol r. The Pearson
correlation test was conducted to determine the relationship between OCR variables of: gov-
ernance (AvgGV), programme (AvgPRG), and network (AvgNTW). Table 7.19 shows the
descriptive analysis of the three main components in the C-Suite Executive survey: gover-
nance, programme, and network.
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Table 7.19 Mean and Standard Deviation of OCR, AvgGV,AvgPRG, and AvgNTW
Mean Standard Deviation
OCR 3.88 0.88
AvgGV 3.96 0.92
AvgPRG 3.75 0.96
AvgNTW 3.94 0.96
Table 7.20 and correlation scatterplots in Figure 7.3 show the high positive correlation be-
tween AvgGV and OCR with r=0.97, AvgPRG and OCR with r=0.93 and AvgNTW with
OCR with r=0.90. This indicates that the increment of governance, programme, and network
factors will strongly influence the OCR.
Table 7.20 Pearson Correlation Results of OCR with of AvgGV,AvgPRG, and AvgNTW
OCR AvgGV AvgPRG AvgNTW
Pearson Correlation (r) 0.965** 0.931** 0.895**
Sig.(2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 83 83 83
Figure 7.3: Correlation Scatterplots of AvgGV, AvgPRG, AvgNTW with OCR
7.9 Significant Study on Organisation Cyber Resilience
of Ten CNII Sectors
Further investigations was conducted to test the differences of OCR perceptions for multiple
sectors involved in the cyber exercise. A one-way between-group analysis of variance was
conducted on OCR perceptions of the 10 CNII sectors to explore the hypothesis stated as
following:
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Hypothesis:
H0: There is no statistically significant difference in OCR perceptions between CNII sectors
that participated in the cyber crisis exercise.
Ha: There is a statistically significant difference in OCR perceptions between CNII sectors
that participated in the cyber crisis exercise.
7.9.1 Data Analysis on Organisation Cyber Resilience (OCR)
As shown in Table 7.21, the OCR perceptions for the 10 CNII sectors is between 2.80 to
4.64. The OCR scores for the 10 CNII sectors were quite small except the slight deviation
in the health service, the emergency service, and food and agriculture sectors from 0.88 to
0.94.
Table 7.21 Descriptive Analysis of 10 CNII Sectors
CNII Sectors N Mean % Standard Deviation
National Defence and Security 8 4.06 81.2 0.61
Energy 6 4.51 90.2 0.55
Banking and Finance 12 4.64 92.8 0.36
Information and Communication 13 4.49 89.8 0.47
Transportation 10 3.32 66.4 0.53
Water 6 2.80 56 0.77
Health Services 6 3.15 63 0.88
Government 8 4.22 84.4 0.44
Emergency Services 5 3.12 62.4 0.94
Food and Agriculture 9 3.26 65.2 0.91
Total 83
7.9.2 Results of A One-Way ANOVA Test
The one way between-group analysis of variance results showed that there were statistically
significant differences in OCR perceptions between the 10 CNII sectors at the p <0.05 level
as in Table 7.22. Multiple comparison between sectors are shown in Appendix G. The Post
Hoc test results showed how one sector was difference from the other sector.
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Table 7.22 OCR One-Way ANOVA Results
Organisation Cyber Resilience
10 CNII Sectors Sum of Square df Mean Square F Sig
Between Groups 35.1 9 0.004 9.78 0.00
Within Groups 29.1 73
7.10 Organisation Cyber Resilience Maturity Model
This section provides the OCR maturity model of the 10 CNII sectors based the on their OCR
perceptions. The OCR maturity model, developed by the World Economic Forum, suggested
five stages of OCR maturity based on Table 7.23 : unaware for OCR scores between 0% to
20%, fragmented for OCR scores between 21% to 40%, top down for OCR scores between
41% to 60% , pervasive for OCR scores between 61% to 80% and networked for OCR scores
between 81% to 100%.
Table 7.23 Organisation Cyber Resilience Maturity Stages
OCR Stages and Stage Description
Stage 1: Unaware (0% - 20%)
The organisation sees cyber risks as largely irrelevant, and cyber risk does not form part of the
organisations risk management processes. The organisation is not aware of its level of intercon-
nectedness.
Stage 2 : Fragmented (21% - 40%)
The organisation recognises hyperconnectivity as a potential source of risk and has limited insight
into its cyber risk management practices.The organisation has a silo approach to cyber risk, with
fragmented or incident reporting.
Stage 3 : Top Down (41% - 60%)
The Chief Executive Officer has set the tone for cyber risk management, has initiated a top-down
threat-risk-response programme but does not view cyber risk management as a competitive advan-
tage.
Stage 4 : Pervasive (61% - 80%)
The organisations leadership takes full ownership of cyber risk management, has developed poli-
cies and frameworks, and has defined responsibilities and reporting mechanisms. It understands
the organisations vulnerabilities, controls and interdependencies with third parties.
Stage 5: Networked (81% - 100%)
Organisations are highly connected to their peers and partners, sharing information and jointly
mitigating cyber risk as part of their day-to-day operations. Its people show exceptional cyber
awareness and the organisation is an industry leader in managing cyber risk management.
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Figure 7.4: Organisation Cyber Resilience Maturity Model of the 10 CNII Sectors
The OCR maturity model results, as depicted in Figure 7.4, show that five sectors have the
highest OCR score of 5 (Networked) : energy, banking and finance, information & communi-
cation, the government and national defence and security sectors. The transportation, water,
health services, food and agriculture, and emergency service sectors were in Stage 3 (Top
Down). According to the maturity stage description, organisation at Stage 5 (Networked) are
highly connected to their peers and partners. They are sharing information and jointly mit-
igating cyber risk as part of their day-to-day operations. Its people show exceptional cyber
awareness, and the organization is an industry leader in managing cyber risk. Organisations
at Stage 4 (Pervasive) have leadership that takes full ownership of cyber risk management,
have developed policies and frameworks, and have defined responsibilities and reporting
mechanisms. Leadership understands the organisations vulnerabilities, controls, and inter-
dependencies with third parties. Finally, in organisations at Stage 3 (Top Down), the chief
executive officer has set the tone for cyber risk management, and has initiated a top-down
threat-risk-response programme, but does not view cyber risk management as a competitive
advantage.
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7.11 Result Discussion
The Cronbach’s alpha test was conducted on 19 items of the C-Suite Executive checklist
survey and showed a good internal consistency of 0.974. Moreover, the Pearson correlation
test on OCR components showed a very high positive relationship between OCR with gov-
ernance, programme, and network components. The Pearson coefficient values range from
0.90 to 0.97. This suggests that the increment of these components will increase the OCR
of the participating sectors. This also indicated the appropriateness of the C-Suite Execu-
tive checklist survey to assess OCR of ten CNII sectors. The one-Way ANOVA test was
conducted to compare OCR among participating CNII sectors and showed a statistically sig-
nificant difference between sectors. Furthermore, the OCR maturity model for the 10 CNII
sectors, developed based on their individual OCR scores, showed differences in OCR matu-
rity stages in the 10 CNII sectors. Results of the study provides evidence of suitability of the
C-Suite Executive checklist survey to assess OCR. This support the use of C-Suite Executive
checklist survey as second component to assess organisation in the proposed framework.
7.12 Chapter Contribution
This chapter highlights three contributions of the study:
1. An assessment of the second component of the Post Assessment Framework for Col-
laborative Cyber Exercises, the OCR.
2. A validation on the reliability of the C-Suite Executive checklist survey to assess OCR.
3. The development of a sector OCR maturity model using OCR scores.
7.13 Summary
This chapter provides an investigation of OCR as the second component of the post assess-
ment framework for collaborative cyber exercise. The assessment involved three tests, the
reliability and Pearson correlation tests on the C-Suite Executive checklist survey and the
OCR significant test of the 10 CNII sectors. The OCR scores were used to developed the
maturity model of OCR of the 10 CNII sectors.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
This research investigated the potential impact of cyber exercises on participants and their
organisations. The study used a cyber exercise post assessment framework to answer five re-
search questions. Research questions were answered through a literature review and several
empirical studies.
8.1.1 Findings to the Research Question 1
The first research question (RQ1) was ’what are focuses of cyber exercises research?’ The
question was answered in Chapter 2 as a result of a literature review. The study contributed
to a general overview of cyber exercise research across three categories of academic, com-
petitive, and collaborative cyber exercises:
The results revealed that academic cyber exercises mainly focus on individual skills and
knowledge development in the information security domain. Academic cyber exercises in-
volve curriculum design for teaching and learning and assessment of students involved in
information security courses at universities, colleges, and in the training industry. The four
main skills needed for information security are system administration, defensive, offensive,
and forensic skills.
Competitive cyber exercises provide a platform to test participants knowledge and skills. The
focus on teamwork and collaborative decision making contributes to a winning performance.
Previous research covers two types of competitions: collegiate cyber defence competitions
(CDCC) and capture the flag exercises that assess student skills and knowledge at school,
college, and universities at national and international levels.Both academic and competitive
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cyber exercises share a structure, including the process of organising the exercise, the envi-
ronment setting, and the software to automate the management and assess the exercises.
Research in crisis cyber exercises involved multi sectors provides a platform to test cyber-
crisis operations involving various organisations at state, national, and international levels.
The cyber exercise supports cyber security strategy implementation as part of public-private
cooperation in cyber security strategy and CII protection. Collaborative cyber exercises use
scenarios that help organisations understand the effect of cyber incidents on their services,
to coordinate the response to cyber crises, to share information on the latest cyber threats
through effective communication, and to collaborate efforts in handling a cyber crisis at
organisation, national, and international levels.
8.1.2 Findings to the Research Question 2
The second research question (RQ2) was ’how do cyber exercises contribute to critical infor-
mation infrastructure protection? This question was answered in Chapter 3. It highlighted the
contribution of cyber exercises to CIIP through joint collaborative exercises between public
and private CII organisations across sectors and borders. Cyber exercises contribute to coop-
eration among collaborators in computer emergency response teams, increase awareness on
interdependencies, sharing information on cyber threats, and mitigation efforts.
8.1.3 Findings to the Research Question 3
The third research question (RQ3) was ’how can cyber exercise be beneficial to participants
and their organisations?’ This was answered in Chapter 4. This chapter contributes to the
development of a post assessment framework for cyber exercise that consists of two parts:
the participants and the organisations assessment. The first part on participants assessment
adopted the four Kirkpatrick training levels that evaluate the effect of collaborative cyber
exercises on their reactions, learning, behaviour, and results.
The reaction level considers participants perceptions in terms of the exercise objectives, the
participants experience with the scenarios used in the exercise, the environment setting that
simulates the cyber operations, and the participants expectations throughout the exercise, The
learning level assesses how new knowledge and skills are developed during the exercise, in-
creasing participants cyber operation analysis capabilities on cyber-attacks. At the behaviour
level, the actions and innovations show how participants responded to cyber threats after the
exercise. The improvements of cyber analysis capabilities and cyber defence actions provide
evidence of the effect of a cyber exercise.
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The second part of the framework proposed two resilience tools to assess organisation’s re-
silience; the organisation resilience benchmark tool of BRT-53 and C-Suite Executive check-
list: The first tool, the BRT-53 developed by University of Canterbury in New Zealand use to
assess behaviour and perceptions that linked to the organisation’s ability to plan for, respond
to, and recover from emergencies and crises. The tools provides three dimensions of situ-
ation awareness (SA), management of keystone vulnerabilities (KV) and adaptive capacity
(AC). Every dimensions have five indicators that contribute to organisation resilience.The
second tool, the C-Suite Executive checklist developed by the World Economic Forum. The
tool provides perceptions on: recognition of interdependencies, executive level awareness of
cyber risk management, and suppliers and customers awareness and commitments to cyber
risks. This tool consists of three main components of governance, programme and network.
8.1.4 Findings to the Research Question 4
The fourth research question (RQ4) was ’what are the impacts of collaborative cyber ex-
ercises to participants and their organisations?’ This question was answered in Chapter 5.
Findings were presented from post assessment interviews conducted with collaborative cy-
ber exercise participants from the X-Maya 5 in Malaysia. Interview data was coded and
categorised according to the four-level Kirkpatrick training model. At level one, participants
reactions involved their perceptions of the objective of the exercise, the scenario, the envi-
ronment, and their expectations towards the exercise. The study showed that participants had
positive reactions to the X-Maya exercise.
At level one, most of the participants agreed on the X-Maya objectives 1) to develop commu-
nications during a cyber crisis, 2) to offer a knowledge-sharing platform in solving incidents
between agencies, and 3) to assess the effectiveness of action, communication, and national
security coordination in dealing with existing cyber crises. At level two, most participants
agreed that they developed new technical skills during the exercise, especially skills relating
to cyber incident handling of 1) knowledge to determine cyber threats according to national
cyber threats levels, 2) how to address incidents, and 3) how to coordinate incident response
through communication between agencies. At level three, participants improved their sit-
uation awareness, including 1) increment in network monitoring activities and 2) more en-
thusiasm in safeguarding their working environments. At the results stage, 1) revision of
their organisations cyber incident response procedures and policies and 2) new directions
to national cyber incident response policies and procedures occurred. Sector leaders were
identified to coordinate cyber incident reporting.
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8.1.5 Findings to the Research Question 5
The last research question (RQ5) was ’how to assess organisation cyber resilience of CNII
sectors involved in collaborative cyber exercises?’ This question was answered in Chapters
6 and 7. Two studies were designed to assess organisational resilience and organisational
cyber resilience of CII sectors involved with collaborative cyber exercises. A preliminary
study conducted in Chapter 6 was designed to determine the suitability of the organisational
resilience tool, the BRT-53, used to assess organisational resilience of organisations in CII
sectors involved in scenario-based cyber exercises. The tool has three main dimensions: sit-
uation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity. The study
involved participants from information security in several critical infrastructure organisations
in six LinkedIn groups.
Several correlation tests were conducted. One correlation test was conducted to discover
relationships between OR and SBE experiences. Other investigations were conducted on
correlations between SBE experiences with OR dimensions and the indicators: AC, KV,
and SA.Correlation test results indicate that there was not enough evidence to support the
relationship between SBE experiences and OR perspectives, including the OR dimensions,
except for a weak relationship between SBE experiences with SA. A one-way ANOVA test
of ORs significant difference between groups with SBE experiences and without SBE expe-
riences showed no differences between them. As a result of the preliminary study, due to the
limited evidence to support the relationship of SBE with OR, the BRT-53 tool was excluded
from the proposed post assessment framework.
In Chapter 7, the C-Suite Executive checklist was used to collect data from participants in
the X-Maya exercise. This survey has three main components: governance, programme, and
network. Several studies were conducted on the tool before it was used to assess the OCR
and to develop the OCR maturity model. First, a reliability test was conducted on the C-Suite
Executive checklist survey. Results showed a good internal consistency of 0.974. Second,
the Pearson correlation test on OCR components showed a very high positive relationship
between OCR with the governance, programme, and network components. This indicated
the appropriateness of the C-Suite Executive checklist survey to assess OCR across 10 CNII
sectors. Third, a one-Way ANOVA test was conducted to compare OCR among partici-
pating CNII sectors and showed a statistically significant difference between CNII sectors.
Lastly, the OCR maturity model for the 10 CNII sectors based on their individual OCR scores
showed differences in OCR maturity across the 10 CNII sectors in the X-Maya 5 exercise
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8.2 Research Limitations
This study faced several limitations, which influenced the research design, data collection,
data analysis, and research objectives.
Differences of scope and objectives of collaborative cyber exercises. It was difficult to use the
collaborative post assessment framework to compare the effect of cyber exercises between
countries since every country has their own cyber security context priority, scope, mission,
and strategy as presented in Chapter 3. For this reason, Malaysia National collaborative cyber
exercise X Maya was chosen for this research instead of a comparison between countries.
Interview data analysis.Codes were specifically generated based on the interview data. Be-
cause every cyber exercise has its own scope, objective, and setting, especially at the learning
stage, code generated in terms of new skills and knowledge for one cyber exercise will not
be the same for other exercises.
Limitation of control on online surveys. Online surveys were used in the OCR investigation
because the researcher lacked direct access to other participants. We could not conducted
detail checks through the participating agencies. Emails were sent through the Sector Leader
only, we have no control if qualified participants actually participating in the survey.
Limitation to access specific participants. Investigation concerning OR used a sample from
the LinkedIn social network. The difficulty using this sampling technique was to reach spe-
cific participants with cyber exercise experience. The participants’ involvement in cyber
exercises varies across the level and type of cyber exercises.
Limitation using available survey. This study use BRT-53 developed by University of Can-
terbury, New Zealand. This version has too many questions as commented by survey par-
ticipants. The short version was produced by the institution later after this study completed.
This new version will use in future study for a comparison.
Limitation of online survey to trace user participation. Another limitation of using LinkedIn
is the participants profile can be checked during the invitation to answer the survey but not
from survey data. The survey was developed using a survey monkey tool. The survey data
only have the IP address of the participant which difficult to trace who was answering the
survey.
Government Staff Mentality and Perception. In Malaysia most of public sectors like health,
nuclear and transport are belong to government. Even though they are belong to any CII sec-
tors, some participants are tending to select government sector rather than their own sector.
This is a reason in most of the survey, the government sector has more respondents compared
to other sectors.
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8.3 Significant Contributions
The significant contributions of this research were mentioned in Section 1.7 of the introduc-
tory chapter, and we can also summarise contributions from each chapter as follows:
1. Contributions to knowledge relating to collaborative cyber exercises and interview data
analysis.
• Chapter 2 contributes findings on cyber exercise comparisons and research direc-
tions across academic, competitive, and collaborative cyber exercises.
• Chapter 3 contributes findings on collaborative cyber exercises to critical infor-
mation infrastructure protection.
• Chapter 5 contributes to interview data analysis using a collaborative cyber exer-
cise post assessment framework. The interview data analysis involved six phases
of audio transcription, translation, text cleaning, code development, data cate-
gorisation, and result presentation. For the inter-rater reliability results on cate-
gorised items showed the Kappa agreement for the two research assistants (RAs)
have achieved almost perfect categorisation on the list of text, according to the
code themes.
2. Chapter 4 contributes to the development of a collaborative cyber exercise post as-
sessment framework: This framework consists of two parts. The first part adopts the
Kirkpatrick training model to evaluate how participants benefit from collaborative cy-
ber exercises in four stages: reactions, learning, behaviour, and results. The second
part assesses organisational cyber resilience for organisations participating in cyber
exercises.
3. Chapter 7 contributions include:
• Reliability test on the C-Suite Executive survey. The study validated the internal
consistency of the C-Suite Executive survey. The reliability results showed a very
high internal consistency of Cronbachs alpha values of 0.976, which supports the
use of this survey for organisational cyber resilience assessment.
• Organisational cyber resilience assessment and OCR maturity model develop-
ment for 10 CNII critical sectors. This work provides an assessment of organisa-
tional cyber resilience for 10 CII sectors and developed an organisational cyber
resilience maturity model for 10 CNII sectors that participated in X-Maya exer-
cises.
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• Chapter 6 provided evidence that the organisational resilience BRT-53 survey
tool was not suitable to assess organisational resilience based on a limited con-
venience sample. The results of the study showed no correlation between organ-
isational resilience with scenario-based experience. The ANOVA significance
test showed no difference in organisational resilience between organisations with
scenario-based experience and without scenario-based experience.
8.4 Future Works
This study can be enhanced for future work:
• A post assessment metrics. Future studies will focus on developing participants post
assessment metrics for the four levels. New study will be designed to gather more col-
laborative outcomes of participants knowledge, skills and behaviour from other col-
laborative cyber exercises to identified the components of the metrics. These metrics
can be used to objectively evaluate and compare the implications of participants post
assessment from 10 CNII sectors for the next X-Maya exercise.
• Correlation between OCR with Collaborative Cyber Exercise. To investigate a corre-
lation between X-Maya experience with organisational cyber resilience, a new study
could be designed to involve CNII organisations with X-Maya experience and without
X-Maya experience.
• Correlation between Public and Private with Collaborative Cyber Exercise. To inves-
tigate a correlation between X-Maya experience with organisational cyber resilience,
a new study could be designed to involve public and private organisations with and
without cyber exercises experiences.
• Enhance the OCR tool. For a holistic organisational cyber resilience assessment, the
current cyber resilience survey could be enhanced to include items that evaluate tech-
nical, process, and operational resiliency.
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8.5 Significant Usage of the Collaborative Cyber Ex-
ercise Post Assessment Framework
The collaborative cyber exercise post assessment framework developed in this research pro-
vides two important assessment components of participants and organisations that can be
used as a whole or separately:
Participant Assessment Component. This component can be applied to assess investments in
security personnel development. It serves as an important tool for human resource managers
or senior managers to assess the benefits of security training. The performance of the trainee
can be assessed by their reaction, learning, behaviours, and results in their organisations. The
outcome of any training or exercise activities can be measured for performance evaluation
and individual development.
Organisation Assessment Component. The OCR survey can also be used to assess OCR of
CNII organisations that participated in cyber exercises, even non CNII organisations. The
maturity model of OCR in these organisations could be developed using the survey. The OCR
components of the OCR survey can also be used to independently investigate governance
programmes and network perceptions of these organisations.
Usage in Other Domain of Crisis Management. This framework can be applied for any type
of crisis exercise such as natural disaster, technical problem or man-made disasters. It can
be used to collect the impact of these exercises on participants reactions, learning, behaviour
and results.
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Appendix A
Permission Application for C-Suite
Executive Survey
Arniyati Ahmad <arniyati@gmail.com>
C Suite Executive Checklist
3 messages
Arniyati Ahmad <arniyati@gmail.com> Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 2:10 PM
To: derek.ohalloran@weforum.org
Cc: alex.deleeuw@weforum.org, elena.kvochko@weforum.org
Dear Derek,
My name is Arniyati Ahmad, I am currently doing my postgraduate study in University of Glasgow,UK. My
research area is in Cyber Security which focusing on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Currently I am
gathering information on Cyber Resilience and I have just found that C Suite Executive Checklist in
Partnering for Cyber Resilience white paper. As it  mentioned that it can be used to check on Cyber
Resilience, I would like to request for a permission to use this tool in my research.
If it is permissible, I will collect some data using this tools from critical infrastructure organisation in my
country (Malaysia).
I am looking forward to hear from you.
regards,
Arniyati
Department of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
UK
Derek O'Halloran <Derek.OHalloran@weforum.org> Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 5:29 PM
To: Arniyati Ahmad <arniyati@gmail.com>
Cc: "alex.deleeuw@weforum.org" <alex.deleeuw@weforum.org>, Elena Kvochko
<Elena.Kvochko@weforum.org>
Dear Arniyati,
 
Apologies for the delay – we just completed our Annual Meeting in Davos and was on vacation last week.
 
Yes, feel free to use the tool. The document has been published under a Creative Commons license 3.0, so
you are free to use with attribution, just not for commercial gain.
 
Many thanks for your interest. We’d be interested to see the outcome of your research.
Best,
Derek
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Appendix B
Permission Application for
Organisation Resilience Survey
Arniyati Ahmad <arniyati@gmail.com>
Permission to use the Resilience Benchmark Tool
8 messages
Arniyati Ahmad <arniyati@gmail.com> Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 2:34 PM
To: erica.seville@rsrc.co.nz, john.vargo@canterbury.ac.nz
Dear Dr Erica and Dr John,
My name is Arniyati Ahmad, currently pursuing my phD in University of Glasgow, UK. 
My research will be focusing on the effectiveness of National Cyber Crisis Exercise in cultivating Resilience
Culture in Critical Infrastructure Organisations.
I am currently look at several Organisational Resilience Benchmark Tool to study the organisation resilience
culture.I found that your Benchmark tool is the most suitable to be used in the study.
I would like to request for a permission to use the tool  in Malaysia environment.
I am really need you permission on this.
Thank you.
regards,
Arniyati
John Vargo <john.vargo@canterbury.ac.nz> Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 2:15 AM
To: Arniyati Ahmad <arniyati@gmail.com>
Cc: "erica.seville@rsrc.co.nz" <erica.seville@rsrc.co.nz>
Hi Arniyati,
Very nice to hear from you and your interest in using our resilience benchmark tool in your research. We would be
happy to have you use the ResOrgs benchmark tool on the following provisos:
-That you suitably acknowledge Resilient Organisations in any publications
-That you make available to us an anonymised copy of the data from your research so we can add it to our
growing database of results to assist in our ongoing research, and
-That you provide us with a copy of your final results/PhD thesis for us to post on our website (at our discretion)
Are you agreeable to those provisos?
Erica, are there any other issues that we need to raise with Arniati regarding this request?
Best regards,
John
John Vargo, co-leader
Resilient Organisations Research Programme
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch
P +643 364 2627
M +6421 442 091
[Quoted text hidden]
This email may be confidential and subject to legal privilege, it may
not reflect the views of the University of Canterbury, and it is not
guaranteed to be virus free. If you are not an intended recipient,
Gmail - Permission to use the Resilience Benchmark Tool https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=76258e022c&view=pt&q...
1 of 4 6/10/2015 11:21 AM
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Appendix C
Interview Consent Form
  
 
The Effectiveness of Cyber Exercise in Contributing Cyber Security to Organisation 
I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. 
My name is Arniyati Ahmad and I would like to talk to you about your experiences 
participating in the X Maya 5 exercise in November 2013. The objectives of this interview 
are to assess the effectiveness of cyber exercise in providing new knowledge on cyber 
threats and new cyber defence skills. It also to see how these knowledge and skills 
transferred to participants’ organisation. 
The interview should take less than an hour. The session will be taping because I don’t 
want to miss any of your comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the 
session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. Because we’re on tape, please 
be sure to speak up so that we don’t miss your comments. 
All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will only 
be accessed by the researcher and I will ensure that any information include in my report 
does not identify you as the respondent. 
Remember, you don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to and you may end the 
interview at any time. 
Are there any questions about what I have just explained? 
 
 
Are you willing to participate in this interview? 
 
__________    ___________    _____________ 
Interviewee    Witness     Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Interview Questions 
 
1. When do you start get involved with Cyber Exercise? 
2. How many times have you involved with cyber exercise including X Maya? 
3. What was the scenario used in X Maya 5 exercise? Was it easy to understand? 
4. What have you learnt from X Maya 5 exercise and other cyber exercises that you 
have involved? 
5. In your opinion, how X Maya 5 exercise has improved your situation assessment on 
cyber threats in your working environment? 
6. How X Maya 5 help you to contribute to cyber security in your organisation? 
7. Did you revise on standard, policy and guidelines after attending the X Maya 
exercise? 
8. Is there any improvement on standard, policy and guidelines that you have 
proposed after attending the X Maya exercise? 
9. Do you think the scenario and infrastructure used in X Maya can easily be 
implemented in your organisation? 
10. Do you plan to run your own cyber exercise in your organisation? 
 
 
Is there anything more you would like to add? 
I will be analysing the information that you and others have provided and writing a 
report. If you are interested, I will send you a copy of the report. 
Thank you for your time and your cooperation are really appreciated. 
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Appendix D
Sample of Interview Coding Script
Table D.1: Sample of Interview Coding Script
Begin of Audio Coding Text
Interview Questions Interviewee Answers
When do you start get involved with Cy-
ber Exercise?
2010,2012, 2013
How many times have you involved with
cyber exercise including X Maya?
3 times X maya 1, X maya 3 and X maya
5 2013
Would you like to share your experience
in X Maya in terms of its objectives,
the scenario, setting environment and sce-
nario? What was the scenario used in X
Maya 5 exercise? Do you think it was
easy to understand?
[RE: SC ]The attack scenario created a
little bit confuse to all the participants.
[RE: SC ]Each scenario different. Sce-
nario have multiple attacks of web, file,
network and server (apache). [RE: SC ]
Different attacks launch to different agen-
cies. No similar attack launched between
agencies at the same time.
What have you learnt from X Maya 5 ex-
ercise and other cyber exercises that you
have involved?
[LE:SK ]If incident happened, we know
how to establish the communication and
sharing the knowledge between agencies
in handling the issues. [LE:SK] We learnt
how to handle incident and knowledge
sharing.
How X Maya 5 help you to contribute to
cyber security in your organisation?
[RS:REV PS] By check the existing pro-
cedure of incidents handling. [RS:REV
PS] Improved the existing procedure.
(Continue to the next Page)
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Continuation of Table D.1
Interview Questions Interviewee Answers
Did you revise the existing security stan-
dard, policy and guidelines after attending
the X Maya exercise?
[LE:PO ]National threat levels. Low,
moderate, high, crucial. General rules.
[LE:PO ]During crisis organisation have
to define crisis stages and business must
operates as usual even under low re-
sources.
Is there any improvement on standard,
policy and guidelines that you have pro-
posed after attending the X Maya exer-
cise?
[RS: NEW PS] sector need to update the
NC4. NC4 belong to MKN. [RS:NEW PS
]Direction by NC4 will be channel to the
lead sector and they will escalate the di-
rection to the agencies.
Do you think the scenario and infrastruc-
ture used in X Maya can be implemented
in your organisation?
[RE: SC ] The cyber exercise scenario
can easily be implemented in the organi-
zation. Only the way to fix the vulnerabil-
ities a bit difficult. [RE:ENV]Run on VM
with VPN. Using VM copied in thumb
drive and run in isolated area through the
cloud.
Do you plan to run your own cyber exer-
cise in your organisation?
No. [RS:LIMIT ] Not enough capability
and competency of people to run the ex-
ercise.
End of Table
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Appendix E
A Pilot Test Survey on C-Suite
Executive Checklist
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Appendix F
Online Organisation Cyber
Resilience Survey
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Appendix G
Post Hoc of Comparison Sectors
Result
Post hoc test results between the 10 CNII sectors 
 
Comparison OCR Between Sectors 
 
Mean 
Difference  
 
Std. 
Error 
 
Sig. 
 
Hypothesis 
p<0.05 
reject H0 
National 
Defence & 
Security 
(Group 1) 
Water 1.28728* .34083 .011 reject H0 
Energy 
(Group 2) 
Transportation 1.18772* .32590 .017 reject H0 
Water 1.71053* .36437 .000 reject H0 
Health Services 1.35965* .36437 .013 reject H0 
Emergency Service 1.39298* .38215 .017 reject H0 
Food & Agriculture 1.24561* .33262 .012 reject H0 
Banking & 
Finance 
(Group 3) 
Transportation 1.31930* .27022 .000 reject H0 
Water 1.84211* .31555 .000 reject H0 
Health Services 1.49123* .31555 .000 reject H0 
Emergency Service 1.52456* .33593 .001 reject H0 
Food & Agriculture 1.37719* .27829 .000 reject H0 
Information & 
Communication 
(Group 4) 
Transportation 1.16478* .26545 .001 reject H0 
Water 1.68758* .31148 .000 reject H0 
Health Services 1.33671* .31148 .002 reject H0 
Emergency Service 1.37004* .33211 .004 reject H0 
Food & Agriculture 1.22267* .27366 .001 reject H0 
Transportation 
(Group 5) 
Energy -1.18772* .32590 .017 reject H0 
Banking & Finance -1.31930* .27022 .000 reject H0 
Information & 
Communication 
-1.16478* .26545 .001 reject H0 
Water 
(Group 6) 
National Defence & 
Security 
-1.28728* .34083 .011 reject H0 
Energy -1.71053* .36437 .000 reject H0 
Banking & Finance -1.84211* .31555 .000 reject H0 
Government -1.42544* .34083 .003 reject H0 
Health Services 
(Group 7) 
Energy -1.35965* .36437 .013 reject H0 
Banking & Finance -1.49123* .31555 .000 reject H0 
Information & 
Communication 
-1.33671* .31148 .002 reject H0 
Government 
(Group 8) 
Water 1.42544* .34083 .003 reject H0 
Emergency 
Service 
(Group 9) 
Energy -1.39298* .38215 .017 reject H0 
Banking & Finance -1.52456* .33593 .001 reject H0 
Information & 
Communication 
-1.37004* .33211 .004 reject H0 
Food & 
Agriculture 
(Group 10) 
Energy -1.24561* .33262 .012 reject H0 
Banking & Finance -1.37719* .27829 .000 reject H0 
Information & 
Communication 
-1.22267* .27366 .001 reject H0 
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